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The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities
Regulation
Roberta Romano t
The U.S. regulation of derivative securities--financial instruments
whose value is derived from an underlying security or index of securities-is
distinctive from that (~f other nations because it has multiple regulators for
.financial derivatives and securities. Commentators have debated whether
shifting to the unitary regulator approach taken by other nations would be
more desirable and legislation to effect such a ~:hange has been repeatedly
introduced in Congress. But it has not gotten very far. This article analyzes
the political history of the regulation of derivative securities in the United
States, in order to explain the institutional difference between the U.S.
regime and other nations' and its staying power. It examines the j;JUr
principal federal regulatory initiatives regarding derivative securities (the
Future Trading Act of 1921, the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, and the Futures
Trading Practices Act (if 1992), by a narrative account of the legislative
process and a quantitative analysis (~f roll-call votes, committee-hearing
witnesses, and issue salience.
The multiple regulator status quo has persisted, despite dramatic
changes in derivative markets, repeated efforts to alter it (by the securities
industry in particular) and sh(fting political majorities, because of its
support by the committee organization of Congress and by a tripartite
winning coalition (if interest groups created by the 1974 legislation (farmers,
futures exchanges, and banks). In what can best be ascribed to historical
j;Jrtuity, different .financial market regulators are subject to the oversight (~f
different congressional committees, and, consequently, the establishment (~fa
unitary regulator would diminish the jurisdiction, and hence influence, ()f
one (if the congressional committees. The committee system is not, however,
a sufficient explanation because committees' jurisdiction can shift over time.
Jurisdiction over derivatives has not changed because (~f the stake tJ( the key
market players-the 1974 tripartite winning coalition-in its preservation
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and because the regulation (~{ derivatives is an issue (~{ low salience to the
public. In the absence (~{ a sustained large exogenous shock which could
ff)CUS public attention on the regulatory regime and could alter the
incentives (~{ the coalition partners to support it, we can predict with
considerable confidence that, regardless q change in administration or
congressional majority, the dispersed organization (if U.S. regulatory
institutions offinancial markets will remain.
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The regulation of financial markets in the United States is dispersed.
Securities are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
while derivatives on securities-financial instruments whose value is derived
from an underlying security or index of securities-are regulated by a variety
of agencies. Options on securities are regulated by the SEC; futures and
options on futures by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC);
and off-exchange-traded forward contracts, options, and swaps are typically
not subject to any federal regulation (unless undertaken by an institution
which is itself federally regulated, such as banks). This multiplicity of
regulatory authority has been the principal bone of regulatory contention for
decades, as regulators, interest groups and legislators have sought to shift
jurisdiction to their preferred agency. Even when a regulator does not object
to another's jurisdictional grab, market participants have contested the
agencies' authority to do so in court.
This Article analyzes the political history of futures regulation in the
United States in order to explain what would otherwise appear to be the
anomalous persistence of multiple financial market regulators in the United
States. The U.S. regulatory scheme for derivative securities is distinctive from
that of other nations, which have one regulator for both financial derivatives
and securities. While some commentators have contended that multiple
regulators foster efficient regulation, competition, and product innovation I ,
others have maintained that it would be desirable to have a single regulator, to
I. See. e.g.. Edward J. Kane, Regulatmy Structure in Futures Markets: Juri.wlictional
Competition between the SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agencies. 4 J. Fur. MARKETS 367 (19X4).
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reduce transaction costs for firms subject to multiple regulators and to
coordinate more effectively intermarket activity during crises, such as the
1987 stock market crash, if not prevent such scenarios' occurrence.2 Whether
to enhance social welfare or constituents' monopoly profits, legislation to
establish one financial market regulator has repeatedly been introduced in
Congress, and one version was advocated by the Bush Administration.3 Yet
such efforts have not gotten very far. The Article's analysis suggests why
fundamental change in regulatory organization has repeatedly been stymied
by the political process, despite revolutionary change in financial instruments
and markets.
The Article examines the four principal federal regulatory initiatives
regarding derivative securities. These initiatives are: 1) the Future Trading
Act of 1921, which initiated federal regulation; 2) the Commodity Exchange
Act of 1936, which extended the coverage of federal regulation; 3) the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, which established the
current institutional arrangement by creating the CFTC; and 4) the Futures
Trading Practices Act of 1992, which reconfirmed the regulatory status quo,
amid a panoply of new instruments. For each of the four initiatives, the
Article includes a quantitative analysis of controverted congressional votes
and, as a proxy for the exertion of interest group influence on the drafting
committees, an analysi~ of the witnesses called before congressional
committees in the years preceding legislation. It also provides an explanation
for why the issue came to the top of the legislative agenda and traces, as a
measure of issue salience, popular magazine coverage of commodities
markets and related topics over time.4 To the extent that the important
decisions are made behind closed committee doors rather than in roll-call
votes, in contexts of both attentive and inattentive publics,S the combination
of the three types of data analyses (roll-call votes, interactions between
~ommittees and witnesses, and indices of public opinion) will provide an
accurate account of interest groups' influence on policy-making regarding
derivatives.
2. See. e.g., Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and Uncertain
Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1431 (1991);
REPORT OF THE PRESIIlENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS (1988) [hereinafter BRADY
COMMISSION REPORT].
3. See Capital Market~ Competition, Stability, and Fairness Act of 1990, H.R. 5006 and S. 2814,
10 Ist Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990) (consolidating responsibility for all stock-related derivative securities in
the SEC, but leaving commodity futures to the CFTC); Market~ and Trading Reorganization and Reform
Act, H.R. 718, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (merging SEC a'1d CFTC); Market~ and Trading
Reorganization and Reform Act, H.R. 2550, 103d Cong.. 1st Sess. (1993) (same).
4. This technique ha.~ been used by political scientist~ to trace changes in popular sentiment
concerning a variety of public policy issues. See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES,
AGENIlAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 50-51 (1993). I also searched for public opinion poll
data a.~ a mea.~ure of issue salience, using the Roper Center data bank, which is available through Mead's
Nexis service. There wa.~ no polling on commodities trading issues, a tinding that is itself persua.~ive
evidence of the subject's low salience.
5. See R. DOUGLAS ARNow, THE U lGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 269-70 (1990).
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A key to understanding the persistence of multiple regulators of financial
instruments is found in our political institutions, in particular the
congressional committee system. By what is perhaps best ascribed to
historical fortuity, the CFTC (the regulator of futures contracts) is within the
oversight of the agriculture committees, while the SEC (the regulator of
securities) is within the oversight of the banking and commerce committees,
as are the federal regulators of banks (the Federal Reserve Board and the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency). Consequently, a merging of all
financial instruments into the domain of one regulator, such as the SEC,
would diminish the jurisdiction and hence the influence of the losing
regulator's congressional committee.
But committee jurisdiction, though important, is only a part of the story.
The jurisdiction of congressional committees expands and contracts over
time, through the efforts of skillful political entrepreneurs, when new issues
are presented.6 For example, Representative John Dingell was one of the most
able of such entrepreneurs, successfully expanding the jurisdiction of the
House Commerce Committee to include energy when it became a potent issue
in the 1970s; other issues over which the Commerce Committee obtained
jurisdiction include the regulation of insurance companies, international
sporting events, health policy, and automobile safety.? Moreover, because the
CFTC is a sunset agency that requires periodic congressional reauthorization,
parties dissatisfied with the regulatory outcome have repeated opportunities to
campaign for legislative redress. For instance, the SEC persistently contested
the CFTC's jurisdiction over financial derivatives during the agency's
congressional reauthorization proceedings from 1978 through 1992. In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, when institutional investors shifted their trading
from securities exchanges to cheaper futures markets, the securities industry
actively supported the SEC's efforts in order to increase their competitors'
costs.
Multiple financial regulators have persisted despite what would appear to
be excellent opportunities for an enterprising committee chairman to wrest
jurisdiction away from the Agriculture Committee: A mix of new products
and markets different from those envisioned by the enactors of the 1974
legislation establishing the CFTC, as well as an organized set of interests-
securities exchanges and firms~needing an alternative policy venue to
change the status quo. The status quo has survived in large part because key
players with well-cultivated connections to the agriculture committees and
who are traditional antagonists on futures legislation-the futures exchanges
and farm organizations-have jointly supported the current regulatory
arrangement against proposals to transfer authority over financial futures to
n. See David C. King, Committee Jurisdictions and Institutional Change in the U.S. House of
Representatives (1992) (un'published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan).
7. ld. at 4, 84-86, 97-100.
284
HeinOnline -- 14 Yale J. on Reg. 285 1997
The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation
the SEC. In addition, banks and their regulators also have a stake in
preserving the institutional balance due to the legislative agreement creating
the CFfC in 1974, which exempted banks' off-exchange derivative activities
from the CFTC's jurisdiction. This tripartite coalition of farm groups, future
exchanges and banks is difficult to overturn by mobilizing political support
because the regulation of derivative products is an issue of low salience to the
public.
The tripartite coalition, which cuts across party lines, has been able to
prevent the formation of potentially upsetting allegiances with the securities
industry that would alter the dispersed regulatory authority. The many access
points in our legislative process before a bill becomes a law further advantage
the status quo, as its supporters need only to succeed at anyone point in the
process to block change.8 Indeed, the 1992 legislation enacted in the wake of
the 1987 stock market crash, which briefly focused public attention on futures
markets and provided ammunition for the securities industry to advocate the
transfer of equity-based financial futures products to the SEC, left the
dispersed regulatory arrangement unaffected. Only an event on the order of a
financial crisis far more severe than the 1987 crash would enable the existing
regime's opponents (the securities industry and SEC) to split the winning
coalition or mobilize public support to overcome the coalition and produce a
different political equilibrium. In the absence of a sustained exogenous shock
which could focus public attention on the regulatory regime and alter the
incentives of the coalition partners, we can predict with considerable
confidence that, regardless of change in administration or congressional
majority, the dispersed organization of the regulatory institutions of financial
markets will remain unchanged.
I. The Origins of Federal Regulation of Futures: The Future Trading Act of
1921
Federal legislation regulating futures trading was enacted in August 1921.
The Future Trading Act imposed a prohibitive tax on grain flltures trading not
undertaken through a member of an authorized exchange (termed a "board of
trade" in the statute).9 The Secretary of Agriculture was given the authority to
designate authorized boards of trade upon evidence that the petitioning
exchange would comply with a series of statutory conditions, including
transaction record-keeping, prevention of market manipulation, and
admission of farm cooperatives as members. 10 As with most successful policy
IL These include the vote in committee. the vote in either chamber. the President's approval. ami
so forth. See JOHN R. WRIGHT. INTEREST GROUPS & CONGRESS 41i-47 (1996).
9. Future Trading Act. ch. 1I1i. 42 Stat. 1117 (Aug. 24. 1921).
10. The Supreme Court found the Future Trading Act to be an unconstitutional use of the taxing
power to regulate exchanges. See Hill v. Wallace. 259 U.S. 44 (1922). Following Justice Taft·s
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initiatives, I I there had been numerous efforts to place futures regulation on
the legislative agenda prior to the bill's passage. Several hundred bills, for
example, had been introduced to regulate, ban or prohibitively tax futures and
options trading between 1880 and 1920, and in the early 1890s one such bill
passed both chambers of Congress but wa<; not enacted. 12 The successful
legislation emerged after extensive hearings by the House Agriculture
Committee in 1921.
A. Economic Conditions on the Farm
From 1920 to 1921, the United States experienced its most severe
recession to that point, as real gross national product (GNP) fell 21 % from
1918 to 1921. 13 During World War I, U.S. agricultural production had
significantly increased as prices rose with booming export demand from war-
tom European countries. U.S. farmers expanded production into marginal
land and borrowed significantly to mechanize production, and this made them
quite vulnerable in an economic downturn. With the restoration of European
agricultural production at the end of the war, U.S. farm prices collapsed "in
the wake of bountiful harvests and the evaporation of European demand.',14
The collapse in farm prices wa<; accompanied by credit tightness due to
'Federal Reserve policy, creating a liquidity crisis for many farmers, evidenced
by increased foreclosure rates throughout the decade. IS
Moreover, declining product prices were not accompanied by a decline in
farm production input prices, thus shifting the terms of trade (also known as
the "parity ratio") against the farmer. 16 The decline in farm income from
declining food prices as demand dropped resulted in a decrease in land value
(which constituted the bulk of agricultural wealth). This led to the failure of
many small rural banks. 17 Not surprisingly, farm population declined
suggestion that the Supreme Court would not reject a similar scheme based on Commerce Clause
powers. see id. at 68-70, the statute wa~ immediately reenacted under Congress' regulatory authority
over interstate commerce in the Grain Futures Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) and upheld by the
Supreme Court. See Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. I (1923).
II. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUlILIC POLICY 122-23 (1984).
12. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FuTURES TRADING AND ITS
REGULATION 10 (1987). For a legislative history of the failed 1893 bill, see CEDRIC COWING, POPULISTS,
PLUNGERS AND PROGRESSIVES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF STOCK AND COMMODITY SPECULATION 1890-
1936. at 21 (1965).
13. JEREMY ATACK & PETER PASSELL, A NEW ECONOMIC VIEW OF AMERICAN HISTORY 565 (2d
ed. 1994).
14. ld. at 574. Wheat prices fell, for example, from a high of $2.58 per bushel to $.92 a bushel in
In I • and average net farm income decreased from $1,395 to $517 from 1919 to 1921.
IS. ld. at 574-75.
16. ld. at 574.
17. ld. at 576. Indeed. one commentator contends that the problem leading to political protest~ in
the InOs was the distress of rural bankers and merchants, not farmers themselves. See H. THOMAS
JOHNSON, AGRICULTURAL DEPRESSION IN THE InO's: ECONOMIC FACT OR STATISTICAL ARTIFACT? 167
(191<5). Walton and Rockoff also empha~ize farmers' credit problems, rather than income declines, as the
rea~on for farmers' political agitation in the I 920s. See GARY M. WALTON & HUGH ROCKOFF. HISTORY
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substantially throughout the 1920s-farm population fell by 1.5 million over
the decade while the U.S. population increased by 8 million-reflecting "the
declining economic opportunities" of rural farm Iife. IH The 1920 census wa<;,
in fact, the first to indicate that the urban population exceeded the rural
I · II)popu atlOn.
Futures markets were a political target of farmers' discontent because
they claimed there was a negative relationship between futures trading and
farm prices.20 With the onset of American involvement in World War I in
1917, the Wilson Administration had fixed the price of wheat, and the wheat
futures markets, accordingly, closed for the duration of the war. 21 The price
controls were lifted immediately upon the armistice and futures trading
resumed on July 15, 1920.22 As the price of wheat plunged with the war's
end, given the new market conditions, farmers attributed the decline to the
manipulative efforts of speculative short sellers on the boards of trade, rather
than to changes in supply and demand for their products. Hence they revived
their historical political agitation against futures trading, contending that
prices would be higher if such trading was banned or severely restricted.
Given the successful paradigm of federal government intervention in the
economy during World War 1,23 it was perhaps natural for them to tum to the
federal government to effect a wheat price increase. Some historians,
however, locate the idea of marketplace intervention as a unifying theme for
the diverse reform efforts of the Progressive Erll,24 rather than the nation's
OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 500-01 (7th ed. 1994). While Johnson may be correct concerning the
relative distress of local bankers compared to farmers in the agricultural protest~ of the 1920s. rural
bankers were not active in the fight against the commodity exchanges at the federal level. A~ indicated in
Table I, no banks testified against futures trading in any of the 1920s congressional hearings on the issue.
18. ATACK & PASSELL, supra note 13, at 575.
19. See JOHN M. HANSEN, GAINING ACCESS: CONGRESS AND THE FARM LoBBY, 1919-1981, at
26 (1991).
20. F\ltures contracts fix the price at which the underlying commodity will be sold at a specified
future date, and therefore enable contracting parties to hedge (that is, to shift their price risk): The futures
buyer limit~ his risk of a price rise above the contract price, while the seller limits her risk of a price
decline. In the agricultural context, millers buy futures, and grain elevators, the middlemen between
farmers and processors, sell futures, to hedge their price risk.
21. See COWING, supra note 12, at 84-85. If the market price of the commodity is fixed, there i~
no reason to enter into a futures transaction, as there is no longer any business uncertainty-no price
risk-and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) therefore shut down for the war. Wheat was the only
agricultural product whose price wa~ fixed. The price wa~ set at $2.20 a bushel in August 1917. What
started out a~ a price three times the average prewar price, ended up by the summer of 1918, however, a~
less than half of the open market price, to the chagrin of wheat farmers, who saw unregulated crop prices
surge. Cowing attributes Republican election successes in the 'Midwest in 1918 to their contention that
the Democrat~ favored colton (whose price was unregulated). Id. at 80.
22. Id. at 84.
23. Robert Higgs contends that World War I not only increased the scale but also permanently
increased the scope of government, a phenomenon that he terms the "ratchet effect" ROBERT HIGGS,
CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ISO-50
(1987).
24. See JOHN W. CHAMBERS, THE TYRANNY OF CHANGE: AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
1890-1920, at 132-40 (2d ed.1992).
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B. The Legislative Process
Without doubt, the severity of economic hard times in the farm belt25
increased the prospects of the 1920s advocates of futures regulation compared
to their nineteenth century predecessors. The 1920 election was a Republican
landslide. The new Republican majority in Congress was pressed by the
deteriorating agricultural economic conditions to do something for grain
farmers, a politically active group who had returned to the Republican fold
after years of supporting independent farm party candidates. In the 1922
elections, for instance, as the farm recession persisted, Republicans lost many
of the seats they had gained in 1920, including four Senate seats to farmer-
backed candid~tes.26
The Republicans' response to the farmers' plight proceeded at a rapid
pace after the election. There were three congressional committee hearings on
futures trading prior to the enactment of legislation, beginning shortly after
the new chamber wa" constituted in January 1921, on five bills, one of which
was sponsored by a committee member, and all of which were introduced by
representatives of farm states. After the Supreme Court's invalidation of the
1921 legislation, there were two further hearings in 1922 on the proposed
reenactment of the statute as an exercise of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause. These five hearings are the linchpin in understanding the
origins of the federal regulation of futures, given congressional committees'
critical role in the legislative process.
I. The Role of Committees
Congressional committees, positioned as guardians of all legislative
proposals within their policy jurisdictions, are the key formulators of
25. The 1880s and I890s, the years in which farm agitation against futures market~ began, were
also periods of low farm prices. Economic historians now believe that the farm political protests of those
decades were due more to disappointed expectations of agrarian prosperity compared to that of the urban
manufacturing sector, rather than actual distress. See ATACK & PASSELL, supra note 13, at 419-25. The
principal object~ of attack by farmers in that period were the railroads, and secondarily, moneylenders and
land speculators, not futures exchanges, and their Populist party platforms advocated railroad regulation,
antitrust legislation and unit banking reforms. See id. at 422, 424.
26. HANSEN, supra note 19, at 35. The Republican defeat is, however, attributed primarily to the
success of the Progressives over the GOP's old guard, rather than to the success of farmers. [d. at 36-37.
Indeed, Hansen traces the development of federal agrarian subsidy policies with the emergence of
national farm organizations as a potent political force in the late 1920s elections. Although Republican
losses in 1922 would be expected, independent of the fmmers' plight, by contemporary political scientist~
given the midterm election cycle (the President's party loses congressional seat~ in the midterm election),
the phenomenon was only becoming established at the time. See ALHERTO ALESINA & HOWARD
ROSENTHAL, PARTISAN POLITICS, DIVIIJED GOVERNMENT, AND THE ECONOMY 83 (1995) (President's
party loss of vote share in midterm elections a regularity since 1918).
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legislation?? When a bill is introduced, it is immediately referred to the
committee with control over its subject matter, and it will not reach the floor
until the committee relea<;es it. This role of the committee is referred to as a
screening or gatekeeping function, and it is the key to committees' power-
"the power to say no".2M Although there is a petitioning route for a majority of
the chamber to force a committee to release a bill (the discharge petition), it is
rarely used. In practice, committees have the ultimate say over whether a
proposal will see the light of day. The committee's power to withhold
legislation is more significant than its power to place legislation onto the
active agenda because the committee usually does not wield absolute control
over the legislation once it reaches the floor due to the vagaries of the
amendment process. 29 But committees do exercise control over the post-floor
progress of legislation by controlling the conference committee process
(referred to as an "ex post veto")-conferees are typically members of the
committee with original jurisdiction of the bill and conference reports are
often restricted to "up-or-down" votes. 30
How do committees develop expertise on policy proposals to be able to
use their strategic position in the legislative process to their advantage?
Committees hold hearings on potential and proposed legislation during which
they obtain input from interested parties, most frequently through their
professional representatives, registered lobbyist<;, who not only testify at
hearings but also attend committee meetings and provide information to
committee members and their stafe l While lobbyists and interest groups
control resources and can generate adverse publicity concerning members'
actions on legislation, there is, in fact, little evidence that lobbyists and the
interest groups they represent control Congress or a substantial proportion of
votes. 32
27. See, e.g., PAUL E. JOHNSON ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 441 (2d ed. 1990) ("With
rare ... exceptions, a bill ha~ no chance to pa~s unless it has the stamp of approval of a committee in
each house of Congress").
28. Id. Evidencing the importance of this power is the statistic provided by Johnson, et al. that "in
recent Congresses, less than 10% of all bills have made it out of committee." Id. at 442.
29. The exception is if the committee is granted a closed rule or other special order that limit~
amendment righl~. The use of restrictive rules has increa~d in recent years. See STANLEY BACH &
STEVEN S. SMITH, MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ADAPTATION AND
INNOVATION IN SPECIAL RULES 122 (l98X).
30. See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weinga~t, The Institutional Foundations of Committee
Power, 81 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 85 (1987).
31. Of course, considerable infonnation is available to members of Congress prior to a hearing.
See, e.g., WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES ANI> THE POLICY PROCESS 9X (3d ed.
19X9).
32. See JOHNSON ET AL.• supra note 27, at 459 (stating that "it is going too far to say that
[interestl groups are dominating Congress"): JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS
174 (3d ed. 19X<) (contending that interest groups have negligible influence on voting decisions unless
connected to congressman's district constituencies): LARRY SAHATO, PAC POWER: INSIDE THE WORLIl
OF POLITICAL ACrION COMMIlTEES 135-40 (19X4) (argoing that occasions on which PAC contributions
make a difference are few, and are on technical issues of low salience or issues on which the PAC
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There is, however, substantial evidence that legislators are more likely to
listen to proponents of views that they themselves favor33 and, more
important, that they are influenced by interest groups when the groups
represent their own local constituents.34 Legislators use interest groups to
obtain information on the potential consequences of policies, particularly
their effect" on constituents. Correspondingly, interest groups lose access and
influence-they are no longer relied on in hearings to formulate policy-when
they advocate policies not responsive to congressmen's constituents (that is,
policies that do not aid a congressman's reelection).35
Congressional committees may use hearings to further a partisan
legislative agenda rather than for informational purposes, since many other
avenues are available to legislators for obtaining information on policy issues
than committee hearings. The committee majority, for example, may use a
hearing to publicize its agenda and galvanize political support for legislation,
by stacking the hearing with witnesses whose position the majority favors. 36
This tactic may not always work, however, because a proposal emanating
from what is perceived to be a biased witness list may face difficulties later in
the legislative process by subjecting the committee to the charge that it has
not conducted a thorough or fair investigation.3?
Paralleling the divergent interpretations of the function of committee
hearings, there is also disagreement about the import of committee control
over the legislative process on policy outcomes. Political scientists have
traditionally viewed committees as consisting of self-selected members with
strong policy preferences on issues within their jurisdiction (whether due to
personal ideology or constituent interest), such that their location on the
relevant policy spectrum arrayed in a left-right ideological line will be an
outlier compared to the location of non-committee members.38 Committees
populated with such members are consistent with an "interest-advocacy-
accommodation syndrome,',39 and can produce legislation unrepresentative of
the interest of the population as a whole, represented by the preference of the
represent~ the legislator's constituent~); GRAHAM K. WILSON, INTEREST GROUPS 43-53 (1990)
(summarizing studies showing that importance of interest groups in American politics is overestimated).
33. See Christopher Z. Mooney, Putting It on Paper: The Content of Written Information Used in
State Lawmaking, 20 AM. POL. Q. 345,355-56 (1992).
34. See, e.g., HANSEN, supra note 19, at 12-15 (arguing that legislators rely on interest groups
when they aid in reelection goals such a~ providing communication channels to legislators' constituent~).
Because of this phenomenon, as Wright poinl~ out, interest groups use witnesses who are not
Wa.~hington-based lobbyist~ but are members located in the congressmen's district~. WRIGHT, supra note
X, at 41. 94.
35. HANSEN, supra note 19 at 15-16. The decline of the American Farm Bureau, from center
stage lobbyist in the 1930s and I 940s to a subsidiary role in the 1970s, in conjunction with it~ position in
favor of tlexible price support~ that divided Midwest and Southern farmers, is a prime example. See id. at
166-73.
36. See WRIGHT, supra note X, at 42.
37. Id.
3X. E.g.. KENNETH SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE (I 97X).
39. Id. at 231.
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full House. Such a scenario is possible because of the committees' gatekeeper
function: The committee keeps proposals that conflict with its
unrepresentative preferences from reaching the floor for a vote. The
committee will also be able to enact proposals that conflict with the
preferences of the majority when legislators follow a norm of reciprocity,
whereby the majority defers to committee proposals, despite the policy
preference disjuncture, in the expectation of logrolling (similar deference for
its own committees' work).4o Self-selected or preference-outlier committees
may be more prone to using hearings for advocacy than for informational
purposes.
An alternative interpretation of the institutional function of committees,
and one that has recently received increased attention among political
scientists, emphasizes the organizational need for information and postulates
majority control of committee membership selection.41 On this view, the
majority delegates power to committees in order to induce members to
develop policy expertise on which the m~ority can rely. But the majority does
so only to the extent that the committees are representative of the majority's
preferences. While majority-controlled committees may also use hearings to
mobilize support for their legislative preferences, this explanation of the
committee system is most consistent with an informational use of hearings.
2. The Hearings on Futures Trading
The five hearings on futures trading during 1921-22 occupied forty days,
with a total of 139 witnesses.42 Table I aggregates witnesses by type and
general position (in support of or against federal regulation). As the Table
confirms, the prime supporters of the legislation were farm organizations and
their congressional representatives (27 of 45 witnesses who favored
legislation). Administration officials also testified in support of legislation.
The opponents were members of the grain trade (elevator operators, grain
40. See Barry R. Weinga~t & WiUiam Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress, 96 J.
POL. ECON. 132 (1988).
41. See, e.g., KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 4-7, 15-19
(1991). A variant on the infonnational hypothesis of committee composition is that the majority
controlling the committee is the majority party, not the chamber majority. See GARY W. COX & MATHEW
D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTYG(WERNMENTINTHEHOUSE 161 (1993).
42. The hearings took place in the House in January-February 1921, April-May 1921 and June
1922; and in the Senate in May·Jun·e 1921 and July 1922. There wa~ a third hearing in 1922 in the Senate
to consider bilL~ extending regulation to cotton futures trading (which spanned across January, February,
March and June); this hearing is not included in the witness tabulations because, a~ noted in the text
following notes 90 and 133 infra, cotton wa~ not included in either the 1921 or 1922 legislation. The
number of individuals testifying is 82: 23 individuals testified at more than one hearing. with two
witnesses, a member of the grain trade and an employee of the Department of Agriculture, testifying at all
live hearings. Of the witnesses speaking at more than one hearing, eight represented exchanges, live the
gmin industry, three farm groups, three were Department of Agriculture officials, three were members of
Congress and one wa~ a state official, representing a lotal of ten supporting and thirteen opposing
witnesses. Tallying the witnesses for and against by individual rather than by hearing, Congress heard 25
witnesses for, and 70 witnesses against, the proposed legislation to regulate futures market~.
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dealers, millers) as well as the exchanges (80 of 94 witnesses who opposed
legislation). At four of five hearings, the opponents of regulation substantially
outnumbered the proponents; the exception is the second 1921 House
hearing, in which the two sides were about equally represented because the
committee allocated three days of testimony to 'each side rather than follow
the first hearing's procedure by which all interested parties were permitted to
testify.43 The restriction on witnesses was a function of the influence on the
committee of the legislation's advocates, who had repeatedly objected during
the initial hearing to having to endure the testimony of the legislation's
numerous opponents and who characterized their desire to testify as a
delaying tactic.44
Farm groups sought far more restrictive regulation of futures trading than
what was eventually enacted. In particular, they proposed either abolishing
futures markets' entirely or eliminating speculation by requiring· futures
transactions to be undertaken solely by individuals with an equivalent cash
market position, thus limiting the use of futures contracts to hedgers. Their
rationale was that speculators' activities manipulated and depressed cash
prices, causing them to fluctuate unduly.45 In support of this contention, they
cited the huge discrepancy between the quantity of wheat underlying the
number of futures contracts traded and the actual cash supply of the crop.46
Farm witnesses and their allies on the committee attacked speculators as
"predatory para<;ites,,,47 thieves, gamblers, and wealthy individuals who "live
like lords and ride in high-powered automobiles and live in great
residences.,,48 The record is also replete with moralistic proclamations against
gambling, which exchange opponents equated with speculating.49 This is not
43. The number of witnesses for and against the legislation by hearing in chronological order and
by chamber were, for the House, 17 to 55, and then 15 to 12, in 1921 and I to 3 in 1922; and for the
Senate, 8 to 16 in 1921 and 4 to 8 in 1922.
44. See, e.g., Future Trading, Hearings Before House Comm. on Agriculture, 66th Cong., 3d
Sess. 128 (1921) [hereinafter Futures Hearings I] (statement of Rep. Hulings); id. at 722 (statement of
Rep. McLaughlin).
45. See id. at 17 (statement of C.H. Hyde, Farmers' Union of Oklahoma) ("[Farmers] believe that
there has been a movement, by concerted action on the part of those that have dealings on the board of
trade, to force the market down early after the harvest season, on account of the credit conditions the
most of the farmers, growing cereals as well as cotton, having to sell their crops immediately.")
46. See id. at 80 (statement of William Eckhardt, Director, Illinois Agricultural Association, a
farmers' organization affiliated with the American Farm Bureau Federation) ("We are told from the
report~ that approximately 600,000,000 bushels of grain actually passed through Chicago.... (T)he
speculative trading of that market amount~ to a figure ... 40 times as much as the actual grain that goes
through.... It does not seem as though the farmer gets much good from it. ... The point I am making,
gentlemen, is: Does not this tremendous volume of speculation push the price away beyond the point it
would go if the true law of supply and demand were maintained.")
47. Id. at 63 (statement of C.S. Barrett, President, National Farmers Union).
48. Id. at 47 (statement of Rep. Tincher).
49. See e.g., Future Trading, Hearings Be/tire House Comm. on Agriculture, 67th Cong., 1st
Sess. 17 (1921) [hereinafter Futures Heurings II] (statement of Rep. Tincher) ("The principle of this
legislation has been conceded by everyone for years, that is, that gambling is a moral wrong in the United
States, pure unadulterated gambling is wrong, ami why it should be tolerated with reference to foou
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an unusual strategy. Lipset contends that a quintessential American
characteristic is the definition of political issues and conflicts in ethical terms,
in which political dramas are seen as morality plays.5o
But even if farmers found gambling more reprehensible than did other
citizens, the gist of the farmers' grievance wa<; decidedly material not moral.
One rea<;on for farmers' impassioned opposition was that the grain exchanges
were established to facilitate the transactions of middlemen and millers, and
few farmers used futures contracts to hedge their crop price risk in the 1920s.
The following interchange during the legislative debate illustrates this point-
the economic rather than moral ba<;is of the farmers' opposition to futures
trading---quite succinctly:
Mr. McKenzie: My understanding of this bill is that its purpose is to
make it possible for the producer of grain to get a better price for his
product, and that it is not the purpose of this bill simply to abolish
gambling on account of its immorality or to assume the character of
an agent of morality.
Mr. Tincher [the bill sponsor]: The gentleman is entirely correct. 51
Consider as well the telling testimony of the Secretary of Agriculture,
Henry Wallace, concerning the use of private wires. In order to facilitate
trading, brokerage firms and agents lea<;ed their own telephone and telegraph
wires in rural areas that connected them to the exchanges, or their offices in
the cities in which exchanges were located. The Tincher bill proposed
prohibiting these wires. Wallace suggested that the prohibition be eliminated
because the individuals using the wires were "small fellows," "mostly the
suckers" who provided valuable buying power because they expected food
prices to rise and therefore "do not cause the evils of which we complain.,,52
Moreover, in discussing the elimination in his revised bill of a provision
limiting futures trades to three times the amount of actual grain because of
objections that it might facilitate cornering the market, Representative
Tincher stated: "[B]eing from a producing section, I never feared a comer,
because that invariably has raised the price, but, wanting to be fair to the
consumer, I was willing to abandon that proposition.,,53 To put it mildly, the
products and not tolerated in other particulars I can not conceive"); see id. at 65 (statement of Rep.
Strong) ("It is gambling, pure and simple, in the foodstuffs of the Nation. You can not make anything else
out of it.")
50. See SEYMOUR M. LIpSlIT, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUIILE-EDGED SWORD 2X. 63
(1996).
51. 61 CONGo REC. 1314 (1921).
52. Futures Hearings ll, supra note 49, at 329 (testimony of Henry C. Wallace, Secretary of
Agriculture). The Secretary tenned this taking the "business" rather than the "moral" standpoint.
53. Futures Hearings I, supra note 44, at 12 (statement of Rep. Tincher). Representative Tincher
acknowledged that his goal was to protect producers, but maintained that it was fair to consumers
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enforcement of a public morality disapproving of gambling had little to do
with the motivation of prominent supporters to restrict futures trading. Rather,
rent-seeking-using the political system to redistribute wealth to farmers from
the grain trade, the by now hated middlemen who were the backbone of the
futures exchanges-is a more accurate description of the objective of the
legislation's proponents.
Grain trade witnesses, who opposed restrictions on futures trading, spent
most of their time explaining hedging strategies and the need for speculators
to provide liquidity to commercial hedgers, and distinguishing speculation
from gambling.54 They empha<;ized that a high ratio of futures contracts to
cash crop was to be expected because a bushel of grain is handled numerous
times as it is sold from producer to elevator to shipper to processor, and each
side of each transaction in the chain hedges.55 Exchange witnesses testified
similarly, seeking to explain why market manipulations involve upward and
not downward price movements.56 Their explanation was that substantial
capital is required to finance the cash market purchases necessary to succeed
in a downward market manipulation, whereas in upward price manipulation
no such capital is required, because the requisite cash market conditions-
commodity shortages-often occur naturally, such as after a natural dis.aster.
Economic theory and empirical research support the analyses of the
opponents of the legislation, in that both formal models and empirical studies
indicate that the farm groups' assumption that speculation produces
artificially low and increasingly volatile cash prices is incorrect.57
Nevertheless, even if the more sophisticated contemporary literature had been
available in the 1920s, it is doubtful that the legislation's proponents would
have listened and altered their views on futures trading. This conclusion is
suggested by the behavior of congressional supporters of the legislation, who
on a number of occasions spent their time questioning the integrity of the
opposing witnesses rather than addressing their analyses of the issues.
For example, the one witness with an academic background in the
hearings, a professor of agricultural economics, was subject to very few
questions, virtually none of which concerned the substance of his remarks. He
was instead questioned on how many copies of his book on speculation were
because legislation that protecL~ producers also protecL~ consumers, implying that higher food prices
were in the consumers' interest. See id. at 10-11.
54. For an examination of changing attitudes to gambling, particularly in relation to the expanding
legitimation of commercial speculation and the futures exchanges' redirection of attacks on "gambling"
speculators into attacks on "counterfeit" speculators who traded in bucket shops, see generally ANN
FAilIAN, CARD SHARKS, DREAM BOOKS AND BUCKET SHOPS (1990).
55. See, e.,~., Future Trading in Grain, Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Agriculture and
Forestry, 1\7th Cong., 1st Sess. 202-ml (1921) [hereinafter Future Trading in Grain] (statement of
George T. McDermott, attorney for Kansas Grain Dealer's Association).
51\. See. e.g., Futures Hearings ll, supra note 49, at 157 (statement of Joseph P. Griftin,
President, CBOT).
57. For a textbook explanation, see FRANKLIN R. EDWARDS & CINDY W. MA, FuTURES AND
OPTIONS 173-75 (1992).
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bought by the CBOT.5x In addition, bill sponsors challenged the truthfulness
of individuals who stated they were farmers but testified against the proposed
regulation, and questioned whether they were truly in the business of
farming. 59 One congressman even suggested that the opponents of the
legislation "might just as well register their names [with the Committee] and
the positions they occupy" rather than waste everyone's time by testifying. 60
While not all committee members had closed minds or supported the most
intrusive regulatory proposals, they all came from agrarian districts and were
well aware of the financial pain back home. It takes no great political insight
to recognize that a congressman's failure to act against individuals
(speculators) who were perceived by agitated voters (farmers) to be
scoundrels, just because some economists thought that what the scoundrels
did was socially beneficial, would not have been a winning political strategy.
. This narrative of the testimony on futures trading suggests that despite
the House Committee's apparent informational, rather than partisan, approach
to its witness list-a higher number of opponents than proponents testified in
most of the hearings-the members had a focused policy objective in mind
from the start, assisting farmers by regulating futures markets. This raises the
question whether the committee members were ideologically representative of
the chamber majority in placing futures trading legislation on the agenda.
When the general ideological preferences for economic regulation of the
committee and the chamber are compared, however, the results are consistent
with the informational, rather than self-selection, hypothesis concerning
committee composition: The Agriculture Committee was not an outlier
committee. 61 This finding is consonant with an investigation by Poole and
58. See Futures Hearings I, supra note 44, at 646 (statement of Rep. Tincher).
59. See, e.g., Futures Hearings II, supra note 49, at 227 (statement of Rep. Tincher, questioning
Charles Kenning, President, Minnesota Farmers' Grain Dealers Association, concerning farm
organizations to which he belonged); Futures Hearings I. supra note 44, at 275-83 (statement of Rep.
Tincher, questioning cotton grower E.A. Calvin, concerning the names and addresses of farmers who
a~ked him to testify, who paid his expenses to testify, and for whom he worked). A~ Table I indicates,
there were very few such individuals.
60. See Futures Hearings I, supra note 44, at 723 (statement of Rep. McLaughlin).
61. The variable used to measure ideological preference is the Poole and Rosenthal first dimension
d-nominate score, which is described at note 84 infra, and in the accompanying text. The median tirst
dimension score of the House committee is insigniticantly different from the median score of the non-
committee members (.247 compared to .265, respectively). Because the median voter determines
legi.~lative outcomes when the issue space is one-dimensional, the median score is the appropriate
comparison. Krehbiel examines committee-chamber differences in mean, a~ well a~ median, ideological
scores. to examine committee representativeness. See Krehbiel, supra note 41, at 123-28. (The
committee members are excluded from the chamber in the calculation of chamber statistics.) The mean
first dimension scores are also not significantly different (.1 14 for the committee compared to .1 17 for the
chamber). A~ a final test, Krehbiel compares the variance in committee and chamber preferences to
determine whether a committee is more homogeneous than the chamber (statistically mea~ured by a lower
variance in d-nominate score). and therefore likely to reach a bipartisan consensus. Such a committee,
Krehbiel argues, is more consistent with an outlier committee hypothesis because a heterogeneous
committee ha~ legislators on both sides of the policy spectrum, and therefore will be more representative
of the chamber. The variance test is also useful to distinguish what he terms a bipolar outlier committee,
which will have a mean insignificantly different from the chamber mean but a higher variance than the
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Rosenthal of the representativeness of committees for the first 100
Congresses. They find that prior to 1946, there were very few outlier
committees.62
3. Output of the Process: The Final Bill
The final legislation, however, might welI have been tempered by the
explanation by the bill's opponents of the economic benefits of hedging.
Representative Tincher revised his bill following the first hearing to permit
unlimited futures trading by persons in the grain or milling business (in
contrast to his original limitation of futures trading to three times the amount
of actual grain) and insisted that his bill did not prevent speculation, a~
opposed to gambling.63 But it is equally, if not more, plausible that these
revisions were pragmaticalIy made to obtain the necessary votes for
enactment, rather than out of an intellectual conviction of the benefits of
futures trading. The opponents of the legislation had employed a two-track
strategy, alternating between opposing all regulation and proposing changes
to the Tincher bill, which was the lea~t draconian bill before the comrilittee, to
mold it more to their liking.
The efforts of the opponents of regulation to weaken, as opposed to defeat
entirely, the legislation were on the whole successful. The statute incorporated
many of their proposals, including elimination of the restriction on trading to
participants in the grain industry (adopting instead the exchange-trading
requirement). In fact, it is reported that the CBOT did not bring the initial
lawsuit challenging the statute's constitutionality because it had been actively
involved in drafting the compromise that took the bite out of the farm groups'
proposals; it left the legal challenge to be undertaken by individual
members.64 When the Future Trading Act wa~ promptly reenacted as a
regulation of interstate commerce, substantively unchanged after its
invalidation by the Supreme Court, the CBOT brought the legal challenge
itself as it was not active in the 1922 deliberative process.
The CBOT did obtain some benefit for its members from the compromise
chamber. The variances in the first dimension scores are not significantly different (.094 for the committee
compared to .119 for the chamber). Thus, on all of Krehbiel's tests, the agriculture committee was a
representative committee, consistent with the infonnational theo"ry of committees. The outlier theory of
committee preferences is theoretically based on preferences regarding agricultural policy, and the d-
nominate score is, of course, not such a mea~ure. The general ideological preference it captures is,
however, relevant here because the principal feature of the Future Trading Act wa~ an important non-
agricultural ideological issue, government intervention in private business.
fl2. KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-EcONOMIC HISTORY OF
ROLL CALL VOTING 185-86 (1997). The agriculture committee is one of the committees that is often an
outlier committee in post-194fl Congresses.
fl3. See Futures Hearings ll, supra note 49, at fl, 12-13 (statement of Rep. Tincher).
M. Jonathan Lurie, Regulation of the Comnwdities Exchanges in the 1920s: The Legacy of Self-
Government, in FARMERS, BUREAUCRATS, AND MIDDLEMEN 233, 249, 253-54 (Trudy H. Peterson ed.,
1980).
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legislation. The substitution of the exchange-trading requirement provided
greater certainty to the speculative trade, as grain speculators might not have
been considered in the grain industry, the qualification for avoiding taxation
in the original bill. In addition, the legislation rid the organized exchanges of
competition for the business of individual traders from "bucket shops."
Bucket shops were off-exchange enterprises in the business of taking bets on
commodity prices. They undercut the exchanges because they had much
lower operating costs-they did not operate a cash market or place and
execute contract orders for the underlying a<;sets, but instead used board of
trade prices to payoff customers who won their bets and to take money from
those who lost. 65 The 1921 legislation was perceived as putting bucket shops
out of business, because they would not meet the statutory criteria for
designation by the Secretary of Agriculture as a contract market.
C. Saliency ofFutures Trading: Tracking Public Opinion
The intensity of opinion of committee witnesses and congressmen
concerning the regulation of futures markets was apparently not shared by the
public. It is well established that for technical, uncontroverted issues of low or
invisible salience to the public, the views of the subset of the population who
are immediately affected by the issue will substantially influence the making
of public policy.66 Under these circumstances, policy-making will produce.
outcomes that are an equipoise among competing interest groups, or are
captured by one group with a strong stake in the policy where there are no
other equally interested, organized groups.
In order to measure issue salience (that is, public interest in futures
markets regulation), I tracked article entries on a number of related topics in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, following an approach of
political scientists for gauging changes in public sentiment over time. 67 As
65. When winning bets were numerous, the bucket shops typically ftIed for bankruptcy or
disappeared. The exchanges attempted to prevent bucket shops from using their quotes, contending that
the quotes were protected proprietary information, but they achieved only mixed success in the court~.
Many agrarian states, however, enacted legislation prohibiting bucket shops as gambling.
66. See, e.g., JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 406; SABATO, supra note 32, at 135-37
(discussing "invisibility" rule).
67. See BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 4. I searched for entries under the following words:
futures, commodity (grain! wheat! cotton! produce), commodity (grain! wheat! cotton/ produce)
exchanges, exchanges, Boards of Trade, bucket shops, commission merchants, speculation, trade and
trading; a~ well as the entries under the more general topics of Congress, agriculture, Department of
Agriculture, grain, and gambling. Baumgartner and Jones track sentiment by whether the entries (article
titles) evoke positive or negative images of the relevant industry, which is translatable into support for or
opposition to the regulation of the industry. See id. at 48-50. Their approach turns out to be infea~ible for
studying futures regulation because almo.~t all of the article titles were neutral and could not be cla~sitied
a.~ either positive or negative. I read the articles on commodity exchanges to determine a classification,
and most of these were best classified a~ "neutral." I also read the entries under "speculation," when the
titles were ambiguous, in order to determine whether they covered stock or commodity trading. In
addition, I read all agricultural entries involving political activities to determine whether they concerned
futures trading legislation. The other topics were tracked simply by number, a~ a gauge of public interest
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Table 2 indicates, there was very little media coverage of the grain futures
industry during the 1920s (and earlier). There were no specific entry topics in
these Guide volumes for futures exchanges or futures trading, and very few
articles on individual exchanges or futures trading under other entry topics,
such as grain or wheat trade. Moreover, of the entries involving grain futures
trading, only one could be characterized as an article critical of the industry
from its title, Grilling the Grain Gamblers, and it was actually an article
favorable to the industry.6~ Far more attention was directed at the stock
market than the grain exchanges. This gap in media interest parallels the
disparate level of public participation in these markets. The pattern is also
reflected in the other entries: All but one of the twenty-three articles under the
heading "speculation" discussed stock, as opposed to commodity, trading.
These data indicate convincingly that there wa<; no heightened interest in
futures trading at the time Congress acted compared to prior and subsequent
periods; in fact, little popular attention was paid to futures markets at all.
Agricultural topics were, however, quite widely reported in periodicals.
Only a few of the many subheadings under agriculture are tracked in Table 2,
those explicitly related to economic conditions or political activities. The
attention paid to agriculture is several orders of magnitude greater than that
directed to futures trading. Popular interest in the farm situation clearly
increased over time, as agrarian economic conditions deteriorated. Moreover,
a<; farmers began to organize, their political activities also became a subject of
interest. For instahce, the congressional "farm bloc," which was formed in
1921, was referred to in nineteen articles in the volume covering 1922-24;
there were no such entries in the prior volume. In addition, a sub-heading
under "farmers" entitled "political activities" began in the volume covering
1919-21, and the subheading "farm relief' under the heading "U.S.
Agriculture" first appeared in the 1925-28 volume (several years after the
Future Trading Act wa<; enacted). None of the entries on farmers' political
activities or the farm bloc contained a reference to futures trading issues in
their titles; a reading of the articles confirmed that they did not discuss grain
futures legislation.
These data make plain that the rea<;on for the absence of articles on
commodity futures trading was not an absence of public interest in the
economic situation or political activities of farmers. Rather, the public simply
was not interested in, or concerned about, futures markets. I am therefore
confident in concluding that futures trading was an issue of low salience in
1921.
The paucity of reporting in the popular media on futures markets
and issue salience. This provides a useful measure of issue salience independent of a~sessing changes in
the industry's image. For a more detailed breakdown of Guide entries, see ROBERTA ROMANO, THE
POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF DERIVATIVE SECURITIES REGULATION tbl. 2 (Yale Law School, Program in
Civil Liability Working Paper No. 203, 1996).
6X. See Grilling the Grain Gamblers, LITERARY DIG., Feb'. 12, 1921, at 12.
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regulation does not mean that political elites did not follow the issue. The
New York Times did report on the progress of the bill, publishing reports on
the hearings that emphasized the testimony of opposition witnesses. This need
not indicate sympathy for the exchanges' position, as the opponents of
legislation were more numerous than its proponents. The New York Times did
not, however, run exposes on speculators in futures markets or on the
activities of grain exchanges, items of the sort to be useful in mobilizing
public sentiment in support of the proposed legislation. In addition, the Times
did not publish any editorials on the legislation.
The Wall Street Journal's coverage of the futures trading legislation was
even more abbreviated than that of the New York Times. A search of Chicago
and other farm belt newspapers69-papers not read by national political elites
but published in locales where futures trading would be expected to be of
greater local interest-also did not reveal much coverage in the months
surrounding the legislative process. Although they did mention the bill and
report sparingly on its progress, these newspapers focused more on other
issues of interest to farm organizations, such as tariff legislation.
While I have no measure with which to gauge whether the coverage of the
futures trading bill was typical of the New York Times' congressional
coverage,70 it is probable that at least some subset of the readership of the
Times (which was then a Republican newspaper), such as the stock
exchanges, financial institutions and the largest grain exporters, which were
based in New York and used futures markets,7l wa" leery of the legislation. It
is possible, for instance, that the stock exchanges saw themselves as a
potential future target. The New York financial community wa" in all
likelihood opposed to government intervention in markets, and the bill's
progress would have therefore been of some interest to them. In fact, their
representatives tended to oppose the legislation along with representatives of
states with major futures exchanges (see Table 3).
The key finding, then, is that the national media paid almost no attention
to futures markets. The elite media wa" only slightly more attentive. Policy-
making regarding futures trading wa" thus left to congressmen responding to
69. Gina Raimundo. Yale Law School class of 199H. provided excellent research aoisistance by
reading the Chicago Tribune, Daily Oklahoman and New Orleans Time Picayune fann belt papers
available at Yale University. for the months of the hearings on the grain futures legislation in 1921 and
1922. It is possible that news stories unfavorable to exchanges appeared in earlier years in the fann belt
papers or the New York Times and were not referenced by report~ covering the legislation, but this does
not seem to be a plausible scenario. In 19H9, for example, a scandal involving the Chicago exchanges
resulted in articles "dredging up" old scandals as well. Sel' LEO MELAMED, ESCAPE TO THE FuTURES 392
(1996).
70. I doubt whether the coverage was particularly unusual. In their study of media coverage of a
variety of issues, Baumgartner and Jones found little difference between the Readers' Guide and the New
York Times as an indicator of trends in public sentiment, although the Time.~ covered government actions
more fully than the periodicals in the Guide. See BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 4, at 25H.
71. See Futures Hearings I, supra note 44, at 46H (statement of L.W. Forbell, New York Produce
Exchange).
299
HeinOnline -- 14 Yale J. on Reg. 300 1997
The Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 14:279, 1997
the interest groups most immediately affected (farmers and exchanges),
without being subject to the more thorough public scrutiny that accompanies
high salience issues.
D. Analysis (~f the House VrJte on the Future Trading Act
The Future Trading Act of Inl passed the House by a sweeping margin
of 269 to 69 (92 not voting).72 It wa" adopted by the Senate without a
recorded vote. The House vote on the bill's passage wa" the only roll-call vote
taken by either chamber during deliberations on both the 1921 and 1922
statutes. One plausible explanation for the absence of a roll-call in the Senate
involves institutional logrolling. The legislation's consideration appears to
have been part of an agreement between the Republican leadership and farm
state senators, known as the "farm bloc," who agreed. to support the
leadership's motion to adjourn only after the Senate passed a series of
pending farm bills.73
The vote distribution in the House, by party and by region, is indicated in
Table 3. The regional differences are striking and significant.74 The
opposition wa" based in the manufacturing states of the North (New England
and Northeast regions). The support came from the farm states (South,
Border, West and Midwest-which, pursuant to the U.S census convention, is
subdivided into West North Central and East North Central regions). The
exception is Illinois (location of the major futures exchanges), whose
representatives voted against the legislation by a two-to-one ratio (14 to 7).
The vote on the bill wa" not a "party" vote as defined in the political
science literature because a majority of both parties supported the
legislation,75 but the difference ·in voting across parties is significant.
Although they were the majority party, Republicans opposed the legislation
more, and Democrat" supported it more, than would be predicted if voting
were random across parties (59 Republicans and 10 Democrats voted no,
compared to 170 Republicans and 98 Democrats voting yes).76 Controlling
for region, the votes differ significantly by party only in the Midwest and
72. 61 CONGo REC. 1429 (1921).
73. The farm bloc first became active when it helped to defeat the leadership's adjournment
motion because their bills would otherwise not be on the agenda; this vote led to the agreement referred
to in the text, between the Republican leadership, President Harding and the farm bloc senators, in which
they agreed to support the recess in exchange for a chamber vote on six pending farm bills. See HANSEN,
supra note 19, at 31. After this victory, the bloc accomplished nothing else in the session, and it was not
reorganized during the next Congress. See id. at 32.
74. The chi-square of the contingency table cross-tabulating votes by region ha~ a value of 57.9
(six degrees of freedom) and is significant at less than .00 I.
75. A pUlty vote is defined in the literature a~ one in which "a majority of one party [is] opposed
to a majority of the other party." JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? 305 n.19 (1995).
70. The chi-square for the contingency table cross-tabulating votes by party ha~ a value of 12.21<
(one degree of freedom), which is significant at less than .00 I.
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Northeast, the geographical bases of the opposition to the Act's passage.77
This suggest<; that the party effect relates to differences in the constituent
interests represented.
Standard multivariate econometric techniques can be used to analyze the
roll-call vote, to identify better the relationship among party, region and
voting behavior, and to probe more deeply the sources of political support for,
and opposition to, the legislation. I performed a logit regression of the House
vote to explain the probability that a congressman voted for or against the
legislation as a function of the influence of interest groups and legislator
ideology.78 In doing so, I followed the two-stage approach of Kalt and Zupan
to parcel out the effect on a representative's vote attributable to constituent
preferences, as opposed to personal ideology.79 This technique first regresses
the measure of the congressman's ideology on a set of district-level
constituent variables (using ordinary least squares), and then uses the
predicted and residual values of this ideology decomposition regression as the
regressors in the logit regression of the roll-call vote, along with variables
proxying for the specific interest groups affected by the legislation. The idea
is that the predicted values of the ideology decomposition indicate how the
legislator would vote based on the preferences of his constituents, wherea<; the
residuals-which are uncorrelated with the constituent variables-measure the
legislator's personal ideology independent of constituent influences.
A common criticism of the Kalt and Zupan technique is that when the
decomposition regression is not weIl-specified, any statistical significance of
the residuals in the regression on congressional votes may be better explained
a<; indicating missing explanatory variables of constituent preferences, rather
than as evidencing the impact of personal ideology on voting behavior.80
Exacerbating the specification problem is the difficulty that, to the extent a
successful (that is, reelected) legislator's personal preferences coincide with
the economic interests or preferences of his constituents, the two wiIl not be
distinguishable. 81 While there is no general solution to the specification issue
77. Controlling for region, the significance test used wa~ either Fisher's exact test (for tables with
fewer than forty observations) or the continuity-adjusted chi-square test (for tables with over forty
observations) because too many of the cells in the tables had expected frequencies fewer than five to use
the standard chi-square test. See SIDNEY SIEGEL & N. JOHN CASTELLAN, JR., NONPARAMETRIC
STATISTICS 123 (2d ed. 1988).
78. For the functional form of the logit regression, see, for example, ROBERT S. PlNllYCK &
DANIEL L. RUBINFELll, ECONOMETRIC MODELS & ECONOMIC FORECASTS 258-63 (3d ed. 1991).
79. See Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of
Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1984).
80. See, e.g., PETER VAN DOREN, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY CHOICES
93-94 (1991); John E. Jackson & John W. Kingdon, Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative
Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 805, 813 (1992). Jackson and Kingdon further criticize the use of voting
indexes as an ideology variable, but they do not provide a superior quantitative measure: They suggest
the use of interviews of legislators, and legislators' speeches and writings. These data are not only
impractical to obtain on a systematic basis but also fraught with classification difticulties.
81. See Keith T. Poole, Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Votinx in thl' U.S.
Conxress. 13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 117. 127-2X (I'!XX).
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(putting aside data limitations regarding district constituent characteristics,
we have no good theory of what specific constituent characteristics determine
a legislator's election), recognizing these criticisms of Kalt and Zupan's
approach, I also report the results of vote regressions using as explanatory
variables the undecomposed measure of legislator ideology and the general
constituent variables.
A final problem for either the two-stage Kalt and Zupan technique or the
approach directly including all of the variables is that if legislators form
coalitions that engage in long-term logrolling, variables that identify
contemporaneous constituent interests may not successfully explain particular
votes. ~2 For example, if urban district representatives vote for farm subsidy
programs in exchange for rural district representatives voting for Food Stamp
programs over many sessions of Congress, farm constituent variables may not
be significant in regressions on the farm subsidy program votes. As with other
voting studies, this is a caveat to interpreting the results because the analysis
cannot control for such an effect.~3
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the regression variables. The
ideology variable is the Poole and Rosenthal d-nominate score, which
identifies legislators' preferences by a multidimensional scaling technique
applied to all roll-call votes in the specified Congress.~4 D-nominate(1), the
82. See Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Congress and Railroad Regulation: 1874 to 1887,
in THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 81, 96-97 (ClaUdia
Goldin & Gary D. Liebcap eds., 1994) [hereinafter Congress and Railroad Regulation].
83. For an effort to try to identify coalitions from a regression analysis of several votes in the 93d
Congress-and thereby to separate out the influence of ideology on voting-by using a two-stage
technique similar to the Kalt and Zupan technique, see James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Self-Interest,
Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting, 21 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1979).
84. See Keith Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Patterns 4 Congressional Voting, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI.
228 (1991) [hereinafter Patterns of Congressional Voting]. The term stands for dynamic nominal three-
step estimation. The statistical procedure identifying the d-nominate scores assumes a spatial theory of
legislator preferences that are single-peaked over the issue dimensions recovered. The statistical
technique essentially recovers the dimensions that account for the same people voting together
repeatedly. The dynamic component of the estimation process estimates the legislators' preferences over
all of the roll-call votes taken in the first 99 Congresses, amI thus per~its legislators' preferences to move
over time. For the most comprehensive description of the estimation procedure, see PtXlLE &
ROSENTHAL, supra note 62, at 233-5 I. Two dimensions suffice to predict virtually all of the votes over
all Congresses, with the bulk of the work (80%) being done by the tirst dimension, which Poole and
Rosenthal identify as the ideological dimension. See ill. at 252; Patterns of Congressional Voting, supra,
at 229. Common interest group rankings of legislators, such as those published by the Americans for
Democratic Action (ADA) are generated from a more limited number of votes deemed to be of interest to
the ranking organization, as compared to the d-nominate scores. Although these Mings do not exist for
pre-World War II Congresses, where they exist, they are highly correlated with the first dimension d-
nominate score. For example, the Pearson correlation between the ADA ratings and D-nominate( I) for
the members of the House in the 93d Congress is .92, and that for the members of the Senate in the !02d
Congress is .93, the two Congresses whose votes are analyzed in this Article for which both measures are
available. As an additional cross-check on validity, for the vote in the 93d Congress, I ran the regressions
using both the d-nominate 'scores and ADA rankings of the representatives; there were no signiticant
differences. I report only the results of the d-nominate regressions. as the d-nominate scores provide
better ideological proxies because they use all roll-call votes rather than a subset of votes t1ltered by the
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first dimension, is the ideology variable, as it is interpreted by Poole and
Rosenthal as representing a political ideology left-right continuum (the more
liberal members of Congress have negative scores while the more
conservative members have positive scores). D-nominate(2), the second and
typically less significant dimension, is interpreted as corresponding to a
geographical, urban-rural division (the members of Congress from urban
areas have negative scores, while the rural area members have positive
scores).85 To restate the interpretation of these variables for our context, the
first dimension captures the continuum of legislator preferences for more or
less government intervention in markets. The second dimension represents
agrarian (rural) versus commercial (urban) interests.
The constituent variables used to decompose the ideology variable are the
percentage of the district population that wao;; (i) engaged in agriculture
(FarmPop), (ii) illiterate (Petlllit), (iii) black (PctBLack), and (iv) voted for
the Democratic presidential candidate in the 1920 election (PctDemPres).86
These variables attempt to capture the ideological proclivities of the electorate
(for example, African-Americans and supporters of the Democratic
presidential candidate tend to be more liberal voters)87 and therefore their use
interest group undertaking the rating, and because their availability for all of the votes under study makes
the result~ across Congresses more readily comparable.
85. Poole and Rosenthal find that, compared to the first dimension, the second dimension has only
been important in explaining voting in the I840s and I950s-60s, when racial issues were dominant. They
interpret this dimension a.~ representing a North-South divide in those periods, proxying for racial politics,
and a.~ an agrarian dimension in the period when it is not significant between the Civil War and the Great
Depression. See Congress and Railroad Regulation. supra note 82, at 81. Because this dimension i~
related to the specific economic constituent interest supporting futures market regulation, farm
organizations, there are complications in it~ use for the regression analysis. See infra note 92 and
accompanying text.
86. The constituent variables are similar to those that other researchers have found to have
explanatory power with respect to differences in voting behavior. See, e.g., John E. Jackson & David C.
King, Public Goods, Private Interests, and Representation, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1143, 1150·51
(1989); KaIt & Zupan, supra note 79, at 292-93. They are limited in number and in some ca.~s crude,
because the 1920 census included very limited county-level population information and I can do no better
than the variables indicated in the text. For example, while the use of the percentage of the population
that is college-educated would be preferable to literacy as a demographic representation of constituent
preferences because there is a strong correlation between education level and likelihood to vote, which
impacl~ upon the security of a congressman's seat and hence his responsiveness to voters' preferences,
the 1920 census only inquired into the population's literacy level. Where counties overlap districts, the
data were allocated across districl~ proportionately. The data were allocated uniformly where the
district's proportion of a county could not be a.~certained. In some instances, the data were allocated
disproportionately: For example, the wheat acreage for a fully urban district was assigned a value of zero
rather than proportionately allocated the county's wheat acreage. In some states, such as Massachusett~,
it was impossible to allocate county data to congressional district~. Such states were excluded from all of
the regressions. It is obvious that the allocation technique will generate measurement error. To test for
this, regressions were run again using only "clean" district~ (excluding district~ with overlapping
counties), and the result~ were substantially unchanged. The text therefore report~ the regressions using
the full sample,
1<7. The 1920 Democratic presidential nominee, James Cox, was a Progressive, in contrast to the
Republican nominee Warren Harding, who emphasized a "return to normalcy." See CHAMIiERS. SUpl'l1
note 24, at 272-73. To the extent that African-Americans were effectively prevented from voting in the
South because of their exclusion from voting in Democratic primary elections, see ill. at 143, the
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in the d-nominate regressions will parcel out to what extent a congressman's
ideology, represented by his d-nominate score, is a faithful representation of
his constituents' preferences as opposed to his personal taste. Dummy
variables for the congressman's party (Party; I = Democrat) and whether he
represent" a Southern state (South; I = South) were also included as
explainers of ideology. M8
These constituent variables explain a substantial proportion of the
variation in congressmen's d-nominate scores (adjusted R2 of .8842 and
.5012, respectively, for the first and second dimensions).89 From these
regressions, the ideology regressors for the logit regressions of the roll-call
vote are derived, denoted Pred(i) and Res(i), i = 1,2 for the two dimensions,
the fitted and residual components, respectively, of the regressions on the d-
nominate scores.
Although Poole and Rosenthal suggest that the two dimensions are
sufficient to explain overall congressional voting,90 I am interested in
examining the impact on votes of very specific constituent interests (one
could call it "constituent service") that cannot be distinguished by the two
dimensions recovered through the d-nominate estimation, such as the
interpretive u.~efulness of the PctBlack variable is limited in this and the 1936 vote regression when
compared to the regressions of the 1974 and 1991 votes.
KK. Following Kalt and Zupan, supra note 79, two formulations were used in the decomposition:
one in which the party variable is included in the fitted component of the d-nominate scores and one in
which it is included in the residuals. The text report~ the decomposition with party in the fitted
component, as it is most plausible to consider the candidate's party affiliation as a function of constituent
preferences. When the d-nominate decomposition regressions are run putting the influence of party into
the residual instead, then the fitted component of the first-dimension (picking up the legislator's proclivity
toward regulation) is no longer significant in the logit regression. All other significant statistical result~
are the same as those reported in Model I in Table 5. This change probably reflect~ the correlation
between D-nominate( I ) and Party: Democrat~ are more liberal than Republicans. In fact, if the regression
of D-nominare( I) on constituent variables excludes the party dummy, the explanatory power decreases
(adjusted R2 is .6K95), but when it is excluded from the regression on D-nominate(2), the decrease is les.~
(adjusted R2 of .457).
K9. Party is negative and the most signiticant regressor on the first dimension score, while the
most significant regressor on the second dimension score is FarmPop, which is positive. FarmPop and
South are negative and significant regressors on D-nominare( I); the other regressors are in~igniticantly
positive (PctDemPres and Pctlllil) and negative (PctBlack). Party and PctIllit are negative and
significant regressors on D-nominate(2), and PctDemPres is positive and signiticant; the other regressors,
South and PctBlack, are negative and insignificant.
90. Pauerns of Congressional Voting, supra note K4; see Poole, supra note KI. Heckman and
Snyder contend that a higher number of dimensions is necessary to explain voting in, at least, post-World
War II Congresses. James J. Heckman & James Snyder, Linear Probability Models of the Demand for
Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estinwting the Preferences of Legislators, 2K RANIJ J.
ECON. SI42 (1997) (special issue). They use a simpler statistical technique for identifying the significant
factors that predict roll-call votes, and find that if they model the space as of low dimension, their
estimates are highly correlated with the d-nominate scores, but if the space is of higher dimension, the
estimates differ. However, the first dimensions of both set~ of researchers are highly correlated,
particularly in the post-war Congresses that I am examining in this paper. POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra
note 1\2. at 252-55. In addition, the tirst dimension d-nominate score is highly correlated with the ADA
ratings. and consequently, I believe that it is a good measure of ideology, despite the estimator's possible
inconsistency identitied by Heckman and Snyder.
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presence of a futures exchange in a district, or wheat as opposed to cotton
farmers. The interest group variables that represent supporters of futures
regulation are the district's farm population (FarmPop) and wheat and cotton
acreage (Wheat and Cotton respectively). Because the 1921 Act regulated
only grain and not cotton futures and there are substantial regional differences
in crops, crop variables are included to eliminate noise created by using only
the farming population variable. The variable that proxies for the legislation's
opponents is the presence of a futures exchange in the district (ComEx; I =
exchange).91 The FarmPop (or Wheat) variable should be positively, and the
commodity exchange (ComEx) variable negatively, related to the probability
that a congressman votes for the legislation.
An institutional feature besides party included in the regressions is a
dummy variable for the congressman's membership on the Agriculture
Committee (AgCom; 1 =member of committee), as this is the committee with
jurisdiction over the legislation, and whether it is a predictor of voting
behavior in 1921 will be useful for comparative purposes when examining the
1974 and 1991 votes where jurisdictional issues are of greater importance.
The remaining variables in the table are attributes that should make a
legislator less responsive to constituent preferences (that is, more likely to
vote his personal ideology), measures to proxy for a safe seat: the proportion
of votes obtained in the congressman's 1920 race (ElectPct) and the
congressman's consecutive terms in office (Terms), which indexes the
strength of an incumbency electoral advantage. A caveat needs to be made
with respect to the incumbency effect on a legislator's ability to vote his own
personal preferences in distinction to constituent interests: Longevity in office
may well be a function of having personal preferences that are identical to
constituent interests.
The regression results for the 1921 House vote are reproduced in Table 5.
The equations estimated include a Kalt and Zupan model (Models 1, 2 and 5),
a model including the d-nominate scores and party and South dummy
variables directly (Model 3), and a model further including the constituent
variables directly (Model 4). In all models, the most important predictors of a
congressman's vote on the Future Trading Act of 1921 are the presence of a
commodity exchange in the district (ComEx), the representative's ideology
(Pred(1), Res(1) and D-nominate(1), and agrarian roots (Pred(2) and D-
91. The exchange variable is an imprecise inuicator of constituent interest because exchange
members may live in uistrict~ other than the uistrict in which the exchange is !ocateU. As a consequence.
the effect of exchanges on voting is likely to be unuerstateu. because some representatives voting against
the legislation have exchange members as constituent~ but they are not classitied as such. This
cla~sitication error is. in all likelihoou. not a serious problem. To the extent that the exchange members
are dispersed across many district~. they are not likely to have a signiticant impact on their individual
representatives, nor are they likely to have an incentive to lobby. The exchange eliminates free rider
problems concerning individual members' political activity by centralizing the lobbying effort, and it also
provides signiticant business revenue to the district in which it operates. Thus, it will have a greater
impact on it~ representative's vote than individual members will have on their representatives.
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nominate(2): The more liberal representatives were more likely to vote for
the bill and those with an exchange in their district were less likely to support
it. If the agrarian-related d-nominate score is omitted, the proportion of the
district's population in farming is positive and significant, and the signs on
Wheat and Cotton, although insignificant, are in the predicted direction
(Model 5). This suggests that the explanation of the insignificance of the farm
constituent variable in the other four models is collinearity with the second
dimension score.92 Committee membership wao;; also not a significant
predictor of support for the bill.
Comparison of Model I with Model 2 indicates that personal ideology-
the residual component of the decomposition of the congressional d-nominate
scores-is a significant explainer of the 1921 futures regulation vote: There is
a significant loss in the regression's explanatory power when the residual
variables are excluded, and a likelihood ratio test of the excluded residual
variables is significant at less than 5%.93 Moreover, in Model 5, where the
second (agrarian) dimension d-nominate score is excluded, only the residual,
or personal ideological component of the first dimension score, is significant.
It should be noted that none of the district constituent variables are
significant when entered directly into the vote regression (Model 4) although
some of them are significant explainers of the representatives' ideology in the
d-nominate decomposition regressions. Moreover, they add no significant
power to the model, as a likelihood ratio test of Model 4 against Model 3 is
insignificant (chi-square of 1.59). The finding that generic constituent
attributes do not affect legislators' votes is in accord with the proposition that
regulation of futures trading wao;; an issue of low saliency, as suggested by the
data in Table 2 reporting the periodical index search results.
The variables meao;;uring the likelihood that a representative can deviate
from his constituents' preferences (terms in office and election vote
percentage) have no explanatory power when included in the logit regressions
of votes (added to either Model 3 or 4), and a likelihood ratio test of their
exclusion is insignificant (chi-square values, with two degrees of freedom, of
1.28 and 1.07, respectively). Accordingly, these regression results are not
included in the tables. Ordinary least squares regressions were also run fitting
the residuals of the d-nominate decomposition regressions to the security of
seat variables, as they are e~pected to affect the legislator's responsiveness to
constituent preferences,94 but these regressions explained virtually none of the
variance in the residual values (adjusted R2s of less than .01).
92. The Pearson correlation between FarmPop and PrNJ(2) is .73. and between FarmPop and D-
nominate(2), .52.
93. The test statistic, twice the difference of the log-likelihoods of the unrestricted and restricted
regressions (Model I and Model 2), which is distributed as a chi,s4uare with two degrees of freedom, has
a value of 41.44.
94. See Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators:
Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103 (1990).
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The nicest regression result is that the commodity exchange variable (the
"constituent service" variable) is a significant predictor of votes. Given Poole
and Rosenthal's finding concerning the power of two dimensions to explain
congressional voting, we might not have expected such a result. The
commodity exchange constituent interest discriminates across legislators
aligned dimensionally over votes according to the d-nominate scores, the
farm-state Republicans. Its significance thus graphically underscores the
nexus between legislators and local constituents that the political science
literature emphasizes.
Another test of the importance of the constituent variables compared to
the d-nominate scores is a likelihood ratio test of the unconstrained
regressions (Models I and 3) against regressions with only the d-nominate
variables (entered into the regression as either the decomposed components or
directly). The test statistics are significant at 5% (chi-square values of 11.09
and 15.15 respectively). Hence, the constituent variables add explanatory
power to the vote regressions. The d-nominate variables do provide more
predictive power, as would be expected by Poole and Rosenthal, because the
likelihood ratio tests of the unconstrained regressions against regressions with
only the constituent variables (that is, tests of the explanatory power of the d-
nominate regressors) are even more significant (chi-squares of 46.498 and
44.98, respectively). However, in the regressions with only the d-nominate
scores for regressors, the second dimension is more significant than the first
dimension. Because this dimension is closely related to the economic interest
of constituents in the legislation (farmers), while the other dimension indices
ideology, this provides further evidence that constituent concerns are critical
to an explanation of the vote on the Future Trading Act.
E. What Did Farmers Gain From Futures Regulation?
As indicated by the legislative record, farmers sought the abolition of
futures trading in the belief that this would raise commodity prices. Even had
they obtained the legislative prohibition that they desired, rather than the
more modest regulation that was enacted, the economics of the relation
between futures and spot market prices makes clear that eliminating futures
markets would not have raised spot prices. If anything, it would have further
lowered prices as the increased cost of hedging would reduce the price
elevators and millers were willing to pay farmers in forward contracts for
wheat.
A rather obvious question follows: Why would farmers pursue what
would appear to be a fruitless strategy? One rationale for farmers' political
activism against futures trading has been offered by Pashigian. He contends
that commercial line elevators, which dominated the market in some states,
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used futures prices to sustain monopsonist pnclng against producers.95 In
such a scenario, farmers have a perfectly rational economic reason to oppose
fl,ltures exchanges: To end the elevators' ability to collude on prices. To test
this hypothesis, Pashigian examines three Senate votes on bills to ban or
prohibitively tax futures trading that were considered after the Future Trading
Act was enacted, in 1927, 1928, and 1938. He finds that the farm state
senators who supported the legislation were from states where commercial
line elevators were more important and thus more likely to have monopsony
power, than were the farm state senators who opposed the legislation. He also
finds that farm-state senators from states in which futures exchanges were
located were less likely to vote for the proposed futures transaction tax.
There is not even a hint in the extensive testimony in the 1921-22
hearings on futures trading of the kind that Pashigian hypothesizes
concerning the use of futures markets by commercial line elevators to sustain
noncompetitive prices. Indeed, the principal architect of the 1921 Act,
Representative Tincher, was from a state (Kansas) in which commercial line
elevators had the smallest market share of any grain-producing state.96
However, to ascertain whether Pashigian's hypothesis holds up for the
passage of the Act, I reestimated the logit regression for the 1921 vote for the
fourteen grain-producing states using the two factors that Pashigian uses in
his analysis of subsequent votes by those fourteen states' senators: the market
share of commercial line elevators and the presence of a futures exchange.97
In contrast to his results, only the commodity exchange variable is significant.
The elevator share variable is insignificant, and its inclusion in the logit
regression adds little explanatory power besides that provided by the
commodity exchange variable.98 Accordingly, Pashigian's hypothesis that
farmers exposed to an elevator cartel formed the political base for futures
regulation does not explain the voting on the legislation creating the
regulatory regime.
Pashigian's explanation is therefore an unsatisfactory answer to the
question why did farmers seek to eliminate futures markets. A more fruitful
alternative explanation inverts Pashigian's thesis: Because futures markets
play an important role in price discovery, if wheat farming had been
concentrated in the hands of a small number of producers, then the
elimination of futures markets could have enabled those farmers to charge
millers and other grain end-users above-market prices. Such a political end
95. B. Peter Pashigian, Why Have Some Farmers Opposed Futures Markets, 9fi i. POL. ECON.
371 (198l\). Pashigian does not offer any explicit evidence of price-fixing.
9fi. See id. at 374 tbl. 2.
97. The Federal Trade Commission collected the elevator market share data; it is available only at
the state level. See Futures Hearings I, supra note 44, at 793-94. For the exchange variable I continue to
use my district-level data. .
9l\. The chi-square statistic for a likelihood ratio test of the regression model including the
exchange and elevator share variables against the model including only the exchange variable is an
insignificant 1.04.
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would not be an economically irrational strategy. But wheat production wa<;
not concentrated in a few large farms. Futures legislation therefore only held
out the potential to raise prices if the farmers' parallel political effort at
organizing producers' bargaining agents into farmers' cooperatives was
successful. Moreover, to the extent that regulating futures trading raised the
costs of the cooperatives' competitors, the grain middlemen, this might assist
farmers' effort<; to develop a national marketing and distribution system that
could compete with the middlemen (the increase in hedging costs from the
legislation might offset other cost advantages middlemen had over
cooperatives).
Political activists in the farm belt were, in fact, strongly committed to the
cooperative movement. For example, a piece of legislation that had been high
on farm groups' political agenda wa<; the Capper-Volstead Act, which wa<;
enacted closely in time to the futures trading legislation, in February 1922,
and exempted agricultural cooperatives from the antitrust laws.99 In addition,
several recommendations of the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry,
.created by Congress in 1921 after serious farm protests, involved measures to
aid cooperatives. loo A final datum in support of this alternative explanation
for farm support of futures legislation is the fact that farm organization
witnesses during the futures hearings repeatedly expressed the belief that
farmers' prosperity depended on the success of a cooperative movement. 101 In
this scenario, farm representatives would not consider futures legislation a
failure, even if it initially lowered grain prices as hedging costs increased,
because it was the first step along the road to a new marketing system through
cooperatives.
Prohibiting futures trading, then, would not immediately raise prices, but
could achieve a price increa<;e in the long run if it led to producer control of
the grain marketing system. Grain-producing districts were not numerous
enough to enact a specific public policy, whether it wa<; futures market
regulation, a program of direct farm income support, or a government-
sponsored cooperative movement that envisioned producers' monopolizing
the grain distribution system to secure higher prices. Although there was
undoubtedly sympathy for farmers' economic distress, there was not yet
popular support for a policy of national income redistribution to farmers.
Farmers' emphasis of the need for higher commodity prices throughout the
hearings would surely not be a winning strategy on the chamber floor with
non-farm state legislators, whose constituents would have to pay for increa<;ed
food prices. Targeting futures trading in relation to the problem of depressed
farm incomes ("low" prices for agricultural products) provided a basis for
99. Capper-Volstead Act § 1,42 Stat. 3XX (1922) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1994».
100. See WALTON & ReX::KoFF, supra note 17, at SOl.
10 I. For example, Benjamin C. Marsh. Secretary and Director of Legislation for the FllImers'
National Council, repeatedly mised this point. Sel'. e.)(., Future Hearin)(s II. supra note 49, at 2A-27:
Future Tradin)( in Grain. supra note 55. at 4AA.
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creating a winning political coalition.
Non-farm-state representatives, for instance, would have far less
difficulty explaining to constituents a policy aimed at rooting out gambling,
which wa", claimed to cause price distortions, rather than one explicitly
directed at raising prices. Americans' attitude to gambling, as opposed to
commercial speculation, has historically been complex, as the two activities
have been ambiguously intertwined in the public imagination. 102 Although
there was not any public outcry against, much less notice of, futures markets
outside the farm belt in the 1920s, having just experienced a decade of a
politics infused with morality in the Progressive moverrient, legislators may
have wanted to distance themselves from an activity that could be equated in
the public imagination with gambling, even if their constituents were not
farmers who saw first hand the "devil" in the "gambling hells" of the boards
of trade. 103
The interweaving of the two issues, gambling and farmers' increasing
financial distress, may have provided the basis for enough "constituent-
indifferent" legislators (non-farm, non-exchange district legislators) to vote
with grain-producing district legislators and pass the futures trading
legislation. Equally important, the market intervention contemplated by the
final bill was modest, so there would not be any significant cost to the non-
farm district legislator from voting for the bill, such as an increase in food
prices, despite the aspirations of farmers and the criticism of the' grain
trade. 104 In short, for a legislator concerned about reelection, voting for the
legislation had some upside, and very little downside, return.
The most important consequence of the Act, particularly from the
farmers' standpoint, was the introduction into political discourse of the
principle of federal government involvement in commodities markets. It
102. See FABlAN, supra note 54, at 2-7. Gambling was a topic of only slightly greater salience
than futures exchanges with six entries in each of Readers' Guide volumes 5 (1919-21) and 6 (1922-24).
It was therefore not at all comparable to the interest in stock market speculatil;m or the economic plight
of agriculture at the time, as indicated in Table 2. In addition, very few of the articles under the gambling
entry concern stock market speculation or commodity trading, as opposed to "straight" gambling, betting
on horse racing, card games, and lotteries.
103. The phrase is from a farmer testifying to Congress in 1892, quoted by Fabian as a key
metaphor indicating a "moral" component to the late nineteenth century economic debate over
speCUlation. FABlAN, supra note 54, at 153. Chambers considers the "distinct" quality of the Progressive
movement a "combination of moralism and pragmatism," providing as examples, Progressives' successful
crusades against alcohol and political corruption. See CHAMBERS, supra note 24, at 169. The prohibition
amendment to the Constitution had, in fact, only recently gone into effect, in 1920. Other objects of the
Progressives' moral concern were the "social evils" of prostitution and narcotics. Jd. at 164-65. They
were also intensively concerned over the corruption of politics by business interests. See Richard L.
McCormick, The Discovery that 'Business Corrupts Politics ': A Reappraisal of the Orixins {~f
Proxressivism, 86 AMER. HIST. REV. 247 (198 I).
104. The legislation was not likely to have a large effect on trading costs. Large traders, as well as
institutional hedgers, did not place their orders with bucket shops, so it is unlikely that the elimination of
such operations by the Act would result in higher commissions on the theory that competition from
bucket shops had kept exchange trading fees low.
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created a regulatory toehold that could be expanded over time, through farm
groups' influence on the political process, to guarantee that the existing
marketing network did not disadvantage a nascent cooperative one. 105
Successful advocacy of futures legislation may also have provided a second
auxiliary benefit besides the potential to increase farm prices, experience in
forging a political coalition to enact the farmers' agenda. Although it can
plausibly be contended that the farmers' victory in the enactment of the
Future Trading Act wac; more symbolic than real, such a characterization is
not inconsistent with a rational political program: the restructuring of the
grain marketing system through cooperatives.
O. Futures Regulation in the New Deal: The Commodity Exchange Act of
1936
In the 1920s grain producers sought to ac;sert control over market prices,
and the futures exchanges were an impediment to this objective because they
were a central feature of the pricing mechanism, an institution of the grain
trade middlemen. Speculators were easier targets of opprobrium than
middlemen in the farmers' efforts to broaden support for their cause (the
raising of food prices) given their association in the public mind with
gambling. 106 But the lack of public interest and the intense opposition by the
105. The use of futures exchanges by cooperatives was not a far-fetched possibility. An issue of
interest to a small number of farm witnesses during the 1920s was enacting a provision to require
exchanges to grant memberships to cooperatives. Exchanges wanted cooperatives to revise their
patronage dividend policies (which were based on the farmers' volume of busines.~ with the cooperative)
in order to be admitted a~ members, on the ground that patronage dividends violated exchange rules
prohibiting the rebating of commissions. The 1921 act contained a non-discrimination clause. requiring
the admission of cooperative members as a criterion for contract market designation, and prohibiting
exchanges from applying anti-rebating rules to cooperatives' patronage dividends to "bona tide
members". Future Trading Act of 1921 § 5(e), 42 Stat. IKK (1921). This language wa~ undoubtedly
considered responsive to exchanges' concerns regarding a non-discrimination clause, that cooperatives
could circumvent the no-rebating rule and refund commissions to any trader. and that there was a host of
"sham" cooperatives, a~sociations a majority of whose busines.~ was by non-members, that would take
advantage of the situation. The 1921 language was changed in the 1922 Act to require cooperatives to
comply with all exchange rules and to prohibit exchanges from construing any rules to forbid patronage
dividends to "bona fide members" paid out of "moneys collected in excess of the expense of conducting
the busines.~ of such association". Grain Futures Act of 1922 § 5(e), 42 Stat. 99K, 1000 (1922) (codified
at 7 U.S.c. § 7(e)). Further protection was derived from the definition of a cooperative in a separately
enacted federal statute, the Capper-Volstead Act, see .wpm note 99, which included a requirement that
more business be conducted for members than for non-members.
106. Farm political agitation in earlier eras, such as the populist movement, had expressed bigoted
sentiment~ against specitic groups, including Jewish and Catholic immigrant~, some of which were related
to anti-banker sentiment In addition, the Ku Klux Klan, an exponent of prejudice against those groups,
had strong rural support in the I920s-30s. See L!PSET, supm note 50, at 165. It is possible that such
biases accounted for some part of the farm groups' animus toward futures exchanges: The Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (Mere) was established by descendants of Jewish immigrant~ from Eastern Europe:
the CBOT wa~ established by descendant~ of Irish Catholic and German farmers. See BOB TAMARKIN,
THE MERe: THE EMERGENCE OF AGLOBAL FINANCtAL POWERHOUSE 50 (1993). But I fountJ no evitJence
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organized exchanges prevented them not only from abolishing the futures
market, but also from implementing a regulatory apparatus with real bite. It
took the Great Depression to introduce a government subsidy program for
farmers through price supports in conjunction with the broad scale
intervention of government into all sectors of the economy in' the New Deal,
to achieve, albeit through a different mechanism than direct control of the
grain marketing system, the farmers' goal of guaranteeing a particular income
level.
A. Creation of the Federal Price Support Program and Futures Regulation
The core of all farm political protest", whether directed against futures
exchanges in the 1920s or against railroads and mortgage banks as was the
focus of protests in an earlier era, was a grievance concerning the marketing
of crops, that the producer was receiving too little, and the middlemen too
large, a proportion of the retail price, given the relative importance of their
services. IO? Abolishing futures trading wa" ancillary to addressing this core
grievance, and some farm representatives acknowledged as much when they
indicated to the congressional committees investigating futures trading in
1921 that the true sblution was a farmer-run agricultural marketing system,
supported by the government, that eliminated middlemen. lo8 By neither
abolishing futures markets nor prohibiting sPeculative. trading, the 1921
legislation did little to disrupt the marketing system of the loathed
middlemen. Nor wa" the fledgling cooperative movement quickly replacing
that marketing system. Therefore, with much of the farm belt still
experiencing hard times, farmers' political agitation wa" not assuaged with
the enactment of the Future Trading Act and its successor, the Grain Futures
Act.
At the time of the congressional consideration of the Future Trading Act,
legislators from agrarian states organized into an official voting coalition,
which cut across party lines, known as the "farm bloc."I09 The centerpiece of
of such attitudes in the congressional hearings. nor in the small number of Readers' Guide articles
concerning futures trading in 1919-22. .
107. See COWING. supra note 12, at 267.
lOS. See, e.g., Futures Hearings t, supra note 44, at 190-93 (testimony of Benjamin Marsh.
representing Farmers' National Council); 01 CONGo REC. 1314 (1921) ("To present a bill which would
eliminate the evil features [of commodities exchanges) ha.~ been a difficult problem. I believe the bill
which has been presented at least tends to accomplish this purpose. I believe that in time a new system
will grow up which will make the exchanges a.~ they are conducted at present wholly unnecessary. An
effort is now being made through a system of cooperative marketing to secure a substitute for the system
which now prevails.") (statement of Rep. Jones of Texas).
109. The Senate farm bloc was organized in May 1921, at a meeting attended by nine senators in
the American farm Bureau Federation's office, at the FaJm Bureau's prodding. See HANSEN, supra note
19, at 31. At it~ peak it had thirty members. See ill. The House counterpart was less well organized, and
estimates of it~ membership vary between twenty-eight and one hundred. See id. Hansen does not
indicate when the House group was formed.
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farm bloc legislative efforts in the plid-1920s, known as "McNary-
Haugenism" after the congressional leaders, was a demand for "parity prices,"
which referred to crop price supports calculated by reference to
nonagricultural product prices that would restore the farmers' position to what
it had been during the high point of agrarian prosperity, 1909-14,110 rather
than a demand for further futures market regulation. The parity price wm; to
be implemented by tariffs on imports and a private government-chartered
corporation that would buy commodities in order to raise prices up to' the
parity level, financed by a tax on the protected commodities. I I I A parity price
program was not enacted in the 1920s. President Coolidge vetoed McNary-
Haugen bills twice. 112 The farm programs enacted after the Future Trading
Act instead were the high tariffs and duties in the Smoot-Hawley Act, the
exemption of agricultural cooperatives from antitrust laws, the establishment
of intermediate credit banks for agricultural paper, and the creation of the
Federal Farm Board in 1929 to stabilize farm prices through private
cooperative marketing associations supported with a $500 million fund for
the Board. 113
A parity-price-based program was finally enacted in the Agricultural
Adjustment Act (AAA)of 1933, which directly compensated farmers who
voluntarily reduced production according to a government schedule intended
to calculate the crop size necessary to achieve the parity price. 114 But the
AAA wa" held unconstitutional in 1936. 115 Congress enacted in its place the
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936, which paid farmers
to plant soil-conserving crops rather than to limit production of soil-depleting
crops (which were the crops covered by the AAA), and two years later, the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which established marketing quotas
and specific price supportS. 116 This dramatic policy shift followed what is
often referred to as a critical election, an election that involves cross-cutting
issues on which the major parties take clearly opposing positions and results
in fundamental political realignment that lasts for decades. 117
110. See Gn..SERT C. FiTE, AMERICAN AGRICULTURE AND FARM POLICY SINCE 1900, at 10-12
(1964).
III. See WALTON & ROCKOFF, supra note 17, at 501-02.
I 12. [d. at 502.
113. See id.
114. See ATACK & PASSELL, supra note 13, at 071.
115. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (1930).
116. See ATACK & PASSELL, supra note 13, at 075; WALTON & ROCKOFF, supra note 17, at
504-06.
117. See DAVID BRADY, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY MAKING 4 (19XX).
There have been three realigning or critical election periods in U.S. history, the Civil War, lX90s and
1930s. Consistent with the critical election literature, a~ Poole and Rosenthal indicate in their uiscussion
of their data set containing all congressional roll-call votes, congressional voting patterns are
extraordinarily stable, changing only by replacement of legislators rather than by inuividuals experiencing
a change of heart. See Patterns ofConxressional Vorinx, supra note X4, at 257. Their spatial analysis
suggest~, however, that the New Deal was not a realigning election but a ma~sive shift in the
congressional majority. See POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 02, at Xo, 100-X, 114.
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After the adoption of the first AAA but before its constitutional
reenactment in 1938, Congress systematized the federal regulation of futures
markets in the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) of 1936. 11H The CEA
expanded the authority of the Secret~ of Agriculture to include the licensing
of futures brokers and the setting of speculative position limits, required the
segregation of customer accounts from brokers' own funds, and extended
regulatory coverage to commodities other than grain, including cotton, butter
and eggs. Apart from the provision to segregate customer funds, the
regulatory reforms in the CEA had been high on the legislative agenda since
1934 when a similar bill passed the House. Some commentators today do not
consider the 1936 statute as significantly altering the regulatory regime
instituted in 1922.119 But the legislation's opponents did not share this view.
The CEA was vigorously opposed by the commodity exchanges, including
both those already regulated by the Grain Futures Act and those which would
be newly subject to it (see Table 7).
The 1934 version of the CEA wali not the first attempt to alter the 1922
regime. Bills to expand the federal regulation of futures markets or to prohibit
all futures trading or only trading by speculators continued to be introduced
after the 1922 Act (see Table 6). The Secretary of Agriculture, in particular,
had sought at least since 1925 increased authority over futures trading from
Congress. A change in the position toward government intervention by cotton
state legislators, whose constituents had experienced declining cotton prices
in 1935, was in all likelihood the decisive factor in the success of these efforts
in 1936. Another factor that may have effected the timing of the legislation's
success wali the adoption in 1934 of federal laws regulating stock markets:
Supporters of futures regulation maintained that legislation had become
essential because "professional" stock market speculators would move into
commodities if those markets were not equally regulated. 120
B. The Legislative Process
A number of hearings were held by the agriculture committees in the
1930s on the issues that were resolved in the CEA. The hearings followed a
similar pattern to those in the 1920s, as the witnesses' positions summarized
in Table 7 evidence. Exchanges and their markets' users (millers, elevators,
shippers and other members of the grain trade) testified in large numbers
against the bills and farm groups, legislators and executive branch officials
118. See Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1994)).
119. See, e.g., 2 PHILIP M. JOHNSON & THOMAS L. HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION 220
(1989). Johnson and Hazen note that there was "little substantive difference" between the Grain Futures
Administf'dtion (the name of the Department unit established after the 1922 Act) and the Commodity
Exchange Authority (the renamed Department unit after the CEA), and the CEA it~elf, like the Future
Trading Act and Grain Futures Act before it, referred only to the Secretary of Agriculture regarding the
Act's administration. td. at 220.
120. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 74-421, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935).
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testified in their support. The hearings were more pro forma, 121 and the tone
even less civil, than those of the I920s. For instance, committee members
instructed witnesses opposing legislation to keep their statements short, often
reminding them that they had testified in previous years against the same
proposals,122 and the committee chairmen followed strict time limits on
witnesses' testimony and questioning. 123 Even fewer committee members
expressed any sympathy for the exchanges' position than in the 1920s, and
when government witnesses from the Department of Agriculture expressed
support for futures trading or disagreed with proposed restrictions, their
competence and integrity were challenged. 124
The arguments for and against regulation were largely unchanged from
those of the 1920s, with farmers and their legislative sponsors claiming that
speculation in futures markets created fictitious supply and thus had caused
the disastrous decline in grain prices, and exchanges, millers and shippers
maintaining that prices were a function of supply and demand. 125 Proponents
of increased regulation, including the Secretary of Agriculture, did provide
new rationales for legislation, principally the difficulties that had arisen under
the 1922 Act, including judicial rulings that certain manipulative conduct
could not be reached under the statute and an unacceptably stringent sanction
for misconduct-suspension of the contract markets' operations rather than of
121. The duration and subject of several of the hearings was strictly limited in advance. See, e.g.,
To Amend the Grain Futures Act, Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry on H.R.
6772, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1936) [hereinafter /936 Hearing] (statement of Sen. Murphy);
Regulation ofCommodity Exchanges. Hearing Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess.8 (1935) [hereinafter /935 Hearing] (noting that witness testimony is to be limited to provisions in
bill that were not in 1934 bill).
122. See, e.g., /936 Hearing, supra note 121, at 22 (statement of Sen. Murphy) ("Before you
proceed with your testimony, Mr. Boylan, may I suggest that this great long list of witnesses that you
presented be restricted? It would appear that most of them would express the same state of mind
regarding this bill, based on much the same reasons"); Regulation of Grain Exchanges, Hearing Before
House Comm. on Agriculture, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) [hereinafter /934 Hearing] (statement of
Chairman Jones) ("Hearings on the same subject or similar subjects in former bills are already available.
and it seems that there is no essential reason why we should have further extended hearings and go into
great detail in regard to most of the phases of the subject.").
123. See, e.g., Commodity Short Selling, Hearing Before House Comm. on Agriculture, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 152 (1932) [hereinafter /932 Hearing] (statement of chairman restricting questions to
ten minutes); /934 Hearing, supra note 122, at 115 (statement of chainnan suggesting that members
limit questions to matters not previously covered).
124. When the administrator of the Grain Futures Administration appeared to be defending
futures trading he was challenged by congressmen who "would like to know why the $200,000 or more is
appropriated for [his] department" if it was not "functioning for the people who actually grow the
agricultural products," /932 Hearing, supra note 123, at 206 (statement of Rep. Glover), or why he was
"sit[ting] idly by, apparently unconcerned, and not tak[ing] action against some of these speculators," id.
at 228 (statement of Rep. Larsen). He was further asked if he had ever worked for an exchange when his
testimony countered a legislator's proposed restrictions on short selling. /d. at 225 (statement of Rep.
Larsen).
125. This reprise of the issues is in keeping with Poole and Rosenthal's characterization that the
New Deal wa.s not a fundamental realignment of the issue space. See POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note
62, at 86, 106-08, 114.
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the individual violators' operations-which stymied enforcement effort<;.126
Although Department of Agriculture representatives empha<;ized the
importance of short selling and futures markets, they were the driving force
behind the proposal for government-set position limits. Their position wa<;
buttressed by a department study of the grain futures market, using data
obtained under its 1922 Act powers, that contended that large speculative
trades typically resulted in substantial 'price movements and were undertaken
by a very small number of traders.12~ Farm groups still wanted to ban all
speculative trading, rather than simply limit it, and sympathetic legislators
particularly wanted trading restrictions to apply only on the sell side, rather
than the Department's more evenhanded treatment of buyers and sellers. They
gave their support to the Department's more restrained proposal, however, in
the hope of ensuring that a bill would be enacted.
The grain exchanges particularly objected to the provisions permitting the
government to set speculative position limits, to require the licensing of
brokers, and to require segregation of customer margin accounts from
brokers' funds. The cotton, butter and eggs exchanges objected to being
subject to the grain futures regime in the first place, as well as to the n~w
proposals. All of the exchanges insisted that the provisions were unnecessary
and ill-suited to achieve higher prices. Although they did not dispute the
contention of the Grain Futures Administration (GFA), the entity established
by the Secretary of Agriculture to implement the Grain Futures Act, that very
few traders would be directly affected by the Secretary's contemplated trading
limit of two million bushels of grain, they maintained that permitting the
government to set speculative limits would chill speculative activity (because
a trader could be required to liquidate a position without warning if the
Secretary were to change the limit), and thereby reduce trading and further
lower prices.
The exchanges' principal new defense against regulation was that a newly
established Grain Exchange Code would effectively take care of all of the
concerns underlying the legislative proposals and should at least be given an
opportunity to work. 128 This. code wa<; a "code of fair competition" for the
grain exchanges adopted in March 1934 with the President's approval under
126. See, e.g., 1934 Hearing, supra note 122, at 9 (statement of J.M. Mehl, Ass!. Chief, Grain
Futures Administration) (contending that proposed bill corrects current situation where only remedy
against manipulation is revocation of contract market designation); 1935 Hearing, supra note 121, at 77
(statement of J.M. Mehl) (lamenting that cross-trading and taking orders into broker's account not
"manipulation" within meaning of 1922 Act under Commodity Exchange Commission opinion and
proposed bill will correct that); 1936 Hearing, supra note 121, at 246 (statement of Wendell Berge,
Special Ass!. to the Attorney General) (discussing enforcement problem).
127. See, e.g., 1934 Hearing, supra note 122, at 13 (statement of Dr. J.W.T. Duvel, Chief, Grain
Futures Administration).
128. See ill. at 86 (statement of Robert P. Boylan, Vice President, CBDT); ill. at 93 (statement of
E.J. Grimes. Chairman, Grain Exchange Code Committee); 1935 Hearing, supra note 121, at 39-41
(statement of George H. Davis, Vice President, Terminal Elevator Grain Merchants' Ass'n and Chairman,
Code Authority of the Grain Exchanges).
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the National Industrial Recovery Act (NRA) of 1933, and negotiated by the
exchanges with the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, a division of the
Department of Agriculture, and the Administrator of the NRA. It wa<;
undoubtedly viewed by the exchanges as a mechanism for preempting the
proposed federal legislation,129 and featured a 10% speculative margin
requirement as opposed to the proposed legislation's limit on speculative
positions. The code also required exchanges to establish business conduct
committees. In a further effort to preempt legislation, the business conduct
committees agreed to establish voluntary speculative position limits (albeit at
a number higher than the GFA desired). Although the exchanges saw a world
of difference between voluntary limits set by their self-regulatory
organizations and a government official establishing position limits,
legislators considered this action as demonstrating the feasibility of providing
such authority to the government.
While a dispute over the regulation of cotton rather than the presence of
the code is the more probable explanation for the failure of the Senate to enact
the bills passed by the House in 1934 and 1935, the enhanced self-regulation
provided by the code may well have aided the cotton state legislators seeking
to put off the legislation's consideration. The grain code defense became
moot, however, after the Supreme Court struck down the NRA and its system
of industry code regulation in May 1935. 130 In the remaining legislative
session in 1936, the cotton dispute was resolved through its inclusion in the
CEA and the Senate approved the 1935 House bill. The decision on the NRA
is therefore illustrative of how nonlegislative actors, such as the Supreme
Court, can influence congressional action: By changing the status quo, an
expansion of futures regulation that had not been attainable by voting
coalitions arrayed against the old equilibrium point became possible.1 31
C. The Changing Market ConditirJns 4 Cotton, Regional Alliances and
Popular Opinion
Why wa<; the inclusion of cotton in futures trading bills a matter of
controversy, yet key to enactment of grain futures reform? Cotton wa<; not
subject to either the 1921 or the 1922 futures trading legislation because the
cotton industry-producers, dealers, and processors-wa<; opposed to federal
regulation. There are three rea<;ons for this difference. First, in the I 920s,
cotton farmers were not experiencing the severe financial problems that wheat
129. In a discussion of the relation between the Grain Exchange Code and the proposed
legislation, a department official stated that, in the exchanges' "panic of fear that there would be
legislation, they have been willing to write into the code almost anything, whether it was workable or
not." 1934 Hearing, supra note 122, at 255 (statement of J.M. Mehl, Asst. Chief, Grain Futures
Administration).
130. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
131. For another illustration of this phenomenon, see Congress and Railroad Regulation, supra
note 82, at 108-09 (describing effect of Supreme Court decision on passage of Interstate Commerce Act).
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producers were. The end of World War I had reopened European markets for
cotton, so that Southern farmers prospered in contrast to Midwestern grain
farmers. 132 This difference Wa'; incorporated in the parity price scheme of the
AAA of 1933: Cotton prices were pegged to post-war prices, while the other
commodities' prices referenced pre-war years.
Second, federal regulation of the cotton futures market had been the
subject of legislative debate during the previous decade when there had been
a large decline in cotton prices. The resulting legislation in 1914 established a
national grading system for deliverable cotton and required the use of
commercial differences rather than fixed prices at settlement for delivered
cotton of a non-basis grade; it did not otherwise regulate cotton futures
trading. 133 In the 1920s, the participants in the 1914 legislation did not want
this legislative solution redrafted. 134 Finally, the potential success of federal
regulation in raising commodity prices by restricting futures trading was even
'more circumscribed for cotton than for grain because there were competing
foreign futures exchanges in the United Kingdom for cotton (servicing the
textile industry), while there were no foreign rivals to the Chicago wheat
futures market.
The changing attitude to federal regulation of futures trading by cotton
state legislators is paralleled by the timing of riational farm groups' influence
on Southern legislators: Hansen notes that these farm groups did not gain
access to legislators in the South until the 1930s when Southern agriculture
became financially distressed in the worldwide depression, in contrast to the
Midwest where the agricultural depression began in the 1920s.l35 In other
132. See HANSEN, supra note 19. at 61. For example, by 1923, cotton was selling for twice it~
historical average price. See id. In addition. the farm foreclosure rate in 1926 was 60.8 per 1,000 farms in
Minnesota and 52,5 per 1000 in South Dakota, both wheat-producing states, while only 9.3 per 1,000 in
Texa~, a major cotton-producer. See ATACK & PASSELL, supra note 13, at 575.
133, See Cotton Futures Act, Pub. L. No. 63-174, 38 Stat. 693 (1914) (repealed and replaced
with substantially identical language by the Cotton Futures Act, Pub. L. No. 64-190 Pt. A, 39 Stat. 476
(1916)). Unlike grain, cotton was a large export crop and the onset of World War 1disrupted it~ market,
as the British embargo blocked shipment~ to the Central power~. See RICHARD F. BENSEL,
SECfIONALISM AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: 1800-1980, at 120-21 (1984). Numerous bills
were introduced to ban cotton futures before and after World War I, and in both 1910 !lnd 1912 bilL~ to
abolish cotton futures passed the House but were not considered by the Senate. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No.
765. 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914). Cotton transactions also involved difficulties not present in grain
transactions. Cotton is very variable in type and quality, and grading is therefore a problem for
commercial transactions. See A,W.B. Simpson, The Origins of Futures Trading in the Liverpool Cotton
Market, in ESSAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH 179, 182 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1991). Prior to the
1914 legislation, U.S. standards differed from international standards. See H.R. REP. No. 765, supra, at
20, With the enactment of the Cotton Futures Act of 1914, demands to ban futures trading by cotton
farmers ended (until the depression of the I930s). It should be noted that legislation standardizing
delivery and storage of grain deliverable on futures contracts, see Grain Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 64-
190 Pt. B. 39 Stat. 482 (1916): Warehouse Act. Pub. L. No, 64-190 Pt. C. 39 Stat. 486 (1916). did not
put an end to grain producers' attacks on exchanges.
134. See. e,g.. Hearings 10 Amend Seclion 5 of Ihl' Cot/on Futures Act and Prevent Ihe Sail' of
Cot/on and Grain in Fulures Markets, Sen. Comlll. on Agriculture and Forestry, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 17
(1922) (statement of E.B. Nonnan. member, New Orleans Cotton Exchange).
135. See HANSEN, supra note 19, at 67-69.
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words, the national farm group lobbyists were now important to the Southern
legislators because their constituents were now inclined to support
government intervention. This influence is consistent with Markham's
assertion that the experience of a sudden collapse in cotton futures prices (200
point") in March 1935 at the time grain futures regulation was being
considered in the House undercut opponents of the legislation,136 as
Midwestern representatives desirous of increased market regulation gained
allies among the Southern representatives.
The one roll-call vote on the CEA, the Senate's vote adopting it in 1936,
illuminates the regional alliance between grain and cotton farmers. As
indicated in Table 8, all of the Western and Southern state senators, and all
but one Midwestern senator, voted for the legislation. The opposition wa"
only in the Northeast and New England (where mills and exporters were
located). The regional division appears, on visual inspection, to be even
starker than it was in the 1921 vote on the Future Trading Act but we cannot
ascertain whether it is statistically significant; the small number of
observations per table cell renders invalid the standard chi-square test.
The Senate Republicans voted somewhat more frequently against the
CEA than did. the Democrats and, as in 1921, they were more numerous in the
Northeast and New England. Visual inspection of the data in Table 8
compared to Table 3 suggests that the regional effect more clearly
predominates the party effect in 1936 than in 1921. This comparison is
supported by the insignificance of the continuity-adjusted chi-square ratio
from a cross-tabulation of the 1936 vote by party (a value of 2.85 significant
only at the 9% level). Of course, the composition of Congress had changed
significantly between the two votes, as had economic conditions; the
Democratic party's victories and the deterioration of the economy surely
made the remaining Republican officeholders more cautious on economic
legislation and more amenable to government intervention. In fact, in the
floor debates on the bill in 1935 and on the CEA' s predecessor bill in 1934,
remarkably not one representative voiced opposition-a marked contrast to
the 1920s. 137
The muted House opposition to futures legislation in the 1930s may also
be due to greater public interest in matters pertaining to futures trading. As
indicated in Table 2, there wa" a more than three-fold increa"e in the total
number of articles concerning futures exchanges from the 1920s to the 1930s.
But we should be cautious in interpreting this increase as a sign of heightened
issue salience. The comparable increase in articles concerning stock
exchanges was over seven-fold, and the four-fold increase in articles on
13/i. See MARKHAM. supra note 12. at 25.
137. One member of the House Agriculture Committee had dissented from reporting the bill to
the tloor in 1934 without a more thorough set of hearings to investigate whether there was misconduct
on the exchanges. but he did not appear on the tloor "to defend his views" during the bill's consideration
in the chamber. See 78 CONGo REC. 10,450 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Hope).
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speculation again concerns stock and not commodity speculation. Moreover,
the economic condition of agriculture still predominated financial markets as
a topic of popular interest. Indeed, the situation merited a new category,
agricultural relief, whose coverage alone equals the reportage of futures and
stock markets combined.
These comparisons of issue salience suggest that although the futures
markets' higher visibility in the 1930s may have made the opposition to
regulation more circumspect, futures markets were still of comparatively
minor concern to the public, so that legislators would still be able to follow
the dictates of constituent interest groups or personal preference without fear
of a large electoral backlash. But the data suggest that those seeking increa~ed
regulation had an advantage. To the extent that futures regulation could be
successfully linked in the public imagination to farm relief, that is, as a
solution to the farm problem, which was clearly a subject of heightened
public awareness, then legislators would be even more hard-pressed to vote
against farm interests than they were in the 1920s.
As in the 1920s, there wa~ a slight divergence in the coverage of futures
trading legislation by the elite and p.opular media. The New York Times
covered the legislative process with somewhat greater attention than did more
popular periodicals. And in contrast to the earlier period, when the House
passed the CEA bill, it ran an editorial which criticized the House for
"legislating on the run" without "real debate" and advised the Senate to
undertake a "more careful study" of the bill before acting. 138 The newspaper's
guarded assessment of the need for increased regulation was undoubtedly in
accord with the sentiment of many of its readers, the New York financial
community (such as the New York cotton exchange) and the export trade, and
is consistent with the opposition of Northeastern senators to the CEA. In
accord with such constituents' views, these senators were also ideologically
more conservative, hence more opposed to government intervention in the
economy, as measured by the D-nominate(l) scores (median score of .217
compared to the chamber median of -.271).
D. Analysis (~f the Senate WJte on the CEA
The year-long delay between the House's passage of the CEA and the
Senate's passage of the same bill was caused principally by a fight over the
inclusion of cotton under the grain futures regime. 139 One of the opponents of
cotton's inclusion under the GFA's authority wa~ well situated to delay
enactment: Senator Ellison Smith, the chairman of the Senate Committee on
13X. Editorial, Legislating on the Run, N. Y. TIMES, June 5, 1935, at 18. The New York Times ran
no other editorials on the CEA during its legislative consideration from 1934 through 1936.
139. See. e.g.. 80 CONGo REC. 7,X49 (1936) (statement of Sen. Pope) (recounting history of
committee's consideration of House bill and actions on inclusion of cotton); Commodities: Senate Passes
New Bill Regulating Exchanges, NEWSWEEK, June 13, 1936, at 30 [hereinafter Comnwditiesj.
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Agriculture and Forestry. Senator Smith wa" from South Carolina, a cotton
producing state. He wanted a separate regime for cotton futures and he added
to the House bill a set of cotton amendments establishing such a regime that
were opposed by several senators from other cotton producing states who
were not on the Agriculture Committee. The House Agriculture Committee
wa" aware that cotton's inclusion in a bill would be highly controversial: In
both 1934 and 1935, the futures regulation bill wa" debated under a
suspension of the rules, which precluded the offering of amendments, and
thereby minimized the possibility that a split among cotton state
representatives could result in a realignment with Northeastern state
opponents and defeat the bill by the use of killer amendments such as Smith's
Senate strategy.140
As the 1936 elections' approached, Senator Smith began to encounter
political pressure, presumably from grain state legislators whose constituents
were keenly interested in the legislation. In May 1936, with sentiment in the
Senate running against. him, Senator Smith agreed to withdraw his
amendments from the bill and to offer them instead as committee-sponsored
amendments to the bill on the floor. This compromise released the bill from
the holds of other senators who were opposed to Smith's amendments, as the
Senate would now be able to vote on the Smith amendments and House bill
separately. Political pressure may also have been directed by the White
House, which supported the House bill and opposed Senator Smith's
amendments: Journalists provided conflicting accounts of the events, from the
prediction that the Administration would "muffle the cotton senator and get
the aged bill through,". to the characterization that the Administration "sighed
with relief' when Smith "surrendered.,,141
After some debate on the chamber floor, Smith's amendments were
rejected. The votes were not close-there was no need or request for a roll-call
vote. Senators from other cotton producing states, particularly Texas, opposed
the amendments on the floor. The differences appear, in part, to be
constituent-driven, based on differences in the proposals' impact due to
differences in crop quality as well as marketing in the two regions. In
particular, a multistate cotton cooperative based in Texas, which wa" said to
have short-changed South Carolina producers and to now be insolvent at the
140. See. e.g., 79 CONGo REC. X.593 (1935) (statement of Rep. Fulmer) (describing cotton
amendmenl~ he might have been able to offer "if the biU had been brought up in the regular way"). A
"killer" amendment is an amendment to a bill designed to defeat a biU that would otherwise pass were it
not amended: A killer amendment adding a second issue dimension to a bill creates a voting cycle. with
the adoption of the amendment (often phrased a~ a "motherhood and apple pie" issue on which it i~
impossible to vote no) sinking the bill. See, e.g., POOLE & ROSENTHAL. supra note 62. at 152. 157-62.
The effect of dimensionality on voting cycles is discussed infra at text and accompanying notes 174-75. If
legislators vote strategically rather than sincerely on the killer ameodment. however. the strategy will not
succeed (the amendment wili be defeated). Id. at 157.
141. Compare All in One Basket. Bus. WK.. Apr. IX. 1936. at 41 with Commodities. supra note
139.
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taxpayers' expense, would have been adversely affected by Senator Smith's
amendments. 142 A further problem for Senator Smith was that his proposals
were not likely to draw support from grain producing state senators, apart
from those who had reached a compromise with him on the committee,
because they would have been concerned that the controversy over cotton
would defeat their proposal for grain futures regulation. 143
Because there were no roll-call votes on the cotton amendments, it is not
possible to determine whether the agreement of the grain state legislators on
the committee to support Smith's amendments held up on the floor and
whether it was an alliance of conflicted cotton interests and manufacturing
state senators that produced the defeat. The data on the one available vote, the
final vote adopting the CEA, cannot shed light on the committee coalition
issue. Senator Smith did not vote on the bill's final passage. His abstention
may have been due to dissatisfaction with the defeat of his amendments, but
there wa" no statement offered to explain his absence or how he would have
voted, as there was for most of the other non-voting senators. l44
One change was made in the analysis of the 1936 vote compared to the
1921 vote because of the difference in chamber. The use of state-wide
constituent variables to explain senators' voting raises a more serious issue
than does the use of district-wide data to analyze representatives' votes
because states are often represented by senators from different parties, a fact
that suggest" that a senator's reelection constituency is a subset of state
voters. 145 Accordingly, one would expect a senator to respond to that subset's
preferences, rather than state-wide preferences. As a consequence, the average
characteristics of state residents will not adequately capture a senator's
reelection constituency, and thus may render less accurate the fitted
components of d-nominate scores relying on such data (the residual
components will contain the omitted reelection constituencies' preferences as
well as the legislators' own tastes). The problem of a split electorate cannot,
of course, occur at the district level, and the likely greater homogeneity of a
district compared to a state suggest" that for representatives, district-wide
142. While Senator Smith characterized his amendments as aiding the cotton producer and voiced
opposition to speculative trading. at least one periodical suggested a different explanation for the
disagreement. An article in Business Week suggested that Senator Smith wa~ a friend of small
commission fmns located in the South, which were "crusading" against two large cotton houses. and was
not representing the concerns of cotton producers. All in One Basket. supra note 141.
143. The concern was that any changes from the House version would result in a conference
committee coming up empty-handed. See, e.g., 80 CONGo REC. 7.850 (1936) (statement of Sen. Norris)
("It is necessary that this grain exchange bill be passed at this session. because this is the last session of
the present Congress. and if the Congress shall adjourn without passing it. it will be necessary to start
again at the next Congress.... There is danger even now a~ to getting it into conference. and a dispute
about cotton may endanger the entire grain provisions of the bill.")
144. The record contains statement~ explaining fourteen of eighteen non-voting senators; another
non-voting senator responded "here" to the roll call. See 80 CONGo REC. 8,293 (1936).
145. For the concept of a legislator's reelection constituency. see, for example. MORRIS P.
FJORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS AND CONSTITUENCIES 122 (1974).
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average characteristics are likely to coincide with the characteristics of the
reelection constituency.
To address the senatorial reelection constituency issue, another variable
wa~ included to proxy for senators' reelection constituencies in undertaking
the decomposition of the d-nominate scores. The variable is the average d-
nominate score of the congressmen elected in a senator's state from the same
party as the senator (HouseD(i), i=I,2 for the corresponding dimension). The
idea is that such congressmen are elected by the voters most likely to have
voted for the senator. 146 Descriptive statistics for the variables in the
regression are summarized in Table 9.
An analysis of the 1936 Senate vote (66 in favor to 18 against) reveals a
number of differences from the 1921 House vote. As indicated in Table 10,
none of the interest group variables are significant, nor are the ideology
variables, although the variation explained by the model is extremely high (a
goodness of fit of over .85), much higher than that of the comparable 1921
regression (Modell). The data demonstrate the decline in influence of the
exchanges in the 74th Congress, which accords with the legislative history
indicating far less vocal support for the exchanges among legislators than in
the 1920s.147 It is also consistent with the possibility already mentioned that
heightened public attention to farmers' economic distress, as well as greater
public awareness of futures exchanges, undercut the influence of the
exchanges on legislators' voting.
As in the 1921 data, the farm interest group variable is positive and
significant only in the regression model omitting the second dimension of the
d-nominate scores (Model 3). In this case the personal ideology variable (the
residual from the decomposition of the D-nominate(1) score) is also negative
and significant-more liberal senators were more likely to vote for the CEA.
When the personal ideology variables are omitted from the regression (Model
2), both of the constituent-driven ideology variables, the fitted components of
the d-nominate score decompositions, are negative and significant. The
omitted personal ideology variables (the decomposition residuals) are,
however, also important as there is a loss of explanatory power across the
models and a likelihood ratio test of their predictive importance is significant
(the chi-square of 15.97 is significant at less than 5%).
There is no ready explanation for why the rural dimension of the d-
nominate scores is negatively related to senators' votes. The variable's
insignificance when the residual components are included makes it difficult
to attribute much to its significance in Model 2. The instability in significance
persists in the other models: The second dimension d-nominate score is
146. See Steven D. Levitt. How Senators Vore? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences,
Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology, 86 AMER. ECON. REV. 425 (1996).
147. All of the regression models were run with separate dummy variables for grain and cotton
exchanges and there were no differences from the models reported in the text that use a dummy for the
presence of either type of exchange in the state (AI/Ex).
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negative and significant when the d-nominate variables are entered into the
vote regression directly (Model 4), but it is not significant when the state-
level constituent variables are also included (Model 5). This bolsters the
decision to attribute little import to the finding of significance.
It is possible that the insignificance of the ideology variables in the 1936
regression compared to the 1921 regression is related to the difference in
chamber of Congress-the regression model has not captured as adequately
the election constituency of the senators as it did for the representatives-but I
doubt that this is the ca<;e. Although the House d-nominate score is a crude
proxy for a senator's reelection constituency, the decomposition regressions
for the 1936 Senate vote including it are not worse predictors of their scores
than those for the 1921 House vote: adjusted R2s of .7781 and .3576, for the
first and second dimensions, respectively. Moreover, the House d-nominate
score is a significant predictor of the first-dimension score, and its inclusion
improves significantly the explanatory power of the decomposition
regression. 148 When the constituency variables are entered directly, rather than
through a decomposition of the d-nominate scores (Model 5), none are
significant explainers of the votes, including the House d-nominate scores, as
wa<; true of the 1921 House vote regressions!49 Given the similarity in these .
result<;, the distinct reelection constituency explanation can be rejected as the
explanation of the insignificance of the ideology variable (the first dimension
score) for the 1936 vote.
The institutional variables, membership on the agriculture committee and
political party affiliation, are also not significant explainers of the vote
(although committee members voted yes in a higher proportion than non-
committee members, 93% compared to 67%, and Democrats voted yes in a
higher proportion than Republicans, 83% compared to 62%). The
insignificance of the party variable is expected given that it was not a "party
vote" (a majority of both parties voted for the bill), and it is consistent with
participants' claims that the legislation was bipartisan.150 It is also consistent
with the interpretation of Table 8 as showing that the regional effect was more
important than the party effect. The insignificance of the committee variable
is not surprising, as the Senate Agriculture Committee wa<; representative of
the chamber, just as the House Agriculture Committee was in 1921.151
A further institutional variable was added to each of the regression
148. Other significant predictors in both of the dimensions' decomposition regressions are the
percentage vote for the Democratic presidential candidate in (932, party and farm population. The fit of
the decomposition regressions excluding the special constituency proxy, the House d-nominate score, i~
much worse, particularly for the first dimension score, with an adjusted R2 of .6247 and .3283, for the
first and second dimension score regressions, respectively.
149. The model failed to converge when the cotton and wheat variables were included, so they
are therefore omitted from the regression (ModelS).
150. See, e.g., 78 CONGo REC. 10,450 (1934) (statement of Rep. Hope).
151. The median, mean and variance of the committee and chamber D-nominate( I) scores do not
differ significantly (-.367, -.261, .14, and -.276, -.144, .06 respectively). See note 61, supra.
324
HeinOnline -- 14 Yale J. on Reg. 325 1997
The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation
models of Table 9: a dummy variable indicating whether the senator wa<; up
for election in 1936 (Upin36). The motivation for this refinement is the
possibility that senators who must stand for reelection will be more responsive
to public opinion and constituents than those who are not up for reelection. A
failure to control for this institutional difference (which is, of course,
irrelevant to members of the House)152 could obscure the constituent
variables' effects, and thus provide an alternative chamber-based explanation
to the distinct reelection constituency explanation for those variables'
insignificance. The election-year indicator variable wa<; not, however,
significant in any of the models that could be estimated, and although it
increased the models' goodness of fit and percentage of observations correctly
predicted, its inclusion did not alter the finding of the insignificance of the
constituent variables. 153 This finding is consistent with that of studies of
voting practices of legislators not standing for reelection, which conclude that
the effect is to reduce the frequency with which the legislator votes, rather
than to alter his or her substantive positions.1 54
There are some additional· simple tests to explore whether constituent or
ideological factors influence congressional voting that make use of the
distinctive feature of the Senate, that the same geographical base elects more
than one legislator. The theory underlying the tests is that if legislators are the
agents of constituents, then two senators from the same state should vote
together (because they represent the same interests).155 Senator pairs that vote
differently on the roll-call vote are classification errors; a high percentage of
such errors indicates that the constituency model is of little explanatory
power. Of course, a low level of classification errors does not mean that a
constituent voting model is robust unless it represents an improvement over
the errors that would arise if senators voted randomly.156 To account for the
contention that senators serve different constituent groups within the state, the
classification errors of the senator pairs can be adjusted to exclude
152. Systematic infonnation concerning whether House members had in 1921 announced plans to
retire prior to the 1922 election (which was more than a year away at the time of the vote) is not available
to include a similar variable in the House vote regression. I do not have such infonnation for the Senators
voting in 1936 either.
153. Models 3, 4 and 5 did not converge when the reelection dummy was included and could not
be estimated. Model 4 could be estimated excluding farm population, and in this case both D-nominate( I )
and D-nominate(2) were negative and significant.
154. See, e.g., John R. Lott, Jr. & Stephen G. Bronars, Time Series Evidence on Shirking in the
U.S. House of Representatives, 76 PUR. CHOICE 125 (1993).
155. See Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Are Legislators Ideologues or the Agents of
Constituents?, 40 EUR. ECON: REV. 707, 711-12 (1996) [hereinafter Ideologues or Agents?]; Keith
Krehbiel, Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences, 76 PUR. CHOICE 21,25-26 (1993).
156. While we would expect at lea~t 50% of the pairs to vote together if voting is random, the
more appropriate ba~line comparison adjust~ for the actual distribution of the votes. It asks what
proportion of matches would we expect for the observed vote outcome if voting wa~ independent of
constituent characteristics? See Krehbiel, supra note 155, at 26. For the 1936 vote, with 56 of 74 yes
votes for the 37 voting senator pairs, the expected or random match rate is .64 (the sum of the squares of
the probabilities of a yes and a no vote).
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disagreeing vote pairs whose senators are from different political parties. 15?
To test whether the senator's constituency matters less than his or her
ideology on the vote, the proportion of classification errors occurring in the
constituent and political party models can be compared to the classification
errors arising from using senators' ideology (the D-nominate(1) scores) alone
to predict the vote. 158
There are thirty-seven pairs of voting senators for the vote on the CEA's
passage. Of these, only four state pairs had disagreeing votes. Table 11
reports the match rates derived from the classification errors of the three
models of senator voting for the vote on the CEA. As the Table makes clear,
the constituency models perform significantly better than a random model,
and more importantly, than the ideology model. 159 The constituency model
has fewer errors than the ideology model in classifying the senators' votes
(four errors compared to twelve). In addition, the simple constituent model
performs virtually as well as the political party variation (only one disagreeing
pair consisted of senators from different parties). This simple test of
constituent influence comparing senator match rates indicates that there is a
significant constituent, as well as an ideological, component in the vote on the
CEA, consistent with the 1921 voting regression analysis.
E. The Legacy of the New Deal .
The enactment of the CEA did not end the efforts of farm-state
legislators, nor the demands of their constituents, for further farm relief
legislation because, not surprisingly, the CEA did not increa<;e prices. Direct
income support was eventually enacted in 1938 with subsidies received in
exchange for government control over decisionmaking, through the acreage
reduction program of the AAA. The more interventionalist approach taken
toward the perceived farm problem in the second New Deal with the AAA
differed substantially from the more private-sector orientation of McNary-
Haugenism and the 1920s legislation. Concurrently with the implementation
of a program to raise farm income through payments to reduce plantings, as
indicated in Table 6, the political activity directed against futures markets
declined sharply.
It is no coincidence that the farm group effort to abolish futures declined
157. See Ideologues or Agents?, supra note 155, at 708·09.
15R. See id. at 709. To detennine the cla~sification errors, the senators are ordered by D·
nominate( I ) scores and then the cutpoint is found that minimizes the c1a~sification error. The minimum
classification error identified by this technique for the CEA vote is 12.
159. This result differs from the findings for aggregated Senate roll-call votes of both Krehbiel,
supra note 155 (one Congress) and Ideologues or Agents?, supra note 155 (100 Congresses). One
explanation for the difference is that the aggregated Senate votes include procedural votes, which tend to
be dominated by party line considerations (cases where the ideological voting model should be superior
to the constituent model), and such votes may swamp the effect of constituent influence on other votes in
the sample involving substantive issues.
326
HeinOnline -- 14 Yale J. on Reg. 327 1997
The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation
dramatically upon the New Deal's establishment of a comprehensive federal
farm subsidy program. The New Deal also effectively ended the cooperative
movement as the mechanism to improve farmers' income, for the AAA
directed payments to individual farmers. The cooperatives had expended
considerable political effort on the futures exchanges because their integral
connection to the agricultural marketing system made them business rivals.
For instance, the CEA provision most opposed by the exchanges after the
provisions directly affecting trading (position limits, broker licensing and
customer account segregation) wa" a provision that extended the rights of
cooperatives to be admitted to exchange membership.l60
The controverted provision addressed a problem for cooperatives under
the 1922 law. A cooperative denied a membership on an exchange could
appeal to the GFA. However, because the only sanction the GFA could take
against a wrongful denial wa" to close down the exchange, if an exchange
appealed an adverse GFA determination, the courts would maintain the status
quo, exchange operation without the cooperative as a member, until the
appeal was concluded. This practice imposed significant additional trading
costs on a cooperative that eventually won its dispute; it had to pay the
commission fees charged to non-members pending resolution of the litigation,
which could take years. Exchanges contested the legal qualifications of
cooperatives seeking membership because patronage dividends (which were a
function of members' usage, that is, of their trade volume) undermined the
exchanges' rule against the rebating of commissions. The exchanges were
concerned that cooperatives would do substantial business with non-coop
members at lower commission rates than exchange members charged.
The new 1936 provision required an exchange to accord cooperatives full
membership rights during litigation brought by the exchange over the
cooperative's admission, unless the exclusion was authorized by the
Commodity Exchange Commission (CEC), which wa" created by the CEA to
carry out the Act's regulatory functions and wa" comprised of the Secretaries
of Agriculture and Commerce and the Attorney General. This resolution
reduced a challenged cooperative's costs-it still paid the reduced fees of a
member pending the exchange's appeal of a CEC order to admit the
cooperative.
The proponent of the provision wa" an important constituent of the
Agriculture Committee members, the Farmers' National Grain Corporation
(FNG), a cooperative established to serve as the national grain marketing
agency under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929. The FNG estimated
that it had lost over $250,000 in additional trading fees because of litigation
160. The cooperative membership issue played a more prominent role in the 1930s hearings than
in the I920s. precisely because of the constituent connection, discussed infra at note 161 and
accompanying text, a dispute between the Farmers' National Grain Corporation (a national cooperative)
and the CBOT.
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over membership rights with the CBOT. 161 The connection between
cooperatives and futures trading reform could not be more graphic than this
case: FNG, with its intense concern over the cooperative membership rights
provision, wa" also in charge of shepherding all of the witnesses testifying in
support of the CEA before the Senate.162 With the grain and cotton
cooperative interest groups' disappearance from the political scene on the
adoption of the New Deal programs that assisted individual farmers directly,
there were no competitors to the exchanges to lobby for increased regulation
in order to advantage their marketing efforts a" against the exchanges.
ill addition, farmers' concerns over regulating futures markets were, in
truth, a second best solution to their goal of establishing control over the cash
markets, for this was a circuitous means of raising 'commodity prices. Indeed,
during the 1932 hearings on futures markets regulation prior to the enactment
of the New Deal AAA program, witnesses noted that restricting speculative
trading would not raise farm incomes, and that the only policy that would
maintain farmers' income levels would be the institution of cash subsidies-
which they did not believe wa" an acceptable national policy at the time. 163
Thus, the advocacy of increased futures regulation in the 1930s performed the
same two-fold function as it did in the 1920s, increasing the extent of
government intervention into the agricultural marketplace and coalition-
building in the larger drive for farm relief, although the political agenda wa"
shifting from concentrating bargaining power through cooperatives to
obtaining an income maintenance program.
Another piece of suggestive evidence that the demand for regulation of
futures markets is inextricably connected to farmers' desires to obtain
government price supports and not a concern to perfect the market, is that, as
Simpson observes in reviewing the development of cotton futures trading in
Liverpool, there was "no active hostility to futures trading" in the "regular
law" of England, and there also were no English cotton producers. l64 This
characterization of the priority of farmers' regulatory concerns is also
supported by the political dynamics of more recent futures regulation reform:
Farm organizations often support the exchanges' position against opponents
and efforts to abolish futures trading have been focused upon only a few
161. See /934 Hearing, supra note 122. at 42 (statement of Irving B. Goldsmith, counsel for
FNG). The CBOT had refused to admit the cooperative to membership in the CBOT's clearinghouse
because a majority of its business was for nonmembers. based on FNG's extensive transactions for the
federal government's Grain Stabilization Corporation. The CBOT contended that this rendered it an
illegitimate cooperative under the Capper-Volstead definition, despite iL~ recognition by the government
as a cooperative. See id. at 156, 173 (statement of Howard Ellis, counsel for the CBOT).
162. See /936 Hearing, supra note 121, at 156 (statement of Irving B. Goldsmith, counsel for
FNG).
163. See, e.g., /932 Hearing, supra note 123, at 148 (response of Siebel C. Harris, Chainnan,
Grain Committee on National Affairs, representing several grain exchanges); 80 CONGo REC. 8,088
(1930) (statement of Sen. Frazier) (noting CEA was "simply...a step in the right direction" toward more
important legislation that "we have not been able to get," legislation that would fix commodity prices).
1M. Simpson, supra note 133, at 207.
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contracts (onions and Irish potatoes) introduced immediately after World War
II.165 While the shift in farmer attitude is, no doubt, to some extent a function
of their greater economic sophistication, as farmers now use futures markets
to hedge price risk, it is also true that the federal price support program
eliminated the principal source of farmers' antagonism to exchanges:
Speculators on exchanges no longer were "setting" the price farmers received
for their products, the government was.
m. Setting the Stage for the Dispersion of Financial Market Regulation: The
1974 Reforms
Although the overall regulatory approach to derivative instruments wa"
established in 1922, the present regulatory institution is not much more than
twenty years old. The 1974 amendments to the CEA, known as the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974,166 established an
independent agency to regulate futures, the CFTC, along the lines. of the
regulator created by the New Deal for securities, the SEC. The new futures
regulator was given exclusive authority over futures contracts and the
165. See text following notes 190 and 286, infra (1974 and 1991 legislation). Onion and potato
faimers lobbied for elimination of futures trading in the 1950s when futures contracts on these
commodities were introduced after price supports were lifted at the end of World War II. The onion
growers succeeded in 1959, when Congress outlawed onion futures after a trading scandal, but the potato
growers did not. Several competing explanations have been advanced for these farmers' advocacy of a
futures trading ban. Cox contended that by reducing risk, futures markets increase crop supply, and that
under certain conditions this increao;es optimal farm size. correspondingly decreasing the number of
producers. Charles Cox. The Regulation of Futures Trading (1975) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago). Cox provides data that the size of onion and potato farms increased during the period of
futures trading more than did farm size in general, and that the number of onion and potato farms also
decreao;ed during the period of futures trading. In this view, the protesting onion and potato farmers
would have been inefficient small producers, whose livelihoods were threatened by the scale economies
brought about by futures trading. Working offered a contrary hypothesis: he suggested that because
futures markel~ make product prices more transparent, they eliminated the monopoly bargaining power of
large onion producers and dealers to set prices. See Holbrook Working, Futures Markets Under Renewed
Attack, 4 FOOD RES. INST. STUD. 13 (1963). In this view, the protesters would be the larger, and not
smaller, onion farmers. Hieronymus offered a third explanation. He maintained that the source of the
onion farmers' agitation for a ban wa~ the farmers' substantial trading losses from speculating in long
positions on the futures exchanges at the time onion prices collapsed. To Prohibit Trading in Irish Potato
Futures on Commodity Exchanges, Hearings on H.R. 7287, a Bill to Ban Maine Potato Futures. Before
Subcomm. on Domestic Marketing and Consumer Relations of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1972) (testimony of T. Hieronymus. Prof. of Agricultural Economics, Univ. of
Illinois). It should also be noted that, in contrast to wheat and cotton exchanges which produced
numerous witnesses in support of their cause such as millers and processors, who were important
congressional constituent~, the onion exchange had little out~ide support. This is because most onions are
not processed but are marketed directly to consumers. Consequently, there were few onion u.sers to lobby
for the maintenance of their hedging markets. For the most part, the hedgers were onion producers.
Besides affecting the exchange's ability to rally political support, this market characteristic is more likely
to produce a thin trading market, which is more easily manipulated. than other crop markets. because
hedging demand is key to futures market liquidity. See Basil S. Varney. Scope for Futures Tradinx and
the. Conditions for Success, in How COMMODITY FlJrURES WORK 14,20-22 (1985).
166. Pub. L. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.c. §4(a) et seq. (1994).
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definition of its authority was expanded beyond that of its predecessor in the
Department of Agriculture to all futures trading.
The key structural change, the separation of the futures market regulator
from the Department of Agriculture, was opposed by the futures exchanges,
farm and grain organizations, and commodity trading firms. Despite the
opposition, the measure had specific appeal to legislators because it
strengthened congressional control of public policy, and in particular that of
the Democratic majority, against that of the Republication administration.
Creating an independent agency wa" an attempt to leverage congressional
influence in an era of divided government. But neither the proponents nor the
opponents of the change foresaw the legislation's most significant
consequences: Dispersion of U.S. financial market regulation.
A. Choice of Venue for Reform
The agriculture committees held three hearings from 1973-74 on what
became the 1974 amendments to the CEA. An important impetus for the
hearings was a steep increase in food prices. From December 1972 to April
1973, food prices rose 8.3%, in contrast to a 2.6% increase in the c.p.I. I67
One congressman stated that without the price controls instituted by the
Nixon Administration, 1973 food prices would have increased by 16% over
1972 prices. 168 Consumer groups formed to organize boycotts of meat
because of spiraling prices. 169 Farmers were an obvious potential target for the
swelling consumer discontent. The agriculture committees sought to be
responsive to these concerns while at the same time ensuring that legislation
adverse to farming interest" would not be enacted.
The first hearing was held, in part, in response to the entrepreneurial
activities of Congressman Neal Smith, a Democrat and self-described farmer
from lowa,170 who held investigative hearings on grain marketing in 1973 in
his position as chairman of a special subcommittee of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Small Business. Smith's subcommittee produced a
report with several recommendations concerning the regulation of futures
167. See Food Price Investigation, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law, House Comm. on the Judiciary. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1973) [hereinafter Food
Price Hearings] (statement of James T. Halverson, Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade
Commission).
168. See id. at 76 (statement of Rep. Rodino). Food prices had increased substantially in 1972,
after the Soviet Union bought 25% of the U.S. wheat crop through a secretly negotiated agreement to
which government export subsidies applied. Russian Grain Transactions, Hearings Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Sen. Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1973) [hereinafter Russian Grain Hearings] (statement of Sen. Jackson). The sale wa~ claimed to have
atfected 1973 prices by reducing domestic supply. Id. at 4.
169. Food Price Hearings, supra note 167, at 76-78.
170. Trained as a lawyer, Smith identified his occupation as a farmer in his official congressional
biography. See 1974 Official Congressional Directory, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1974). Directory
biographies are furnished or authorized by the members. [d. at 3.
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trading, a subject not within his committee's jurisdiction. These included a
proposal to create a stronger futures regulator-an independent agency,
analogous to the SEc. 171 Smith's subcommittee deemed such an entity
necessary to ensure the effective implementation of new regulatory powers
that it wa" proposing, which included margin setting and designation of
contract delivery points (matters the CEA had left in the exchanges'
control). 172
Because Smith was not a member of the House Agriculture Committee
that had jurisdiction over futures markets, his investigation provided an
opportunity for venue-shopping by interest groups dissatisfied with the
existing futures regime and seeking to place new regulatory proposals ooto
the active legislative agenda. On occasion, interest groups who have lost in a
policy arena are able to alter the status quo by skillfully changing the public
perception of an issue; such successful issue redefinition typically occurs by
the groups' attaching themselves to a competing policy-making venue from
the status quo's defender (such as a different congressional committee), one
more sympathetic to theirposition.1 73 This issue redefinition activity is
referred to in the political science literature as expanding (or manipulating)
the dimensions of the issue. 174 The key fact is that as an issue expands beyond
a single dimension (where a dimension refers to a relevant variable property
of an alternative and voters' tastes), voting outcomes are more likely to cycle,
producing no unique majority vote winner. Under such circumstances, a
coalition can be formed that offers a proposal that successfully defeats the
status quO. 175
For example, if the issue is a school budget, dimensions might be the
range of teachers' salaries or the student-teacher ratio. If only one dimension
mattered, such as salary, then all the voters' preferences could be arrayed
171. Although there is a technical distinction between the tenns independent agency and
independent regulatory commission, see JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 534, I use them
interchangeably, as was done in the legislative debate.
172. See Small Business Problems Involved in the Marketing of Grain and Other Com/'/'wdities,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems of the House Permanent Select
Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., 1st Se.~s. 1-2 (1973) [hereinafter Small Business Hearings)
(opening statement of Rep. Smith). Fanners sought government control over margin selling to prevent
the exchanges' practice of raising a contract's margin requirement~ when the market moved substantially
(a rea~onable and prudent policy, from the exchanges' point of view, as a means of ensuring performance
and thus protecting the c1earinghou.~). In 1973, as soybean prices increa~d dramatically, margins were
raised, creating ca~h problems for short sellers (hedging fanners and elevators to whom fanners hau solu
produce forwaru). The uemanu for government regulation of uelivery points arose because regional
market~ were not designated delivery point~ for the Chicago exchanges' futures contract~, pUlling
regional fanners at a disauvantage because their produce could not practically be u.~d to deliver on the
contracts.
173. See BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 4, at 29-35.
174. See, e.g., WILLIAMH. RIKER, THE ARTOFPOLlTICAL MANIPULATION 150-51 (Ino).
175. The technique-increa~ingissue dimensionality- can, of course, also be used to preserve
the status quo from a new majority that would otherwise implement a different equilibrium point. See,
e.g.. POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 02, at 157-5X (discussing Powell amendment to the 195(, School
Aid Bill).
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along a line, from low to high salary ranges, and there would be a clear
majority winner (the median voter's preference).176 When two or more
dimensions enter the decision, voters' preferences need no longer neatly line
up in the multi-dimensional choice space to produce a clear-cut winner and,
depending on the order of the alternatives (i.e., budget proposals combining
different salary ranges and class sizes) to be voted on, the majority decision
will differ. 177 Thus, voters who disagree with the median voter's salary
preference could seek to include in a school budget vote both salary and class
size proposals, and thereby produce a different salary range choice closer to
their preferred outcome. This strategy may not succeed, however, if the
opponents recognize the strategy's intended effect (to break up their winning
coalition), for then the opponents will not vote sincerely on the new
dimension to ensure that their coalition, and hence, preferred outcom~, is
maintained. 178
Baumgartner and Jones relate issue dimension expansion to choice of
institutional venue. Status quo opponents can choose a new dimension that is
within the jurisdiction of a political institution different from the current issue
guardian, in order to change the equilibrium. For example, opponents of
civilian nuclear power succeeded in stemming the industry's expansion by
redefining the issue from economic growth and clean energy to health and
safety hazards, which appealed to different political actors than the nuclear
power regulator, the Atomic Energy Commission. The opponents of the, status
quo did not attempt to counter proponents' data on the economic benefits of
nuclear power but rather shifted the focus of debate to new issues subject to
different venues (federal court, state and local government offiCials, and
congressional committees other than the Joint Congressional Committee on
Atomic Energy).179 This strategy succeeded before public sentiment turned
decisively against the nuclear power industry in the wake of the Three Mile
Island reactor incident,180
A similar venue-shifting strategy is at work in the Smith subcommittee
investigation. Although there is nothing in the legislative record to suggest
that Smith had closer relations to farm groups than Agriculture Committee
176. For a nontechnical discussion of social choice theory reviewing this and many other result~
of the voting literature, see generally WILLtAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982).
177. This is because the median voter need not be the median in all dimensions and the other
voters may not line up in pairs of opposing sides on a line through the median. For a non-technical
discussion of this condition and historical examples of the use of the strategy of issue-dimension
expansion see RIKER, supra note 174, at 144-46, 150-51.
178. For an example where introducing a new dimension into legislative debate failed for this
reason see Congress and Railroad Regulation, supra note 82, at 103 (discussing failure of effort to break
up the coalition supporting creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission by introducing another
dimension-a provision prohibiting racial discrimination-into the legislation, because coalition members
foresaw the amendment's unraveling effect). Senator Smith's cotton amendment~ to the 193/\ CEA bill
was an unsuccessful effort at issue-dimension expansion.
179. See BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 4. at /\8-76.
180. Id. at 79-82.
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members, the Agriculture Committee also had ties to the futures exchanges,
which would delay pursuit of the farming agenda as well as temper the
legislative output. Smith's subcommittee would therefore be a preferable
arena for farm groups seeking new institutional arrangements. The venue-
shopping scenario is indeed quite apt. One of the principal items on Smith's
agenda was to evaluate whether the Commodity Exchange Authority, the
successor to the GFA created by the Secretary of Agriculture to administer the
CEA, was effectively discharging its duty under the ACt. ISI This inquiry
principally focused on farm groups' grievances against exchange practices
that were tolerated by the Authority. In fact, the bill that wa<; eventually
presented to the House by the Agriculture Committee was less restrictive of
exchange activities than Smith's subcommittee's recommendations (for
example, it did not grant margin-setting authority to the government.) It also
did not create an independent regulatory agency.
The subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee with jurisdiction
over the regulation of monopolies also investigated food prices in 1973 and
entertained the possibility of eliminating the antitrust exemption for
agricultural cooperatives. IS2 This is yet another example of venue-shifting
efforts in pursuit of regulatory reform. It is not surprising that criticism of
producers would emerge in this forum, the one committee investigating food
prices without ties to farm interests.
B. The Futures Legislative Process in the Turbulent Politics of the 1970s
Farm-state representatives attending the Judiciary subcommittee hearing
defended their constituents by noting that for the first time in twenty years
farmers were "getting a decent return,"183 and sought to identify other
potential villains. Given the political history of futures regulation, it should
come as no surprise that futures exchanges were one such target. Smith
aggressively pursued this agenda in his subcommittee. He placed a substantial
part of the blame for higher food prices on futures exchanges, suggesting that
wide fluctuations in grain futures prices as food prices increased were the
work of manipulation by speculators. 184 In his subcommittee's work, the rest
of the blame wa" apportioned to other familiar villains: the nation's grain
distribution network, railroads and other middlemen. ls5 But it should be noted
IHI. Small Business Hearings. supra note 172, at 2 (statement of Rep. Smith).
IH2. See Food Price Hearings, supra note l1i7, at 71i-7H.
IH3. Id. at 7H (statement of Rep. Dennis of Indiana); Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act, Hearings Before Sen. Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry. 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 259 (1974)
[hereinafter /974 Sen. Hearings] (statement of Rep. Rodino).
IH4. See Small Business Hearings, supra note 172, at I (opening statement of Rep. Neal Smith).
I H5. See generally Small Business Prohlems Involved in the Marketing of Grain and Othl'l'
Commodities (Vol. Ilj, Hearings Beji"e the Suhcomm. on Special Small Business ProhlenM'. House
Permanent Select Comm. on Small Business. 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Farm groups also raised
concerns about the adequacy of railroad facilities that prevented them from shipping their produce on
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that the impetus for Smith's inquiry, ironically, wa<; not so much the
complaints of consumers concerning rising food prices as it was the
complaints of farmers (and grain elevators) who had hedged their crops on
futures markets and sustained considerable losses on the futures transactions
as prices rose. Because of the daily marking to market of gains and losses in
futures markets, farmers' losses on the futures side of the hedge were
immediately recognized, wherea<; the offsetting gains on the cash side would
not be realized until they sold their grain. 186
Smith wa<; the lead-off witness of the House Agriculture Committee's
hearings reviewing the CEA, and his subcommittee's earlier work may well
have propelled the issue of revamping the CEA, in response to rising food
prices, to the top of the Agriculture Committee's agenda. Some newspapers
suggested that the increases in food prices were caused by speculators'
trading, a proposition at the core of Smith's subcommittee's work,18? which
called for Agriculture Committee action to reform the CEA. The Assistant
Secretary of Agriculture, however, testified to the Agriculture Committee that
such claims were incorrect,I88 and there is nothing in' the extensive legislative
record to suggest that the claim had any validity. In fact, notwithstanding
Smith's subcommittee's investigation of futures exchanges and the sporadic
newspaper reports, attacks on speculation were not as prominent in the
hearings on the CEA in 1973-74 as they were in the hearings in the 1920s and
1930s.
The decline in importance of speculation in the 1970s futures debate is
consistent with other trends. Speculation was an issue in the 1920s and 1930s
due to farmers' attacks on exchanges as the source of their financial
difficulties. In the 1970s, commodity prices were rising and speculation wa<;
therefore not a prominent concern of farmers. Moreover, as Table 2 makes
clear, popular concern over speculation wa<; virtually nonexistent by the
1970s compared to the Depression years. Its absence from the legislative
discourse was therefore consistent with the national mood.
While animus towards speculators wa<; not shaping the public discourse,
it was surely an intelligent strategy for farmers and their committee supporters
to move quickly to advocate reform of the CEA and increased regulation of
futures markets in the inflationary economy of the 1970s. Prompt action
would preempt other committees from responding to consumer concerns over
rising food prices by revising laws under their purview which could adversely
time to comply with contract deadlines. See, e.g., Smull Business Heurings, supru note 172, at 14-15
(testimony of Argie Hall. Fanners Grain Dealers Ass'n of Iowa).
186. This ca~h-flow ditliculty was the reason fanners sought federal regulation of exchange
margins. See note 172, supra.
187. See Smull Business Heurings, sUflra note 172, at 2 (statement of Rep. Smith).
188. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of /974, Heurings Bejore House Comm.
on Agriculture, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1974) Ihereinafter CFTC Heurings) (statement of Clayton
Yeutter, Asst. Secretary, Dep't of Agriculture).
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affect producers, such as eliminating the previously mentioned antitrust
exemption for producer cooperatives under the Judiciary Committee's
jurisdiction. This would ensure agricultural interests controlled the legislative
agenda concerning commodity prices.
C. Creation (l the CFTC: The Debate over an Independent Futures
Regulator
The broadening range of groups interested in futures regulation wa<;
reflected in both the witness list and legislators' remarks in the record as a
new political actor wa<; introduced. Consumer "representatives" were
explicitly called to testify and, in contrast to the 1920s, there are scattered
references to consumers' concerns throughout the 1970s hearings. 189 Another
measure of this new phenomenon of consumer representatives is the tracking
in Table 2 of national periodical coverage on food prices: Media coverage
during 1974-75 is higher (averaging over thirty stories a year) than the years
immediately before and after the legislation, and it is much higher than during
the previous periods of futures trading reform in the 1920s and 1930s (which
averaged four and sixteen stories a year on food prices, respectively). 190
Although farm organizations were the source of the federal initiatives to
regulate futures trading in the 1920s and 1930s, they were not the principal
advocates of the structural change in the 1974 legislation, the creation of an
independent futures regulator. This was notwithstanding Representative
Smith's association with farming interests. This is evident from Table 12,
which tallies the witnesses in the House and Senate hearings by their position
on the creation of an independent agency.191 As Table 12 makes clear, the
principal proponents of an independent agency were legislators and self-
described consumer advocacy groups.
I. The Farm Groups' Position
In sharp contrast to the regulatory InItIatIve of the I 920s, farm
organizations were split or undecided on the proposed change to an
189. See, e.g., 1974 Sen. Hearings, supra note 183. at I (opening statement of Sen. Talmadge);
CFTC Hearings, supra note 188. at 13 (testimony of Clayton Yeutter. Asst. Secretary. Dep't of
Agriculture).
190. Coverage in the Guide ha~ increa~d over time. in terms of number of periodicals covered
per volume and pages per year (since the earlier volumes covered multiple years). But. given the stability
of a low number of food price articles per year both before and after the I970s. I do not think that
expanding coverage alone explains these data. a.~ opposed to increased public interest in the issue. For a
chart of the changing coverage of Guide volumes by page and periodical numbers. see BAUMGARTNER &
JONES. supra note 4. at 264-66.
191. Nearly one-third of the witnesses expressed no position on the issue. The reason in many
cases was that the witnesses were testifying on specific issues unrelated to the new agency's structure.
such as. whether international agricultural commodities futures should be regulated or whether metal
options trading should be banned, which would be the effect of the proposed expansion of the CEA's
coverage to all commodities.
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independent regulator, rather than uniformly in support of it. One explanation
of the farm organizations' split on creation of an independent agency is that
their influence within the Department of Agriculture varied. Another, perhaps
related explanation for this change is that by 1974, a number of farmers and
cooperative elevators were using futures markets to hedge, and although they
still may have been wary of speculators, they were far more integrated into
trading markets than they were fifty years earlier. 192 In addition, as previously
mentioned, the changed economic circumstances motivating the demand for
legislative action-rising prices-meant that political agitation did not
originate in farming communities.
Farm organizations did support Smith's other substantive
recommendations calling for the government's setting of margins and
contract delivery points. The exchanges' practice of raising margins when
prices rose dramatically and the single delivery point on certain grain
contracts exacerbated farmers' hedging losses in the rising grain market. 193
Farmers thought that the government would implement policies more
favorable to them. Although Smith thought an independent agency would
handle such authority best, farm groups may have been less confident of that
outcome. Alternatively, they may have been positioning themselves to forge a
compromise with opponents of the structural change in exchange for support
on other futures reforms (for instance, the transfer from exchanges to the
government of authority to set margins and delivery-points) or on other farm
programs.
2. Support for an Independent Futures Regulator
Several disparate arguments were advanced in support of creating an
independent agency, none of which had any bearing on farming issues, a
factor that further highlights the difference between this legislative effort and
that of the 1920s and 1930s. The most frequently expressed rationale wac; that
the proposed expansion of regulation to cover previously unregulated futures
trading in nonagricultural products, such as silver and foreign currency, and
internationally-grown agricultural products, such as coffee and sugar,
required expertise beyond the Agriculture Department's competence. 194 The
192. See 120 CONGo REC. 10,739 (1974) (Rep. Mayne) (expressing surprise at widespread use of
futures among his farmer constituents); 1974 Sen. Hearings, supra note 183, at 45!1 (statement of George
C. Cortwright, Director, Delta Council); id. at 422 (statement of L.c. "Clell" Carpenter, Vice-President,
Midcontinent Farmers Ass'n). It is possible that the differences in the farm groups' positions are related
to differences in attributes of the farmers represented by the groups, such as farm size or relative benetit
obtained from federal SUbsidy programs; but that information is not readily available, and it is not
apparent how such attributes would affect one's view of the appropriate structure for the futures
regulator.
193. See notes 172 and I!Iii, supra.
194. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1974). Senator McGovern, who had
introduced legislation to create an independent agency, cited all of the rationales discussed in the text in
his opening statement. See 1974 Sen. Hearings, supra note 183, at 195-98.
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CBOT's contemplation of marketing a financial futures contract on
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) pass-through
certificates (a fixed-income security) raised a similar concern regarding
institutional competency. 195 However, it is difficult to characterize the
concern over expertise as the primary reac;on for creating an independent
agency because very few witnesses, including independent agency
proponents, foresaw that the market would shift dramatically away from a
predominance of agricultural products in a few years.
A related impetus for the desire to regulate all futures contracts, which
underscored the expertise issue, wac; a scandal involving substantial investor
losses from the failure of a California firm, Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., a
modem-day bucket shop trading options on precious metals. 196 The firm's
activities were not within the Commodity Exchange Authority's jurisdiction
(metals were not a commodity under the CEA) and the SEC wac; apparently
slow to assert jurisdiction over the failed firm, arguably because its authority
was uncertain (whether options on metals were "securities" under the federal
securities laws was uncharted legal terrain).
Another frequently stated rationale for the establishment of the CFTC was
a perceived structural weakness in the Commodity Exchange Authority. It
was thought that there wac; an inherent conflict of interest in assigning futures
market regulation to the Department of Agriculture because it was an
organization that had a statutory duty to protect farmers' income, a duty
considered inconsistent with acting impartially toward futures trading. '97
Concern over conflict of interest surfaced as an issue for the first time in the
1970s because food prices were spiraling upward rather than downward as
they were when the futures regulator wac; created in the 1920s and 1930s. No
specific charges of an actual conflict, however, were ever made. The
Commodity Exchange Authority wac; at most criticized for not being
sufficiently vigilant in policing the exchanges' enforcement of their own
rules. 198 Given the absence of any suggestion of actual misconduct, the
conflict of interest contention is not a convincing explanation for the creation
of an independent agency.
195. A Ginnie Mae certificate is a security backed by a pool of mortgages; investors in the
certificates receive the interest and principal paid on the underlying mortgages, less some administrative
fees. Futures contracts on foreign currencies had been traded on the Mere, through a separate division,
the International Monetary Market (IMM) division, since 1972.
196. See Review of Commodity Exchange Act and Discussion of Possible Changes. Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Agriculture. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. II (1973) [hereinafter CEA Hearings]
(statement of Rep. Smith) (noting that over $100 million was lost in unregulated commodity option
trading). The bucket~shop characterization is apt because the tinn sold naked options, relying on the
London Metals Exchange for transaction prices, and when prices moved against it, it could not cover the
options and payoff its customers. See Options Trading Comes Up Short, Bus. WK., Mar. 10, 1973, at
43.
197. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note lID, at 197 (statement of Sen. McGovern
summarizing General Accounting Office report on futures regulation reform).
19M. Id.
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A more persuasive explanation for the independent agency proposal,
albeit one never explicitly stated in the legislative record, involves the subtext
of the Democratic Congress' maneuvering for greater leverage over
agricultural and regulatory policy, given its objections to the Nixon
Administration's deregulatory approach (which in agriculture consisted of an
attempt to reduce farm subsidy programs). An independent agency would be
expected to be more responsive to congressional concerns than an agency
within a cabinet department. The success of the Democrats' agenda was
undoubtedly facilitated by the Nixon administration's secret grain agreement
with the Soviet Union, which farmers claimed produced substantial profits
only for middlemen because they had sold their crop unaware of the
impending purchases that raised domestic prices. 199 Having been shut out of
the negotiations with the Soviets, farm organizations may well have viewed
the Administration, and hence the Department of Agriculture, as an
untrustworthy ally. By weakening constituent support for the Administration,
the Soviet grain agreement strengthened the Democrats' leverage in shaping a
regulatory institution more amenable to congressional control than to control
by a Republican Administration. The evidence in Table 12 that federal
legislators were the principal advocates of the institutional change accords
with such an explanation.
It is important to review the political context in which the debate over the
futures regulator took place because it bolsters the institutional explanation
for the independent agency proposal. The debate coincided with the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against President Nixon. In addition, the
Democratic Congress and the Nixon Administration continued to clash over
the conduct of the Vietnam War. Finally, Democrats were battling the
Administration's efforts to reduce government spending, at the expense of
their budgetary priorities through impoundment. In such a politically-charged
context as the early 1970s, the Agriculture Department's testimony that
futures trading was not the cause of higher food prices fell on deaf ears.
3. Opposition to an Independent Futures Regulator
One might have predicted that the exchanges would support an
independent agency proposal, on the view that the Department of Agriculture
would be more closely associated with the interests of farmers than those of
the exchanges (the premise of the conflict of interest rationale for an
independent agency). However, the independent agency proposal was
opposed by virtually all exchanges,200 as well as the Department of
199. See id. at 201 (statement of Sen. Clark); Russiun Gruin Heurings, .I'lIpru note 16K, at 2-3
(statement of Sen. Jackson).
200. The unregulated exchanges and the CBaT took no position on the issue. The unregulated
exchanges focused their efforts on opposing the extension of the CEA to their activities. The explanation
provided for the CBaT's failure to take a position was that the CBaT's board was divided on the issue.
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Agriculture. Grain organizations, like the farm organizations, were split on
the issue. 201
The exchanges' position is consistent with regulatory capture, the thesis
that regulators come under the influence of the regulated, and implement
policies that favor the regulated industry over the public at large.202 Following
the enactment of the CEA in 1936, a separate office, the Commodity
Exchange Authority, administered by a civil servant, had been established in
the Department of Agriculture to implement the Secretary's responsibilities
under the Act. This office's personnel, in contrast to the rest of the
Department, would have more contact with exchanges than with producers,
which gives surface plausibility to the hypothesis of agency capture by
exchanges. Because the entity administering the CEA was not autonomous,
however, regulatory capture is inapt as an explanation. Ultimate authority
resided in the Secretary of Agriculture and the other executive branch
officials on the CEC, political appointees who would be highly sensitive to
the political cost of adopting policies adversely affecting farmers.
Little can be gleaned about the validity of a capture explanation for the
exchanges' opposition to an independent agency from the position on the bill
of the Commodity Exchange Authority. Besides opposing the creation of an
independent agency, the Authority's administrator, Alex C. Caldwell, testified
against proposals that the exchanges were vigorously resisting such as
government supervision of margins. But he endorsed an equal number of
proposals that the exchanges intensely opposed such as expanding
governmental emergency powers over exchanges. 203 Caldwell was well aware
of the regulatory capture hypothesis concerning his office's activities; in fact,
he maintained that an independent agency would be more susceptible to
capture by the industry than a commission in which the Secretary of
Agriculture participated.204 The moving force behind the activities of the
Merc, Leo Melamed, has a<;serted in his memoirs that he influenced the
choice of commissioners and staff at the newly-established CFTc.205 This
claim, if true, is consistent with Caldwell's position, that an independent
agency, rather than one within the Department of Agriculture, would be more
See /974 Sen. Hearings, supra note 183, at 524 (statement of Frederick Uhlmann, Chairman. CBOT).
There is no publicly available information concerning the reason, substantive or strategic. for the CBOT
board's split.
20 I. The only cooperative grain organization testifying at the heat;ngs opposed an independent
agency, while the commercial organizations were divided on the issue.
202. E.g., George Stigler, The Theory lit Economic Regulation. 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971): Sam
Peltzman, Toward a General Theory ofRegulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1970).
203. See CEA Hearings, supra note 1%, at 25. 29 (statement of Alex C. Caldwell, Administrator
of the Commodity Exchange Authority). The 1974 legislation essentially tracked Caldwell"s
recommendations with one notable exception, the creation of an independent agency.
204. N74 Sen. Hearings, supra note IX3, at 229 (statement of Alex C. Caldwell).
205. MELAMED, supra note 09, at 222, 292. Moreover, in detailing his rea.~oning till' insisting on
granting the new agency discretion over key issues. he stated that because "the exchanges had the
expert.~," their positions would "ultimately prevail," /d. at 217.
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susceptible to capture.
The exchanges' negative reaction to the independent agency proposal is
also compatible with a risk aversion, rather than a regulatory capture,
explanation. Risk-averse individuals will prefer a known regulator to an
unknown one, even if they have not captured the regulator, because they are
more concerned over the worst-case scenario, the possibility that regulation
will be more burdensome under a.new regulator, than the upside scenario, that
a new regulator will implement significant improvements in the regulatory
regime. The risk aversion explanation of the exchanges' position on an
independent agency is supported by the CBOT's experience in 1972, when it
created a separate entity, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) to
trade stock options,206 and registered it as an exchange with the SEC.
Negotiations with the SEC were frustrating and protracted, as the SEC sought
to force the products into the utterly inappropriate securities regime.207 Such
an experience undoubtedly made the CBOT extremely wary of being subject
to a new regulator. By contrast, the Department of Agriculture staff at lea"t
had experience with, and appreciation of, the economic essentials of futures
contracts.208
The most important objection to the independent agency proposal voiced
by the exchanges, consistent with either the capture or risk aversion theses,
wa" that the agriculture committees could lose oversight jurisdiction if an
independent agency wa" created.209 Grain and farming organizations opposed
to the independent agency proposal similarly raised this jurisdictional
objection.210 While this concern may have played to the audience, it
highlights an institutional consideration somewhat different from, although
not at odds with, agency capture or risk aversion..It illustrates the strong ties
between interest groups and oversight committee members, and is in accord
with what political scientists refer to as "fire alarm" oversight of regulatory
agencies by Congress. In this perspective on oversight, Congress controls
206. Having devised a new product, a futures contract on stock, the CBOT decided for
regulatory reasons to market stock options instead. See Todd E. Petzel, Derivatives: Market and
Regulatory Dynamics, 21 1. CORP. L. 95, 98 (1995). .
207. For example. it insisted that there be an "issuer" and a prospectus, a~ well as 50% margins.
See Memorandum from Philip McBride Johnson, former Chairman of the CFTC, to Author, Apr. I I,
1996, at 4 (on file with Yale Journal on Regulation).
208. This experience probably also account~ f()r the exchanges' support of the expanded and
exclusive authority over all futures contracts given to the CFTC. The CBOT did not want the SEC to be
able to assert authority over the financial futures products it was planning to launch. Id. Melamed also
considered the exclusive jurisdiction provision critical to his support of the legislation because it ensured
that the SEC and state regulators would not have oversight over futures market~. See MELAMED, supra
note 69. at 217.
209. See 1974 Sen. Hearings, supra note 183, at 190 (statement of Michael Weinberg, Chairman,
Mere): CFTC Hearings. supra note 188, at 118 (statement of Carlos Bradley, President, Kansa~ City
Board of Trade).
210. See CEA Hearings. supra note 190, at 140 (statement of William F. Brooks. President,
National Grain Trade Council): CFTC Hearings, supra note 188, at 2n2 (statement of L.C. Carpenter,
Vice President, Mid-Continent Farmers Ass'n).
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administrative agencies by reacting to constituent complaints about agency
action ("fire alarm" oversight) rather than by its own active preventative
monitoring of the agencies through committees ("police patrol" oversight).211
Congressional oversight thereby ensures that agencies are responsive to the
concerns of the key legislators' constituents. The witnesses' intense interest in
retaining the Agriculture Committee's control over the futures regulator is
consistent with participants in the policy process having an expectation of a
fire alarm institutional arrangement.
In a system of fire alarm oversight, even if a group has "captured" an
agency and does not have to resort to appeals to Congress for regulatory
assistance, a change in the oversight committee is potentially devastating. A
new committee might have stronger ties to constituents with a different
agenda for the agency and thus could produce an adverse alteration in
regulatory policy. This is a variation of the Baumgartner and Jones venue-
shopping explanation of how a regulatory status quo changes. If the
committee overseeing futures regulation were to change with the
establishment of a new agency, then new lines of communication and
relationships would have to be developed between the new set of legislators
and exchanges, farm and grain trade groups, in order to maintain a mutually
satisfactory system of congressional oversight. The fire alarm perspective, by
highlighting the importance of the constituency connection to the successful
operation of congressional oversight, aids in explaining why committees do
not cede jurisdiction to other committees over matters that affect their
constituents.
The issue of committee jurisdiction was, then, a potent criticism of the
independent agency proposal for both constituents and legislators. Supporters
of the proposal in the Senate and House went to great lengths to emphasize
that chamber rules guaranteed that the agriculture committees would retain
. jurisdiction over any new entity. For example, the retention of Agriculture
Committee jurisdiction was emphasized by Congressman Smith in his
opening statement to the House Agriculture Committee's second hearing on
CEA reform, in response to independent agency opponents' having raised the
issue during the first hearing.212 It was also a focus of his testimony to the
Senate committee.213 Allaying concerns over the potential loss of agriculture
211. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarm5, 2 AM. J. POL. SCI. Ili5 (19X4).
212. See CFfC Hearings, supra note IXX, at 3 (statement of Rep. Smith) (noting House rules
and precedent~ provide agency createu in a bill is unuer oversight jurisuiction of committee to which
original bill wa~ referred). Committee jurisuiction was a sensitive issue for representatives in I'J74 tilr
another rea~on as well. The House hau establisheu a committee, chaireu by Representative Bolling,
whose purpose wa~ "a wholesale realignment of jUl;suictions anu a limitation of one major committee per
member." King, supra note Ii, at 7(,. Bolling's reforms were opposeu by committee chairs anu uefeateu in
the House Democratic Caucus, anu a seconu committee, chaireu by Representative Hansen. was
established by the Caucus, to devise weaker alternatives to Bolling's recommendations. ld. That
committee's proposals were adopted in October 1974.
213. See 1974 Sen. Hearings, supra note IX3. at 222 (testimony of Rep. Smith).
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committee jurisdiction was, without question, a key requirement for
developing support for the independent agency proposal.
A final objection to the independent agency proposal invoked by some
Republicans in committee and on the floor was more philosophical:
opposition to intervention in markets.214 This small number of critics
emphasized that there was no support in the public record to justify a
"takeover" by the federal government of the futures markets because there
was no evidence that manipulation or speculation in the futures markets had
caused the increase in food prices.215 The anti-regulatory objection wa" joined
to fiscal concerns. These congressmen asserted that the inflation of the 1970s
wa" due to "big spenders" in Congress, and that a new agency requiring
vastly increased staff would add to the already onerous burden on
taxpayers.216 This objection to the expansion of government intervention in
commerce, albeit by a small minority, is one theme that ties the debate on
futures regulation in the 1970s to the 1920s debate.
D. Enactment of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Analysis
(~fthe House \It')te on Agency Independence (the Sisk Amendment)
The House Committee bill modified Representative Smith's proposal of
an independent futures regulator and proposed instead an "independent"
agency in~~ide the Department of Agriculture. This agency wa<; to be called the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission and to be composed of the
Secretary of Agriculture and four part-time public commissioners.217
Advocates of the independent agency proposal, who had lost in the
committee, sought to amend the bill on the floor to make the public
commissioners full-time. In their view, part-time commissioners were at a
disadvantage compared to the Secretary of Agriculture and the Department
staff, who were full-time government employees. Hence, a shift to full-time
commissioners would be a move toward greater institutional independence.
The full-time commissioners proposal (the "Sisk" amendment, named after
214. E.g.• 120 CONGo REC. 10,742 (1974) (statement of Rep. Goodling) (proposed CFTC as "one
more instance where the Government is attempting to get its long arm around necks of more people"
creating a "new bureaucracy"); H.R. Doc. NO. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1974) (statement signed
by Reps. Price, Baker, Symms and Young) (claiming that bill "represents a total lack of faith in our
market-oriented free enterprise system," and "iL.passed, bureaucrats in Washington will run the
market"). Similar concerns were occasionally expressed by a witness, e.g., /974 Sen. Heurings, supra
note 183, at 760 (letter ·from Great American Silver Co.) (stating "It is my understanding that there is a
bill pending for the government to meddle in commodity trading. As the SEC has been such a horrible
failure in this regard, I fail to see how an additional bureaucracy could possibly do any good. Aside from
wasting money, it would be a further restriction of free enterprise in this country.")
215. See, e.g., 120 CONGo REC. 10,743 (1974) (statement of Rep. Price); Minority Views, supra
note 214, at 165 (statement signed by Reps. Price, Baker, Symms, and Young) (claiming that bill lacks
"evidence that the new and far-ranging authorities proposed by the bill are either necessary or desirable").
216. See, e.x.. 120 CONGo REC. 10,742 (1974) (statement of Rep. Goodling).
217. H.R. 13113, § IOI(A)(iii), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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the sponsoring representative) lost by a vote of 158 to 179 (95 not voting).m
The Sisk amendment vote wa<; a party vote: A majority of the Democrats
voted for the amendment, and a majority of the Republicans voted against it.
The party-line vote on the Sisk amendment is distinctive among votes on
futures legislation. It is consistent with the thesis that the motivation for
establishing an independent agency wa<; to leverage congressional influence
over agency policy. Neither the final vote on the CFfC Act, which passed by
a vote of 281 to 43(108 not voting) shortly after the amendment's defeat,Zl9
nor the earlier votes on futures regulation in 1921 and 1936 (nor the 1991
vote discussed below) were party votes. Moreover, the voting pattern on
futures trading bills is at odds with the modem trend in House voting: Party
votes in the House steadily declined since the New Deal, from 60% of the
recorded roll-call votes during Roosevelt's Administration to under 35%
during the Nixon and Ford Administrations,zzo These data make plain that the
political dynamics concerning the modem organization of U.S. futures
regulation were anomalous for the issue space, a<; well a<; for the historical era.
Analysis of the vote on the Sisk amendment confirms the party-line
component of the vote and that this issue was fundamentally different from
prior futures-trading issues. Table 13 decomposes the vote on the Sisk
amendment by region and party, and reveals strikingly different results from
the analyses in Tables 3 and 8 of the 1921 and 1936 votes. In virtually all
regions, the difference in voting across party is dramatic, with almost all
Democrats voting for and almost all Republicans against the amendment,221
The cross-tabulation of the vote on the amendment by party is statistically
significant at less than .001 (chi-square of 130.3). In two regions, the South
and New England, where Democrat<; are more conservative and Republicans
more liberal than the members of their party in other states,222 the voting wa<;
more evenly divided across the parties, so that the party-line characterization
of the chamber's vote is obscured. But party affiliation, rather than
ideological alignment, best describes this vote. This is because a majority of
the Southern Democrats voted for the amendment, which would not be the
case had this been an ideological vote (a conservative coalition vote).223 These
218. See 120 CONGo REC. 10,763 (1974).
219. See 120 CONGo REC. 10,768 (1974).
220. MARTIN P. WATTENIIERG. THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES, 1952-1994, at
77 (1996); see ALDRICH, supra note 75, at 175-76.
221. In two of the cross-tabulations by vote and party, controlling for region, the border and New
England regions. using Fisher's exact test because there are too few cells with expected count~ greater
than five to use the conventional chi-square test, the test statistic is not significant. For all the other
regions, the chi-square test can be used and it is significant at less than 1%.
222. Using the d-nominate first dimension scores as the proxy, both the median and mean score of
the Southern Democrats are significantly more conservative. and of the New England Republicans
signiticantly more liberal, than the median and mean scores of their parties.
223. A conservative coalition vote is defined as a vote where a majority of Northern Democrats
are opposed by a majority of Southern Democrats and a majority of Republicans. ALDRICH. ,'"pm note
75, at 313. n.2.
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data are persuasive evidence that party politics, rather than constituent
interest, explains the 1974 vote.
The same result is evident in Table 15, which presents a regression
analysis of the vote on the Sisk amendment, paralleling the analyses of the
1921 and 1936 votes provided in Tables 5 and 10. The variables' descriptive
statistics are reported in Table 14; they include additional district-level
characteristics that became available with the 1970 census. No specific
constituent interest variable is a significant explainer of the vote: Only
ideology, and party when included directly in the vote regression (Models 3
and 4), matter.224 Moreover, the second dimension is less significant in
explaining the vote than the first dimension in all of the models reported in
the table, as well as when the d-nominate scores are the only regressors (not
. shown). In addition, the farm variable does not become significant if the
second dimension is excluded (not shown), as it did in the 1921 and 1936
vote regressions. These results underscore that farm state concerns were not at
stake in the vote on the CFTC's independence225 and are consistent with the
farm organizations' not having been united on the question of agency
independence.
In addition to legislators' ideology as a function of constituent
preferences (Pred( J) and Pred(2)), personal ideology (Res(J) and Res(2)) is
an important explanatory variable. Both the fitted and residual components
from the decomposition of the first dimension score are significant, but the
regression loses explanatory power when the residual is omitted (compare
Models 1 and 2). This is the only finding of significance paralleling the
resultc; of the 1921 regressions. The significance of D-nominate(J) and its
decomposed components is undoubtedly picking up the effect of party (the
more liberal voters are Democratc;). But it may also reflect the voting patterns
of Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats, depicted in Table 13,
which were at variance with the majorities of their parties, and whose
ideological proclivities were closer to their political counterparts than
compatriots. This further suggests that the institutional prerogatives issue wac;
related to divided government: Differences with the President over
substantive policies led legislators to seek to ac;sert control over the executive
224. The decomposition regressions were again signiticant: the adjusted R2 for the regression on
D-nominate( I) was .7789, and for that on D-nominate(2) was .6393. There are additional district-level
variables in these regressions because of the greater availability of data in the 1970 census: median
income (Medlncome) and median age (MedAge). In addition, college education (PctCoUege) was used in
place of general literacy. These three new variables correlate closely with likelihood to vote, and
therefore proxy for measuring the ability of a congressman to deviate from his constituents' preferences.
The signiticant regressors for the ftrst dimension were party, South, percentage voting for McGovern for
president, percentage black and farm population; the signiticant regressors for the second dimension were
farm population, median voter age, median income, party, South and percentage voting for McGovern
for president.
225. It is possible that farm constituents' concerns were important but trumped by strict
enforcement of party loyalty, but there is no reference in the record to arm-twisting by party leaders to
obtain votes, and, of course, the amendment was defeated.
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branch, and the outliers in the Democratic (Republican) party who agreed
(disagreed) with the Administration's policies were less (more) likely to want
to exert such control in the context of futures trading regulation.
Membership on the Agriculture Committee has, as before, no impact on
voting, a predictable result as the committee's preferences were representative
of the chamber's (see Table 16). In addition, the district-level constituent
variables again have no explanatory power when included in the vote
regression (Model 4).
The explanatory factors for voting on futures regulation in 1974 are
therefore at variance with those of the 1921 and 1936 votes: The specific
constituent variables are not significant. One possible explanation is
suggested by Poole and Rosenthal's analysis of voting on railroad regulation
in the nineteenth century. They hypothesize that in the formative stages of
regulatory policy, legislators may not 'fully understand how an issue relates to
long-term preferences and stable coalitions will not yet be formed,z26 In those
circumstances, the d-nominate variables will provide a poor fit of the voting
data. As legislators obtain more information, issues become mapped into the
coalitional pattern of the historically low (two) dimensional space, and the d-
nominate scores will dominate economic constituent variables in explaining
votes. Such a scenario is consistent with the difference between the 1974 vote
and the 1921 and 1936 votes concerning the significance of the constituent
variables.
An alternative explanation of the insignificance of the farming
constituent variable is the decline in importance of farm districts. The average
farm population per district declined from .38 to .04 from 1921 to 1974
(compare Tables 4 and 15) and the median district farm population dropped
from .41 to .02. Moreover, the top quartile of district farm population in 1974
began at .06, compared to .54 in 1921. The number of legislators who would
be sensitive to farmers' concerns therefore had dramatically declined between
1921 and 1974. Thus, (or farmers to obtain support for the policy positions
they supported, they would need to engage in logrolling, which, if successful,
would undercut the explanatory power of the farm variable in the regression.
However, at odds with this explanation is the result of a regression analysis of
the House vote on the CFTC Act's final passage (not shown), in which the
farm population variable is positive and significant in explaining the vote. 227
In contrast to 1921 when almost all commodity exchange districts'
226. Congress and Railroad Regulation, supra note 82, at 101.
227. The vote on passage of the CFTC Act was 281 yea~ to 43 nays (108 not voting). See 120
CONGo REC. 10,768 (1974). In the tinal pa~sage vote regressions, in addition to the signiticance of the
fann variable, the personal ideology variable.~ (the residuals of both decomposed d-nominate scores) and
the constituent-driven ideology variable (the titted component of the decomposed d-nominate score on
the titst dimension) are signiticant. In the model in which the regressors are the direct d-nominate scores
and party. analogous to Model 3 in Table 15. in contrast to the Sisk amendment vote, party is not
signiticant, and both of the d-nominate scores are negative and signiticant (more liberal and urban
representatives were more likely to vote for the bill).
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legislators voted against regulation, in 1974 virtually all of these legislators
voted for the full-time commissioner amendment. The exchange variable is
also not significant in the regressions on the final vote. The number of
districts with a futures exchange remained, however, essentially unchanged
from 1921 to 1974.228 Thus, diminished local presence cannot explain the
exchange variable's insignificance. Given the exchanges' expressed
disapproval of this institutional arrangement, it is possible that heightened
issue salience due to rising food prices reduced the influence of the exchanges
on their legislators. Commodity exchanges were also more frequently a topic
of popular reporting in the 1970s than in the I920s, as shown in Table 2,
although the coverage of commodities exchanges continues to be swamped by
that of stock exchanges.229 And, as already noted, consumer concerns about.
food prices were substantial. Higher visibility of an issue diminishes a
legislator's ability to support an interest group whose concerns conflict with
popular sentiment.
A legislator's decision to vote against the exchanges' position on an
independent agency due to constraints created by heightened issue salience
conveniently dove-tailed with institutional rea"ons to oppose the exchanges'
position, the desire to create an agency more responsive to Congress than the
President. Although the more independent agency structure was defeated in
the House vote, as the exchanges and many farm groups desired, the
insignificance of the variables representing those interest groups in explaining
the vote suggests that their influence on the issue outcome was weak, as
subsequent event" demonstrated, when an independent agency wa"
. established.
E. D~fferences Between the House and Senate on Independence
The Senate rejected the House's approach to the CFfC and enacted a
provision creating a separate independent regulatory commission.23o As Table
12 indicates, the House Committee heard more witnesses testifying against an
independent agency than did the Senate Committee. The discrepancy across
House and Senate Committee witness lists parallels the divergence in the
chambers' enactments: The House retained the agency in the Department
while the Senate did not. The difference in witnesses' positions is largely due
to a change in who testified. Of the twenty-six Senate witnesses who had not
testified in either of the House hearings, fourteen supported an independent
228. Of the voting representatives. 13 had an exchange in their district in 1974. compared to nine
in In!.
229, 'Even in the I970s. commodity trading's salience was low compared to other issues.
Baumgartner and Jones find over 50 entries for most of their subject~ in the 1970s, and in some years
over 100 entries. BAUMGARTNER & JONES, SUprtl note 4, at 91 (tobacco consumption), 95 (pesticides),
130 (urban affairs), 1t12 (alcohol abuse).
230, There was no Senate vote on the indepenJent agency provision, nor any Senate roll-call
votes on the bill or any amendment~ to it.
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agency, one wa<; against it and the rest expressed no opinion on the issue?31
This obvious example of witness-stacking is at odds with the contention that
committees use balanced witness lists. 232
One possible explanation of the difference in policy preferences between
the chambers is institutional. House members may be closer to interest groups
than senators because of the greater frequency of House elections. Cutting
against this claim are the possibilities that frequent elections make legislators
more responsive to voters and that the interest groups concerned with futures
trading are concentrated in only a few regions. In addition, senators have
broader and more heterogeneous electorates than representatives because they
are elected statewide. With more potential groups among a voting
constituency, a senator may well be more responsive to specific interest
groups than a representative because the broader electoral base increases the
likelihood that a group is associated with a local constituency.
There is, however, little evidence of a differential interest group effect on
voting between representatives and senators: House members who become
senators vote no differently from the remaining House members in their state
231. Only three witnesses changed their position in the interim between the House and Senate
hearings, and five organizations developed a position over the period. Two witnesses (an unregulated
exchange and a commodity broker) changed to support an independent agency from initial opposition,
and one witness (a grain company) changed to support the House bill and oppose an independent agency
from initial support of it I have no information concerning the motivation for the reversals in position. Of
the five witnesses newly taking a position in the Senate hearings, three were opponent~ of an independent
agency (the Department of Agriculture and two potato farmer groups), and two were supporters (a
commodity exchange firm and the cotton shippers association).
232. See WRIGHT, supra note R, at 42. The differential stacking of witnesses by the House
committee is consistent with both an informational and publicizing role for a hearing (despite Wright's
suggestion that informational hearings have balanced list~). The House hearings occurred earlier in the
legislative process than the Senate hearing, when reform proposals were first being formulated. Those
organizations most concerned over the expansion of regulation would have expressed greater interest in
testifying, in accordance with the view that a~ymmetric stakes in legislative outcomes produce differences
in political activity: namely, groups that will experience losses from legislation will lobby more intensely
than groups that will benefit from it. See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 82-83,129-21 (19M2).
If the committee did not limit witnesses, it would end up with an unbalanced list without having intended
to bias the record in favor of a predetermined policy outcome. But it is also possible that the House
committee deliberately sought the testimony of opponent~ of increa~d regulation in order to be able to
justify modification of the Smith subcommittee's recommendations. Such an interpretation is consistent
with the memoirs of one of the industry participant~ on the creation of the CFfC: Melamed suggest~ that
the futures exchanges turned to the Agriculture Committee when they came under attack by the Smith
subcommittee, and gained the Agriculture Committee Chairman's ear by claiming that Smith was
"poaching" on his jurisdiction; when the Chairman placed the issue in the hands of the committee's
associate counsel "to save" the exchanges from Smith, it wa~ decided that the committee had to hold it~
own hearings. MELAMED, supra note 69, at 215. The Senate committee hearing is less ambiguously
characterized as in the publicizing mode because all three Senate bills under the committee's
consideration established an independent agency, which had already been rejected by the House. More
important, the Senate legislative history empha~ized that only the Department of Agriculture "strongly
opposed" the creation of the new agency, and that the "overwhelming weight of the testimony" was in
favor of an independent commission. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Report on
H.R. 13113, SEN. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1974). Given the disparity in witness
testimony taken across the chambers, this statement in the Senate report strongly suggests that the
difference in the Senate's witness list from that of the House was a deliberate instance of witness
stacking.
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delegation or from the senators they replaced, or from how they voted as
representatives.233 House members do rely more on campaign contributions
from interest groups than senators,234 but the empirical research on the impact
of campaign contributions upon voting, which provides only mixed evidence
of any significant effect, does not indicate any differences in effect across
office held.235 The institutional explanation of the cross-chamber difference
is, therefore, problematic.
A better explanation for the policy difference on agency structure
between the Senate and House bills is ideological differences across the
chambers. As indicated in Table 16, using Poole and Rosenthal first
dimension scores that have been adjusted to create a common space across
the two chambers as the measure of legislator ideology,236 in the 93d
Congress the median voter in the Senate was significantly more liberal, hence
more· supportive of expanding government, than the median House voter.
Poole finds similarly that the Senate was more liberal than the House
throughout the 1970s using a different nonparametric rank-ordering
measure.237 The difference is not a function of the size of the majority party,
a<; the Democrats were 57% of the House and 58% of the Senate.
The difference in ideological preferences across the chambers provides a
more compelling explanation for the divergence in chamber bills than the
other institutional explanation. The committees chose the proposal most
consonant with the preference of their chamber's majority-the more liberal
chamber (the Senate) was presented with the more liberal provision regarding
the structure of the futures regulator (an independent agency).238 The
committees were only marginally more conservative than their chambers, and
233. See Bernard Grofman et al., House Members Who Become Senators: Learning from a
'Natural Experiment' in Representation, 20 LEGIS. STUll. Q. 513 (1995).
234. See WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 131-33; SABATO, supra note 32, at 77.
235. For reviews of the literature see SABATO, supra note 32, at 135; WRIGIIT, supra note 8, at
141-44; and Richard A. Smith, Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress, 20 LEGIS. STUll. Q. 89,
91-97 (1995).
236. The ideological scores used to undertake this analysis are not the same d-nominate scores
used in the vote regressions because those scores are separately estimated for each chamber and hence
not comparable. They are, instead, specially estimated nominate scores that adjust the legislators'
coordinates into a common space across the chambers using an alternating least squares regression
technique. See KEITH T. POOLE, RECOVERING A BASIC SPACE FROM A SET OF ISSUE SCALES (Carnegie-
Mellon University, Graduate School of IndusUial Administration Working Paper No. 44-82-83, 1996).
These common space scores are derived from w-nominate estimates, a static estimation procedure that
estimates scores for a single Congress, in contrast to d-nominate, which uses the first 99 Congresses.
POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 62, at 249. The common space w-nominate scores are highly
correlated (.91) with the d-nominate scores.
237. KEITH T. POOLE, CHANGING MINDS? NOT IN CONGRESS! 10 (Carnegie-Mellon University,
Graduate School of IndusUial Administration Working Paper No. 1997-22, 1997).
23X. The Senate committee's action may also be explained by a logroll: If the more liberal
committee members more intensely supported an independent agency' than the more conservative
members opposed it, this could produce a bill that included an independent agency in exchange for other
provisions of greater concern to the conservative committee members (an untestable proposition given
the available data).
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they were not significantly different ideologically from each other.239 Thus,
their behavior is consistent with the theory of committees as information-
gatherers for the majority, rather than as self-selected advocates of policies
divergent from the majority's preference. They proposed the agency structure
that best accorded with the ideological preferences of their chambers.
In addition to ideological differences, the weight accorded to institutional
prerogatives and, correspondingly, the antagonism felt toward the Nixon
Administration, is likely to have varied across the chambers. Senators tend to
be more jealous guardians of congressional authority as against the executive
branch than representatives. There are good theoretical reasons for such a
difference. Individual senators exert greater influence over public policy-
making than individual representatives, given institutional differences in
chamber decisionmaking, such as the filibuster. Senators are also able to exert
greater influence on independent agencies than members of the House
through their constitutional power over appointments. More immediate
evidence of this hypothesis from the 93d Congress is the symbolic action of
the subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee with jurisdiction
over the Department of Agriculture: It refused to hold hearings on the fiscal
year 1974 budget in protest against the Administration's termination of
several agricultural programs in 1973.240
Reinforcing a difference across the chambers in commitment to
protecting institutional prerogatives against the executive was the timing of
the two chambers' actions. The policy struggles between Congress and the
Nixon Administration were culminating in the initiation of impeachment
proceedings when the Senate began considering the House bill. Thus,
institutional considerations, as well as anti-Administration sentiment, worked
together with the ideological difference between Senate and House to increase
support for an independent agency proposal.
239. Neither committee is an outlier under Krehbiel's tests for a committee's representativeness,
discussed in note 61, supra. As Table 16 indicates, the committee D-nominate(l) score medians and
means are not significantly different from those of the chambers. In addition, the commiitee D-
nominate(J) score variances are not significantly different from those of the chambers. This finding of
committee representativeness is consistent with the finding in MCCUBBINS AND Cox, supra note 41, at
206-13 tbls. 28 and 29, that the party contingents on the House Agriculture Committee in the 93d
Congress were representative of their parties. It bears repeating that the ideological measure used here is
not specific to farm policy but rather a general left-right ideological measure, while political scientists,
when developing hypotheses concerning the representativeness of committee preferences, have in mind
preferences specific to the committees' jurisdiction. Because the key piece of the legislation in question
entails a general ideological, a.s opposed to farm-specific, issue concerning institutional organization. the
indicia of preference outliers relevant to the vote, in my opinion, are the first dimension d-nominate
scores.
240.· See 29 CONGo Q. ALMANAC 134 ()973). I would like to thank Ian Kahn, Yale College clas.s
of 1996, for bringing this fact to my attention in his excellent research for me on appropriations
committee hearings in the 1970s.
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The House effort at retaining the agency in the Department of Agriculture
ultimately failed. The Conference Committee that was convened after the.
Senate enacted its bill agreed to the Senate substitute, with an additional,
albeit largely cosmetic, compromise provision creating a liaison officer in the
Department and a liaison office, staffed by the Commission and located in the
Department, to facilitate the transmission of information between the two
entities.241 The House adopted the Conference Committee bill without
discussion of the change in the regulatory agency's structure by a vote of 375
to 4 (55 not voting). Given the chamber vote on the Sisk amendment, it is
difficult to maintain that the House members saw no significant difference
between their original formulation of an entity with part-time commissioners
inside the Department of Agriculture and the Senate's CFTC, as the liaison
offices would not appear to diminish significantly the CFTC's independence
from the Department.242 The legislative record does not, however, indicate
why the House conferees ceded to the Senate conferees on the establishment
of an independent agency.
The House conferees' capitulation to the Senate version was not a
function of the conferees being unrepresentative of their chamber: A majority
of the House conferees, all of whom were agriculture committee members, as
is the usual composition of such committees, had voted against the Sisk
amendment. While the assurance of agriculture committee jurisdiction over
the CFTC may have assuaged some industry and committee members'
concerns over the new agency enough to permit the Senate version to be
adopted without opposition, the jurisdictional issue had been aired in the
House prior to the vote on the Sisk amendment. It is possible that the
compromise addendum was perceived as offering some valuable benefits for
constituents. The liaison office could provide an early warning of CFTC
proposals to private parties such as the exchanges, which had long-standing
ties to the Department. These parties could then alert the congressional
committees in the mode of fire alarm oversight. While perhaps of symbolic
value, it is improbable that any such benefits were real. But it must be noted
that independent of the revised bill's substantive content, institutionally the
conference committee outcome is not exceptional: The Senate wins more
frequently than the House in conference (60%), and the second chamber to
consider the bill (the Senate in our context) is also more likely to win in
241. The duty of the Department to provide space for a Commission representative wa~
eliminated in 197K. 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supm note 119, at 223.
242. In presenting the conference bill to the Senate, Senators Talmadge and Clark engaged in a
colloquy for the record to indicate that the liaison offices would have solely an informational role and no
impact on the Commission's independence. See 120 CONG. REC. 34,99K (1974).
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conference (70%).243 In addition, most conference reports are adopted, and
they typically come up for consideration with privileged status, without the
opportunity for amendment.244
It is also possible that a simple logrolling story explains the House's
concession. Other provisions may have been of greater concern to the futures
industry, and correspondingly to the House conferees, than the independence
of the futures regulator from the Department of Agriculture. In fact, the
Conference Committee had to resolve many conflicting provisions in the two
bills besides the CFTC's structure. But a logrolling explanation is not
persuasive. The proposals most vigorously opposed by exchange witnesses
during the hearings-government setting of margins and prohibition of dual
trading-were not included in either the House or Senate bill. More
important, of twenty-two differences between the two bills identified by the
Conference Committee, only two were resolved in favor of the House version:
a provision allowing the formation of voluntary futures associations to
regulate brokers and deletion of a Senate provision requiring commodity
trading advisors to provide risk disclosure statements before advising a person
to buy or sell a futures contract. 245 It is inconceivable that either of these
provisions would be so critical to the exchanges or other opponents of an
independent commission as to motivate a compromise on the agency's
structure. Thus, if logrolling took place, it most probably occurred during the
Senate committee's deliberations, and the House conferees went along with
that preexisting deal, rather than actively crafted it. 246
243. See LAWRENCE LoNGLEY & WALTER OLESZEK, BICAMERAL POLITICS: CONFERENCE
COMMITIEES IN CONGRESS 83-84 (1989).
244. For example, of 2,495 conference reports from 1947 to 1982, only 56 were either rejected
or recommitted to the committee. Id. at 252.
245. Issues resolved in favor of the Senate bill included elimination of an economic justification
for contract designation; a requirement to accept U.S. Warehouse Act receipl~ for delivery; a requirement
for daily trading rep0rL~; regulation of leverage contracts (bullion options); disciplinary procedures for
exchange members by the CFTC; the Senate's narrower emergency language in place of the House's
broad scope for Commission direction of exchange activities; the Senate's higher dollar ceiling for
arbitration claims and il~ longer response period for contract markel~ to Commission questions on
contract delivery point~; the Senate's exclusivity provisions; and compromises ba~ed on Senate
refinemenl~ of House provisions on reparations, antitrust considerations, the definition of hedging, insider
trading provisions, and CFTC powers to issue injunctions and to approve exchange rules and regulations.
See CONF. REP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 33-42 (1974).
246. Of all of the issues that had to be reconciled in conference enumerated in note 245, supra,
only two were mentioned a~ determinative issues by one of the key futures market participant~ twenty
years later, the exclusivity provision and the elimination of an economic justification for new contract
approval, both of which were resolved in the Senate's favor. See MELAMED, supra note 69, at 217
(stating he told committee counsel at the start of the House hearings that the Merc could support
legislation if, among other items, it provided that the new agency had exclusive jurisdiction and new
contracts would not be subject to an economic justification for approval). The Senate version of these
issues was the version Melamed preferred. Melamed does not discuss the debate over the agency's
structure, nor list it as a condition for Merc support of the legislation. implying that he supported an
independent agency from the start (although the Merc testitied against an independent agency). It i~
therefore quite possible that the futures industry traded off agency independence for a favorable
resolution of other issues in the Senate drafting negotiations.
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A complementary explanation for the Conference Committee's adoption
of the Senate substitute bill over the House bill is that the political
environment had decisively shifted when· the Conference Committee
undertook its work. The independent agency proposal gave Congress equal, if
not greater, control over regulatory policy, than the Administration. This
meant Democratic-party control, for as the majority party, the Democrats
would control the agenda of the committee overseeing the agency. The
Conference Report came before the House in October 1974, with a
Republican party severely crippled following Nixon's resignation. While the
Democrats could aspire to regaining control of the executive branch given
recent political events, they had controlled Congress for all but a few years
since the 1930s and they surely had little concern over losing control of the
legislature. There wa" accordingly an upside return for Democrats with
virtually no downside in creating an independent regulatory commission.
Given a demoralized opposition party, this may have encouraged the House
Democratic conferees who had originally opposed an independent agency to
accede to the Senate's agency structure.
Two other provisions in the CFTC Act support the interpretation that
diminishing the executive branch's control over the futures regulator explains
the Conference Committee's resolution of the regulatory structure issue. First,
the new agency was given the power to initiate an action for injunctive relief
in federal court without going through the Justice Department, Such authority
frees an agency from executive branch oversight and permits it to establish its
own litigation agenda.247 This authority had also been given to the SEC and
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).248 Proponents of the provision
maintained that it would avoid :'partisan political pressures" that occurred
when the Justice Department had a "veto" over litigation, referring to the
FTC's having been "hamstrung" in it" efforts to enforce its authorizing statute
by the Justice Department,249 As with the independent agency provision, a
proviso for direct injunctive powers was not contained in the House bill but
was included in the Senate bill and adopted by the Conference Committee.
The House bill had simply permitted the new agency to seek an injunction
through the Justice Department,25o
247. This structure-independent litigating authority-may in practice not adequately guarantee
an agency's independence from the executive despite Congress' intentions, if Congress does not vigilantly
police its creation. See Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an
Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L REV. 273 (1993) (discussing how Justice
Department, with White House backing, was able to exert control over Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission).
248. The FfC had only recently received such authority. See /974 Sen. Hearings, supra note
183, at 209 (statement of Rep. Smith).
249. Id.
250. Because the direct injunctive power provision was adopted late in the legislative process,
there is very little attention directed to it in the legislative record. The Department of Agriculture testitied
in support of the House provision at the Senate hearing, and was not invited to comment on whether the
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The second provision providing Congress with greater control over the
agency wa<; a "sunset" provision, which, by authorizing the agency for only a
limited number of years, required its periodic reconsideration through a
reauthorization process. An agency subject to periodic congressional review
concerning the justification for its existence is thought to be more responsive
to the policy concerns of members of Congress than one not undergoing such
scrutiny. The sunset provision wa<; added to the House bill by amendment on
the floor toward the end of the legislative deliberations; the committee
members managing the bill agreed to the amendment without discussion, and
. the House then approved it without debate or a recorded vote.251
It is important to conclude by noting that the congressional objective of
asserting greater control over the futures regulator that led to the creation of
the CfTC was not an isolated event. A number of legislative reforms
throughout the 1970s were directed at strengthening congressional oversight
of agencies. The rationale for this activity has been identified as a reaction to
divided government and, in particular, Nixon's challenge of Congress "in a
clear and open way" by "impounding funds, harass[ing] civil servants in
programs favored by congressional committees and prosecut[ing] the
Vietnam War as he saw fit.,,252 The most convincing explanation of the
dispersed regulatory control of financial markets is, then, that it is the legacy
of congressional efforts to assert institutional prerogatives in the context of
divided government, in conjunction with the historical fortuity that futures
trading regulation was within the agriculture committees' jurisdiction.
IV. The Battle over Financial Futures Regulation: 1975-92
From its creation, the CfTC's exclusive jurisdiction over futures markets
wa<; challenged by other agencies with jurisdiction over the underlying
financial instruments or market participants. Despite repeated efforts, the
agency's jurisdiction has not, however, been significantly altered. The federal
banking regulators obtained the exemption of bank derivatives business from
CfTC jurisdiction in the CfTC's authorizing statute, in a provision known as
the "Trea<;ury amendment" because it was added to the bill at the Treasury
Department's request.253 The SEC's position, in contrast, was left ambiguous
by the statute's combination of a grant to the CfTC of exclusive jurisdiction
agency would support direct authority to sue for an injunction a~ well. See id. at 229 (statement of
Richard Feltner. Ass). Secretary for Marketing & Consumer Services. Dep't of Agriculture).
251. See 120 CONGo REC. 10,766-67 (1974). There is no other reference. let alone uiscussion. of
such an institutional feature anywhere in the legislative record.
252. JOEL D. AIlERIlACH, KEEPING AWATCHFUL EYE 27 (1990).
253. 7 U.S.c. § 2 (1994). The rationale for the exemption was that bank.s' activities were a1reauy
supervised by federal banking regulators. Commouity Futures Trauing Commission Act of 1974, S. Rep.
No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1974).
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over all futures on all commodities with a preservation of the SEC's existing
jurisdiction (which at the time consisted of regulation of only one type of
derivative security, stock options). This remains the status quo: Banking
regulators have successfully retained their jurisdiction and preserved banks'
markets' exemption from CFTC regulation, while the SEC has failed in its
efforts to expand it" jurisdiction significantly at the CFTC's expense.
A. The SEC's Initial Efforts at Sh~fting the Jurisdictional Balance
Shortly after the creation of the CFTC, the futures exchanges introduced
new products that revolutionized financial management Futures contracts
whose underlying assets were financial instruments.254 In 1975, a financial
futures contract on Ginnie Mae pass-through certificates began trading on the
CBOT. The SEC, which regulated the underlying certificates (because they
were securities), opposed the initiation of the trading in the contract.255 In
fact, it opposed the CFTC's exclusive jurisdictional grant over futures from
early on, fearing that it would lose its authority over securities transactions.
The Ginnie Mae contracts ultimately failed, but financial futures have been
extraordinarily successful products, a success which is at the root of the
interagency jurisdictional battle.
Although the SEC wa" not a witness at any of the hearings on the CEA
reform in the 1970s, the House bill contained a provision preserving SEC
jurisdiction. The language of this "savings" provision was altered in the
Senate bill. The SEC attempted to persuade the Conference Committee either
to eliminate the exclusive jurisdiction provision or to rewrite the savings
clause to adopt the language of the House bill, in order to ensure it would
prevail over the CFTC in overlapping or contested jurisdictional areas. This
effort failed; the conferees refused to amend the bill any further. This outcome
was consistent with the other reconciliation decisions, which retained the
Senate's version on virtually all contested issues. It was also in accord with
the views of the futures exchanges, which did not want SEC jurisdiction over
the financial derivatives that they planned to market.256 The SEC was only
able to obtain a statement on the Senate floor, at the time of the adoption of
the conference report, of legislative intent to preserve the SEC's
254. The market for financial futures exploded in the late 1970s in response to increased volatility
in exchange and interest rates following the demise of the Bretton Woods system of fIXed exchange rates
in the early 1970s and a shift in Federal Reserve monetary policy from interest rate levels to money
supply in 1979. See Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities Regulation, 55 MD.
L. REV. 1,8,12 (1996).
255. The SEC sent a letter to the CB'OT objecting to the trading as illegal under the securities
laws, met with the exchange and the CFTC to express its view, and memorialized it~ position in writing
to the CFTC. 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 119, at 265-66.
256. See MELAMED, supra note 69, at 217.
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jurisdiction.257
The SEC persisted in seeking statutory revIsIon of the CFfC's
jurisdiction. At a hearing before the Senate Banking Committee, the SEC's
oversight committee, held four months after the CFfC Act's passage, the
SEC Chairman urged a statutory amendment to the federal securities laws
delimiting the CFfC's jurisdiction.258 He had previously expressed this
position in writing to the House oversight committee.259 Although the
committees were sympathetic to the SEC's position, they did not have
jurisdiction over the subject (the CFfC's authority), and nothing came of the
SEC's initial attempt to reverse the exclusive jurisdictional grant to the
CFfC.
But the SEC had repeated opportunities to resubmit the jurisdictional
issue to Congress because of the CFfC's status as a sunset agency. When the
CFfC came up for its first reauthorization in 1978, the SEC launched what
one CFfC chairman has called a "vigorous campaign to wrest jurisdiction
from the Commission over futures contracts in at least some types of
securities.,,260 The General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) supported the SEC's efforts.261 The GAO
had reversed its position during the course of the reauthorization to
recommend transferring jurisdiction to the SEC, and the OMB adopted a
similar stance.262
257. Senator Talmadge, Chainnan of the Senate Agriculture Committee and the bill's Hoor
manager, stated for the record that the exclusivity provision was not intended to preempt the SEC's
jurisdiction "over securities, including stock options, traded on any national securities exchange or any
other U.S. securities market," nor was it intended to supersede the SEC's jurisdiction over investment
contracts "except to the extent that jurisdiction is granted to the CITC with respect to contracts for
future delivery or options relating ... to tangible commOdities, or which are effected on a contract
market." 120 CONGo REC. 34,997 (1974) (statement of Sen. Talmadge). The exclusive jurisdiction
provision had been added to ensure that there would be no regulatory gaps, as had occurred in the metals
options scandal leading to the 1974 expansion of CEA jurisdiction. See text and accompanying note 196,
supra.
258. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities,
Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 204 (1975) [hereinafter
Securities Amendments Hearing] (statement of Ray Garrett, SEC Chairman).
259. See id. at 209. The SEC Chainnan was responding to a November 1974 letter from
Representative Harley Staggers, Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
inquiring whether the newly enacted CITC Act would adversely affect the SEC's jurisdiction.
260. 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 119, at 250.
261. See id. at 267-68.
262. See S. REP. No. 850, 95th Congress, 2d Sess. 19 (1978). In 1974, the GAO had rejected the
alternative of having the SEC, rather than a new independent agency, regulate futures. See 1974 Sen.
Hearings, supra note 183, at 572 (statement of Henry Eschwege, Director, Resources and Economic
Development Div., GAO). The OMB endorsed the GAO's proposal and offered further suggestions. It
recommended transferring the CITC's authority over registered securities to the SEC; establishing
concurrent authority for the CITC and SEC over unregistered securities; providing the Treasury
Department with the right of tina! approval over futures on government securities and authority to
suspend trading and revoke designated contract markets for such instruments; and abolishing the CITC
and reorganizing it into a subcabinet level agency headed by a single executive, which would give the
President greater control over the agency. Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Hearings on H.R. 13125 Before a Subcomm. of Sen. Comm. on
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One explanation for the GAO's change in position is that the SEC was
considered a tough regulator wherea<; the CFTC wa<; deemed ineffective. The
CFTC had, in fact, received an extremely critical review by the GAO and
House Appropriations Committee investigators.263 The SEC wa" certainly a
more visible agency: As Table 2 indicates, there was over five times more
coverage of the SEC than the CFTC in the popular press during the 1970s.
Whether the level of media coverage factored into the GAO's analysis and
affected the perception of relative enforcement skills is unknown. The GAO's
shift wa" apparently precipitated by an SEC memorandum to the GAO
concerning the jurisdictional issue.264 .
The agriculture committees were not about to cede jurisdiction to another
committee's agency. The 1978 effort at altering the allocation of jurisdiction
resulted only in adoption of a requirement that the CFTC "maintain
communications" with the SEC.265 It wa<; not until the SEC's regulated
constituents (stock exchanges and securities firms) undertook intensive
political activity and obtained the Bush Administration's support in the wake
of the stock market crash of 1987 that the SEC was able to make any inroads
in the legislative process. But even with additional political support, the SEC
failed to obtain jurisdiction over equity futures. In the late 1980s, there were
also powerful countervailing forces concerned with the CFTC's jurisdiction:
money-center banks, who were dealers in highly profitable over-the-counter
financial derivatives, and their federal regulators. The banking sector did not
want to see the allocation of jurisdiction between the SEC and CFTC
recrafted without ensuring the continuation of its exemption from regulation.
B. Jurisdictional Controversies in the 1980s
With the SEC's repeated failure in the late 1970s to redraw the CEA's
jurisdictional provisions and the successful reauthorization of the CFTC in
1978, the forum of the interagency jurisdictional conflict shifted. The SEC
changed tactics and began to permit its regulated entities to experiment in
new financial products, rather than simply seek to prevent CFTC regulated
entities from trading instruments pegged to securities. In short, in order to
avoid losing financial market share, the SEC began to compete with the
ApproprilJtions, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4,I9R (1978) [hereinafter 1978 ApproI'. Hearings] (letter from
James Mcintyre, Director, OMB). The OMB's recommendation to grant the Treasury Department a veto
over futures on government securities was identical to a Treasury Department proposal transmitted by
letter to Congress. See S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (197R). .
263. See, e.g., ReauthorizlJtion of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Agriculture Research and Gen. Legislation of Sen. Comm. on Agriculture,
Nutrition and Forestry, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Reauth. Hearings] (statement
of Sen. Leahy). Not all legislators considered the CFfC an ineffective regulator. Senator Helms, for
example, maintained that the CFfC was overregulating and proposed its abolition. See id. at 213.
2M. See 197/i Reauth. Hearings, supra note 263, at 228 (statement of John V. Rainbolt II, Vice
Chairman, CFfC).
265. 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 119, at 270.
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CFfC by recognizing new products traded on stock exchanges that competed
with futures, a strategy of expanding its jurisdictional scope rather than
simply attempting to decrease that of the CFTC. This striking behavioral
change is consistent with the SEC acting as a Niskanen-type bureaucracy, an
agency whose goal is to expand the scope of its authority and thereby
maximize its budget. 266
In 1981 the SEC granted the right to trade options on Ginnie Mae
certificates to one of its regulated exchanges, the CBOE. The CBOT, which
traded Ginnie Mae futures and wa<; thus a designated contract market under
the CFTC, successfully sued the SEC to prevent the options' trading, on the
ground that the agency's action wa<; a violation of the CFfC's exclusive
jurisdiction.267 Thereafter, the CFTC and SEC reached an agreement, known
as the Shad-Johnson accord after the agencies' chairmen, which allocated
options on securities to the SEC, all futures and options on futures to the
CFTC, and options on foreign currency to the regulator of the exchange on
which the specific option traded.268
The Shad-Johnson accord was codified by Congress as part of the
CFfC's second reauthorization in 1982.269 In addition to the jurisdictional
allocation, the amendments to the CEA codifying the accord prohibited
futures on individual stocks and non-exempted (non-U.S. government) bonds,
required consultation between the CFfC and the SEC on the approval of
stock index futures contracts, and gave the SEC veto power over stock index
futures and options on such futures which are not broadly-based or otherwise
susceptible to manipulation. The CFTC reached an accord with the SEC,
despite the CBOT's court victory, in all likelihood to preempt political
pressure by the SEC that could obstruct its impending reauthorization
process, as well as to provide greater certainty to market participants
concerning the applicable regulatory regime.
The accord proved to be a short-lived jurisdictional truce as new products
emerged such as hybrid securities that were not covered by the agreement
because they were neither securities nor futures nor options (the instruments
specifically allocated by the accord) but a complex combination of those
instruments. The problem was squarely presented with the SEC's approval in
1989 of equity index participation units (IPs), a hybrid security with both
266. See WILLIAM NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).
267. Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th CiL), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
Ginnie Mae certificates were commodities under the statute's definition of a commodity because futures
contracts were traded on them. The Seventh Circuit therefore ruled for the CBOT, given the CFTC's
exclusive jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed a~ moot because the agencies had reached a
jurisdictional accord, which was codified by Congress, as discussed in the text and accompanying notes
268-69 infra.
268. See r1980-82 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) '1\ 21,332 (CFTC, SEC Feb. 2,
1982).
269. See 7 U.S.c. § 2a(iv) (Section 2(a)(I)(B) of the CEA). The accord wa~ also incorporated in
the federal securities laws in 1983, see 15 U.S.c. § 77b(l) (Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933) and
15 U.S.c. § 78c (Section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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stock and futures characteristics, that wall offered for trading by several stock
exchanges. This SEC action wall litigated by the Merc, which traded stock
index futures. The federal court once again ruled against the SEC,
emphasizing the plain language of the CEA, that exclusive means
exclusive.270
To work, the 1982 accord had presumed that a determination would be
made concerning whether or not a particular product was a futures contract or
a security, and thereby allocated to the appropriate authority. Rapid
innovation in financial products, undoubtedly related to competition across
financial markets-stock exchanges developed IPs as a means of attracting
the lucrative institutional business trading stock index futures rather than the
underlying securities-rendered the accord inoperable, as products fit into
neither category and raised once again the definitional stakes of the CEA's
exclusivity clause. The timing of the introduction of IPs coincided with the
. CFTC's third reauthorization, and the court's ruling preventing security
exchanges from trading IPs was cited by proponents of transferring
jurisdiction over equity derivatives to the SEC as evidence of the exigency of
statutory reform.
The court's decision on IPs doomed the product becau'se there are very
real and potentially costly differences associated with the restriction of a
product's registration to a specific regulator. In particular, there are marked
differences in regulatory regime. The differences include market structure
(e.g., the CEA, in contrast to the securities laws, requires open-outcry auction
markets), broker regulations (e.g., the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act are construed to contain an investment suitability requirement
in contrast to the CEA), and trading practices (e.g., insider trading is only
prohibited under the securities laws). The IPs decision therefore became the
backdrop to the legislative debate over the agencies' respective jurisdictions
in the 1990s, as the SEC, stock exchanges and their congressional supporters
contended that the exclusivity provision hindered financial product
innovation.271
270. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, X83 F.2d 537 (7th Cir., 19X9).
271. E.g., The CFTC/SEC Jurisdiction and Margin, Joint Hearings Before the Sen. Subcomm.
on Securities and the Comm. on Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 246 (1990)
(statement of James R. Jones, chairman, American Stock Exchange); Issues Related to the Jurisdiction of
the Commodity Futures Trading Commissi"n and the Securities and Exchange Commission, Hearing
Before the Sen. Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 10 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1990)
Ihereinafter Jurisdiction Issues Hearing] (statement of Richard C. Breeden, Chainnan, SEC). It should
be noted that in Kane's model of regulatory competition, exclusive jurisdictions can ironically result in
increased innovation, as sectors engage in what he refers to as structural arbitrage, creation of new
products to avoid the high-cost regulatory jurisdictions. Edward J. Kane, De Jure Interstate Banking:
Why Only Now?, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 141 (1996). Kane's model differs from the approach
in this Article in how it understands the interaction between public awareness of an issue and legislative
behavior. Because Kane models legislators and regulators as deliberately providing the public with
"disinformation" concerning regulatory policies, issue salience is endogenous in his model. This Article's
analysis, however, considers the salience of an issue a~ exogenous from the standpoint of legislators.
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Following the court decision on IPs, the CFTC made a conciliatory offer
to designate the stock exchanges as contract markets for IPs without having to
comply with the regulations that differed between futures and securities
exchanges, action that would reduce significantly the costs of the stock
exchanges' compliance with the CEA exclusivity provision. No doubt, the
CFTC's offer wa<; motivated by concern that the securities industry would
seek the repeal of the exclusivity provision in its forthcoming reauthorization
process.
The stock exchanges rejected the CFTC's offer because of a further
institutional difference of economic import. They wanted IPs to be subject to
the securities and not the futures regulatory regime in order to be able to
market IPs through the more numerous registered securities brokers instead of
the far fewer registered futures commission merchants. They may also have
been betting that they would fare even better in Congress (although as it
turned out they did not).
In addition to the hybrid securities debate, there was a further important
factor contributing to the demand for redefining the jurisdictional boundary
between the CFTC and SEC by the 1990s. The stock market crash of October
19, 1987, when the Dow Jones Industrial average fell over 500 points (almost
23%), the largest one-day decline in the stock market's history,272 was also
invoked by proponents of jurisdictional reform. The SEC and the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) contended that trading in stock index futures and
dispersed regulatory authority contributed to the crash because futures had
lower margin requirements than securities and because the government's
ability to manage market crises wa<; rendered more difficult by the need to
coordinate the actions of multiple regulators. 273
The crash also introduced an important player on the SEC's side in the
legislative debate, the Bush Administration, which sought government control
over stock index futures margins and SEC jurisdiction over equity-based
futures in reaction to the crash. This strengthened the banking and commerce
committees' leverage in delaying the agriculture committees' CFTC
reauthorization bill from 1989 to 1992.
Given the political history of interagency conflict, the blame accorded the
futures markets and the decentralized regulatory regime for the stock market
crash by the securities industry ought to be approached with healthy
skepticism, and many distinguished scholars have questioned such
272. Robert J. Mackay, Introduction, in AFTER THE CRASH. LINKAGES BETWEEN STOCKS AND
FuTURES I (Robert J. Mackayed., 19H8). This drop was preceded by a 10% decline over the prior three
trading days, and rivaled the stock market crash of 1929, when the two-day drop on October 2H and 29
was 24%. See hI.
273. See DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
THE OCTOIlER 19H7 MARKET BREAK (I9HH) Ihereinafter SEC STUDY]; NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENIlACH,
AN OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM TRADING AND ITS IMPACT ON CURRENT MARKET PRACTICES: A STUDY
COMMISSIONED IlY THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (1987).
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contentions, as did the futures exchanges and CFTC.274 Higher margins on
futures contracts were in the self-interest of the stock exchanges, whatever
effect they conceivably would have on preventing stock market crashes,
because they would increa<;e the cost of trading in futures markets compared
to stock markets, and thus improve the stock exchanges' deteriorating
competitive position for institutional traders, who could more cheaply
transact in securities by trading derivatives. The jurisdictional stakes had
changed dramatically by 1990. The fimincial futures markets now not only
dominated the traditional agricultural futures markets,275 but, more
importantly, stock index futures, given low trading costs, dominated stock
trading.276
Complicating the lobbying efforts of the SEC's supporters was the
concern of the banking community, which was a new participant in the
CFTC's reauthorization process. In 1987, the CFTC initiated an investigation
of Chase Manhattan Bank's activities in commodity-based swap contracts
and proposed to regulate the hybrid instruments market, suggesting that
hybrids and commodity swaps might be unauthorized (non-exchange-traded)
futures contracts.277 These actions caused considerable consternation within
the banking community.278 Because swap contracts are an extremely lucrative
segment of the largest money-center banks' activities (although commodity
swaps are a very small part of that swap business)279 and small banks use
interest-rate swaps as a risk management tool, banking regulators were
disturbed by the CFTC's proposal to intervene in any swap market. Thus,
.banks and their regulators were drawn into the jurisdictional controversy to
274. For short statement~ of different views on the cra~h see AFTER THE CRASH: LINKAGES
BETWEEN STOCKS AND FuTuRES, supra note 272. The institutional studies are DIVISIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND OF TRADING AND MARKETS, CITC, FINAL REPORT ON STOCK INDEX FlJrURES AND CASH
MARKET ACTIVITY DURING OCTOBER 1987 TO THE U.S. COMMODITY FlJrURES TRADING COMMISSION
(1988); PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY APPOINTED BY THE CHICAGO
MERCANTILE EXCHANGE TO EXAMINE THE EVENTS SURROUNDING OCTOBER 19, 1987 (1987) (Merton
Miller, John Hawke, Jr., Burton Malkiel, and Myron Scholes, committee members).
275. See, e.g., DON M. CHANCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES 236 fig. 7.1 (3d ed. 1995).
276. SEC STUI)Y, supra note 273, at 3-1 (daily contract trading volume in Standard and Poor's
(S&P) 500 index futures represented equivalent of more than double the daily trading volume on the
NYSE in Sept. 1987). Although stock index futures trading volume declined significantly after the 1987
market crash, it is still one of the most actively traded contracts in the world. DAVlD A. DUBOFSKY,
OPTIONS AND FINANCIAL FuTuRES: VALUATION AND USES 411 (1992). For a discussion of how investors
use futures contracts instead of the underlying securities see Romano, supra note 254, at 31-35.
277. See Sheila C. Bair, Regulatory Issues Presented by the Growth of OTe Derivatives: Why
Off-Exchange Is No Longer Off-Limits, in THE HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES AND SYNTHETICS 699, 700
(Robert A. Klein & Jess Lederman eds., 1994); CITC, Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instrument~, 52
Fed. Reg. 47,022 (1987). A swap contract is an agreement between two parties to exchange a series of
ca.~h tlows over time. In a commodity swap, one side's payment~ are ba~ed on the future price of a
commodity.
278. It also resulted in the commOdity-swap business moving oversea~. See Bair, supra note 277,
at 700.
279. The over-the-counter market of unregulated derivative products has experienced explosive
growth since 1980. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO
PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 36 (1994).
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ensure enactment of an explicit exemption for swaps during the
reauthorization process.
Finally, a series of scandals made the CFTC more vulnerable to a
jurisdictional attack than in its previous two reauthorizations. A sting
.operation on the floor of the exchanges uncovered questionable trading
practices and resulted in numerous criminal indictments in 1989.280 In
addition, in response to an alleged manipulation of the soybean futures
markets, the CBOT (with the CFTC's approval) took action against an
institutional trader suspected of seeking to comer the market. This caused
many farmers, who were hedgers on the same side of the market as that
trader, to lose money. On top of these difficulties for the agency, there wa<; a
second stock market break in October 1989, which reignited the securities
industry complaints over the discrepant margins on stock index futures and
the underlying stocks.
C. The New Dynamics of the Reauthorization Process in the 1990s
The trading scandals, in conjunction with the second stock market crash,
weighed heavily in legislators' evaluations of the CFTC because, in contrast
to the metal options scandal in the 1970s, they involved the federal regulatory
agency's domain. To put it mildly, the CFTC's supporters had a public
relations problem. Public interest in futures products (as reflected in the
Readers' Guide volumes tracked in Table 2) peaked in the early 1980s, just
prior to the stock market crash. Media coverage of futures exchanges peaked
even earlier, in the mid-1970s, at the time the CFTC was established. Thus,
when Congress turned to consider the reauthorizing legislation, futures
trading was no longer at its highest salience as an issue. But in contrast to the
reportage in prior years, all of the articles on futures exchanges indexed in the
Guide in the years following the cra<;h were critical of the exchanges.281
The dramatic increa<;e in the economic importance of financial
derivatives and the politics of scandal altered the political environment,
because the organized opposition to the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction (the
SEC and its supporters) were operating in a context in which the public wa<;
receiving only negative information. Although the Senate Banking and House
Commerce Committees (hereafter jointly referred to as banking committees)
with jurisdiction over the SEC were not involved in the 1974 legislation
.creating the CFTC, they now became active participants in the CFTC's
reauthorization. They intervened in the process, holding their own hearings in
280. See, e.g., Futures Trading Practices Act of /989-S./729, Hearings Before Sen. Comm. on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, IOlst Cong., 1st Sess. I (1989) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (citing
crises in futures industry, including sting operation, as necessitating fast track legislative reform of CEA).
281. Consistent with the tenor of the articles indexed by the Readers' Guide, Melamed recounts
that the Chicago newspapers ran articles on the sting operation on the front page for two weeks, as well
as stories about legendary traders who cornered the Chicago markets in the distant past. See MELAMED,
supra note 69, at 392.
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their oversight capacity of the SEC, in an attempt to tie the progress of the
CFTC's reauthorization to a reconsideration of its jurisdiction. Because
securities markets were now directly implicated in CFTC regulatory issues
given the stock market crash and the development of financial derivatives, the
banking committees' claims of jurisdictional interest had a plausibility that
would have been questionable had they acted as aggressively in the 1970s.
I. The Administration's Involvement in the Reauthorization Process
The banking committees relied heavily on Administration officials'
testimony to advance the SEC's position and to challenge the agriculture
committees' refusal to revise the jurisdictional status quo. In addition,
Administration supporters in the Senate not on the banking committee, as
well as committee members, engaged in sharp procedural maneuvers to
prevent the movement of legislation at odds with the Administration's
position, placing holds on bills.
The key official advancing the Administration's position was the
Secretary of the Treasury, Nicholas Brady, a former Wall Street investment
banker who had led the Presidential Task Force on the 1987 stock market
crash. The Task Force had issued a report recommending a jurisdictional
transfer of equity-based derivatives from the CFTC to the SEC.282 But the
Ta"k Force's recommendation had been' ignored by the Reagan
Administration. As Treasury Secretary under Bush, Brady was now in a
position to have the proposal implemented. A skeptical characterization of the
Ta"k Force's recommendation, given the inchoate nature of the empirical
analysis underlying the report's extensive recommendations, is that it
conveniently furthered the financial interest of the Secretary's former
associates in the securities industry by raising the cost of trading in futures
markets,283 but a sociologist of knowledge might more generously note that
his view was informed by his life experiences.
The Trea<;ury Secretary wa<; not the only spokesman for regulatory
change, although he was the most influential. Another force with ties to the
Administration advocating the jurisdictional transfer was the SEC Chairman,
Richard Breeden, who actively sought control over stock index futures. In
addition, the Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan, shifted his
position from opposition to support of government supervision over stock
index futures margins, although he stopped short of endorsing an equity
product jurisdictional transfer, or the more radical reform hinted at in the
Brady report, consolidation of the CFTC into the SEC.284 Finally, the
282. BRAOY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2.
283. See Roberta Romano, The Politics of the Brady Report: A Comment, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
80S (1989). .
284. See Jurisdiction Issues Hearing, supra note 271, at 139-40 (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chainnan, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System). It is not clear to what extent this change was
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continued independence of the bank swap market from CFTC supervision, a
separate jurisdictional issue, was of concern to other Administration officials,
the chairmen of the federal banking agencies, in addition to the Fed
chairman.285
The banking regulators' activity dovetailed with the SEC supporters'
goal, delay of the CFTC's reauthorization. The array of government officials
raising concerns over the CFTC's jurisdiction was, therefore, substantial.
Consequently, in contrast to earlier reauthorizations, the agriculture
committees had to address the jurisdictional issue.
2. The Reauthorization Hearings
The agriculture committees held three hearings on the CFTC'S
reauthorization from 1989 to 1991, broaching a number of regulatory issues,
including jurisdiction over equity-based futures and their margins. There were
also five separate hearings held specifically on the jurisdictional issue in the
banking and agriculture committees from 1990 to 1991. The difference
between the banking and agriculture committees' approaches is indicated in
.Table 17, which summarizes the witnesses' positions at the five hearings on
the jurisdictional issue.
The banking committees heard a far greater number of witnesses
. testifying in support of removing jurisdiction from the CFTC to the SEC than
did the agriculture committees. Many of those witnesses did not even appear
before the agriculture committees. While the agriculture committees heard
testimony from witnesses supporting the SEC's claims, they still solicited
testimony from far more opponents of a reallocation of jurisdiction than did
the banking committees.
These data illustrate the use of venue selection to promote specific
policies and are consistent with the view of political scientists who emphasize
the rhetorical function of hearings, in which committees tilt witness lists
toward their desired policy outcomes rather than those who stress the
informational role of hearings. The banking and agriculture committees· had
due to lobbying by Trea~ury Secretary Brady. The Chainnan gave a~ the rea~(>n for his switch the Mere's
raising margins a~ the market dropped during the October 1989 stock market break, an explanation that is
not particularly convincing. See SEC/CFTC Jurisdictional Issues: Hearinxs Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Enerxy and Commerce. IOlst Cong., 2d Sess.
268 (1990) [hereinafter SEC/CFTC Jurisdiction HearinxJ (statement of Alan Greenspan). While the
Federal Reserve Board explicitly did not want the responsibility for supervising futures margins as the
Brady report had recommended, the Board was split over which agency should exercise that authority,
the CFTC or the SEC; Greenspan's preference wa~ the SEC. See id.
285. The CFTC had withdrawn its 1987 proposal on commodity swaps and issued a release
detailing a safe-harbor for most swap contracts from CEA regulation, CFTC, Policy Statement
Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (1989), in the face of the "firestorm of criticism
precipitated" by its earlier actions, see Bair, supra note 277, at 700. This action did not, however,
appea<;e the banks and the treatment of swaps wa~ a significant issue in the reauthorization, despite the
greater publicity surrounding the controversy with the SEC over equity derivatives.
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well-developed points of view on the jurisdictional issue from the outset, and
were attempting to promote their views through the hearing process, views
consonant with the preferences of the market participants associated with
their jurisdictions (the securities and futures industries, respectively).
Another notable pattern in the witnesses' positions is the farm groups'
alliance with the exchanges. Farm groups were solidly united with the
exchanges against the proposed jurisdictional transfer (see Table 17). This is
in contrast to the agreement of only some farm groups with the exchanges .on
the creation of an independent agency in the 1970s and to their opposing
positions on the question of market regulation in the 1920s and 1930s. This
behavior suggests that the exchanges' intense support of the CFTC cannot be
explained by a simple regulatory capture explanation, an explanation also
rejected for their position in the 1970s debate over the structure of the futures
regulator. If the exchanges had successfully captured the agency, it is
questionable whether farm organizations would have vigorously supported the
CFTC against attempts to carve financial futures from its jurisdiction. But as
a comparison of Tables 17 and 18 makes clear, the farm groups and
exchanges were still at odds over other regulatory issues debated in the 1990s,
such as restricting dual trading.
SEC supporters may have been correct when they maintained that a
transfer of jurisdiction would not adversely affect agricultural interests and
might benefit producers by focusing the CFTC's attention on their 1T!arket,
but the farm groups saw it differently. They adamantly supported the
regulatory status quo, contending that subjecting futures exchanges to
different regulatory regimes for different products would result in "regulatory
chaos".286 Their concern over the jurisdiction of financial futures is 'somewhat
puzzling. The farm groups may have feared that futures exchanges whose
most lucrative products were regulated by the SEC would pay increasingly
less attention to their agricultural sectors, and the liquidity of the producers'
hedging market would decline. Or they may have feared that, with a more
circumscribed jurisdictional sphere, the CFTC's budget would be cut,
resulting in either an increase in transaction fees, which would make
agricultural futures trading more costly, or a decline in agency resources,
which might affect the integrity of their markets. The American Farm Bureau,
for instance, noted the small size of the agricultural futures market and
expressed the concern that a jurisdictional transfer would "dilute" the CFTC's
expertise and "threaten the long-term availability of an essential agricultural
risk management tool".m
The validity of the farm groups' perception of the inadequacy of a CFTC
2H6. SEClCFTC Jurisdiction Hearing, supranote 2H4, at 173 (Letter to Rep. Tauke signed by
IHleading agricultural organizations).
2H7. fd. at 174-75 (Letter to Rep. Tauke from Dean R. Kleckner, President, American Farm
Bureau Federation).
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without jurisdiction over equity-based futures is unclear. It is altogether
possible that, despite the concerns expressed in the record regarding a
retrenched agency, the farm organizations' support for the CFTC's retention
of jurisdiction over equity futures was part of a logroll with the exchanges, or
members of the Agriculture Committee, on some other matter. But whatever
the farm groups' motivation, their support of the CFTC's jurisdiction is itself
a remarkable testament to how far futures markets have evolved since the
I920s, when farmers sought to shut the markets down.
3. Maneuvering in the Senate Protracting the Reauthorization
The competing interests in the dispute over jurisdiction of financial
derivatives-the securities, futures and banking industries-led to a
legislative process replete with intricate parliamentary maneuvering and a
two-year hold on the CFTC's reauthorization. The House unanimously passed
a reauthorization bill in September 1989 in the wake of the sting operation
scandal and sent the bill on to the Senate. A different reauthorization bill wa<;
approved by the Senate Agriculture Committee and brought to the floor in
October 1989. Neither bill addressed the jurisdictional issue. As uncommitted
senators' votes shifted, opponents and proponents of transferring equity-based
futures to the SEC used their senatorial prerogatives to prevent a vote on the
bill on the floor through June 1990.28M
In an effort to break the impasse, a subset of the Senate agriculture and
banking committees negotiated a compromise proposal in the summer of
1990. This compromise transferred jurisdiction over hybrid instruments (and
any futures-like instrument a securities exchange wished to market) from the
CFTC to the SEC, required the CFTC to exempt swaps from its jurisdiction,
gave the Federal Reserve Board the authority to set margins for stock index
futures, and mandated intermarket coordination by the CFTC and SEC on a
variety of issues.289
Neither the futures nor securities exchanges found the compromise
satisfactory.29o As a result, the senators who had agreed to the compromise
288. See 136 CONGo REC. 59,185 (1990) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (vote stalled for seven
months because senators put holds on the bill). The opponents of transferring jurisdiction to the SEC put
parliamentary holds on the bill from November 1989 to June 1990. when it became apparent that they had
enough votes to defeat the Administration's amendment to transfer stock index futures contracts to the
SEC. See 136 CONGo REC. 517,036 (1990) (statement of Sen. Dodd). At that point, the Administration's
supporters imposed their own holds on the legislation to regroup and gain time to rebuild the support for
their position. See id.
289. See Futures Trading Practices Act of l'J91-S.207, Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 361-76 (1991) (Tit. Ill, 5.2(7); id. at 2
(opening statement of Sen. Leahy) (Tit. III of 5.207 contains compromise developed by banking and
agriculture committee senators in fall of 1990). The mandated intermarket coordination issues included
establishing circuit breakers (trading hall~ upon specified stock price declines) and linked clearance and
settlement facilities, prohibiting front-running (broker trading before placing a customer order). and
implementing cross-margining systems.
290. See 137 CONGo REC. 54,310 (1991) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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could not obtain the unanimous consent necessary to proceed to a vote on
their agreement, or on a reauthorization bill with only a one-year extension to
permit consideration of the jurisdictional issue, or on the Administration's
jurisdictional proposal which was cast as an amendment to the
reauthorization bill. Opponents of a jurisdictional transfer refused to debate
the reauthorization bill with the Administration's amendment while
supporters of the transfer refused to debate the bill without it. In short, there
was a stalemate. The reauthorization legislation therefore died without
reaching a Senate floor vote. The Agriculture Committee Chairman, Senator
Leahy, attributed the stalemate to the Administration, and in particular,
Treasury Secretary Brady, who insisted that the jurisdictional issue be tied to
the reauthorization bill.29t
Reauthorization legislation was reintroduced in the succeeding Congress
in early 1991. In March, the House once again passed a reauthorization bill
without altering the CFTC's jurisdiction, as it had in the prior Congress.292
The Senate compromise of October 1990 was incorporated in a revised bill
introduced in the Senate in January 1991. But by the time the bill came to the
floor in April as a substitute amendment to the House-enacted bill, the
Agriculture Committee had replaced the 1990 compromise with a new
provision, supported by the Administration, that had been negotiated by the
CFTC and the Treasury Department.
The new compromise maintained the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction, but
provided it with exemptive power to exclude classes of instruments from its
jurisdiction and required it to exercise that authority for sW,ap contracts.293 It
also excluded IPs from the CFTC's jurisdiction, by adopting a· 50%
"predominant purpose" test for whether a hybrid security would come under
the CFTC's jurisdiction. Finally, the Administration's compromise gave
authority to set stock index futures margins to the Federal Reserve Board.
This agreement, when all is said and done, essentially recodified the 1974
jurisdictional arrangements: It maintained the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction
over futures contracts as the CFTC retained authority over equity-based
futures and was in charge of implementing the 50% test for hybrids, and it
exempted banks' swap activities, just as the interbank foreign exchange
forward market had earlier been exempted by the Treasury amendment.
Angered by the exclusion of the SEC from the compromise negotiations,
members of the banking committee sought to delay consideration of the
291. Id.
292. The vote to suspend the rules and pass the bill was approved by 395 to 27 (10 not voting
and 1 "present"), See 137 CONGo REC. HI ,386-87 (1991). SEC supporters attempted to amend the bill
and transfer jurisdiction over stock index futures but did not succeed. See id. at H 1.350-62, Because of
the small number of opposing votes (less than 10%). the vote to suspend the rules is not analyzed.
293. See Future Trading Practices Act of 1991, S. 207. 102d Cong" 1st Sess. § 3; 137 CONGo
REC. S4,313 (1991) (explaining technical and conforming amendments to bill); id. at S4,434 (statement
of Sen, Leahy) (summarizing new Administration compromise).
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revised bill.294 They objected to the bill's 50% test, which retained more
financial instruments under the CFTC's jurisdiction than the original 1990
compromise, even though, when compared to existing law (which treated an
instrument as a futures contract even if the futures component wa<; a minimal
proportion of the total value), it had the potential to limit the CFfC's
jurisdiction and expand that of the SEC.
The Senate Majority Leader, Senator Mitchell, however, supported the
Agriculture Committee, and with the Administration's official opposition
withdrawn with the compromise, the bill was released for chamber
consideration. Although the SEC still opposed the legislation, it did not have
sufficient clout on Capitol Hill to stop the bill, in contrast to the situation
when the Administration, in the person of the Trea<;ury Secretary, opposed
legislative action. 295
When the floor debate on the bill commenced, members of the agriculture
committee urged a quick vote on the legislation and attacked the banking
committee members' opposition as an unjustified "turf battle.,,296 The
Administration's support for the bill lent credence to their contention that the
SEC's position was a function of an unwarranted attempt to expand its
jurisdiction, forcing banking committee members to deny that they were
engaged in a turf dispute.297
Banking committee members instead maintained that their committee,
and not the Agriculture Committee, had the appropriate expertise to oversee
financial futures, and characterized the CFfC's exclusive jurisdiction as an
obstacle to financial product innovation.298 They further sought farm state
senators' support by contending that the farm groups' opposition to the
transfer of jurisdiction was misguided because it would not affect their
markets.
The Banking Committee's principal strategy, however, wa<; to offer a
counterproposal to the Administration's compromise provision, referred to as
the Bond-Wirth amendment, after the senators who sponsored it. The
amendment allocated jurisdiction over hybrid securities to the regulator
(CFTC or SEC) chosen by the security's issuer or developer. It also excluded
swaps from the CEA, in order to gamer the support of the banking
community (which had participated in the shaping of the Administration's
294. See, e.g., 137 CONGo REC. S4,309-1O (1991) (exchange between Sens. Bond and Mitchell).
295. The Banking Committee was able to delay the bill's consideration for only a few days, to
attend the funeral of Senator Heinz (who had been an active participant in the 1990 negotiations) and to
hold a hearing on the new compromise provisions.
296. See, e.g.• 137 CONGo REC. S4,440 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hetlin) ("turf tight" is the cause
of the delay and all that is at stake); id. at S4,438-39 (statement of Sen. Dixon) (identifying SEC
Chairman as source of "turf war").
297. See. e.;.,., 137 CONGo REC. S4,I\OO (1991) (statement of Sen. Gam)..
298. See, e.g., 137 CONGo REC. S4,1\89 (1991) (statement of Sen. Gam).; 137 CONGo REC.
S4,I\07 (1991) (statement of Sen. Bond).
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D. The \t{)te on the Bond- Wi.rth Market Competition Amendment
The supporters of the Bond-Wirth amendment labeled it a market-
oriented competition proposal, in contrast to its opponents, who pejoratively
labeled it a "pick your regulator" proposal. Although product marketers
could, in effect, pick their regulator under existing arrangements by
judiciously tailoring the instrument to the product criteria of the desired
regime, the Bond-Wirth amendment would eliminate transaction costs and
litigation risk by substituting a check-off-the-regulator-box approach.
I. The Amendment's Strategy: Expanding the Issue-Space to Alter the
Status Quo
The proposal to permit an explicit choice of multiple market regulators
wa<; an attempt to expand the dimensionality of the issue before the chamber
from the single dimension of the CFTC's .exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
futures markets, to the multiple dimensions of market competitiveness and
product innovation, in addition to the degree of government regulation of
futures markets. The object of this strategy wa<; to unravel the winning
coalition that supported the status quo of exclusive CFTC jurisdiction by
fragmenting its support. The hope was that conservative farm state senators
who otherwise supported the status quo might, for instance, vote for a
deregulatory market competition proposal, while the separate swap exemption
might make market-oriented bank supporters willing to upset the CEA status
quo. This issue-dimension-transforming strategy did not succeed, however:
The amendment was defeated by a vote of 65 to 33.300
CFTC supporters were not fooled by the Bond-Wirth strategy. They
understood the amendment for what it was, a stratagem to increase the SEC's
regulatory authority over new products, rather than a mechanism to introduce
greater competition into, and deregulation of, financial markets.301 As they
noted, the banking committee was not. suggesting the same optional
299. See Agriculture, Rural Development. and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1992,
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations (Part 6), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 36
(1991) (statement of Wendy Gramm, Chairman, CFTC) (stating that members of swap industry trade
group were active participant~ in negotiations). The trade group's position on the proposals is somewhat
ambiguous. Senators Bond and Wirth introduced a letter from the International Swap Dealers
Association (ISDA) expressing a preference for their amendment over the Administration compromise,
because it provided a clear exclusion from CFTC regulation as opposed to a discretionary exemption. See
137 CONGo REC. S4,603 (1991). Senator Leahy, however, inu'oduced a letter from )SDA stating that the
Administration compromise was a "significant improvement" over existing law and "acceptable" to the
organization. Id. at S4,597.
300. See 137 OlNG. REC. S4,693 (1991).
30 I. Senator Hetlin, however, criticized the amendment as an extreme "deregulatory" provision
given the "pick your regulator" approach. See 137 CONGo REC. S4,44 I (1991).
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regulatory regime for all financial instruments such as traditional securities
registered with the SEC, but only for those subject to the CFfC's
jurisdiction.302 They further noted that the banking committee had not
adopted such an optional strategy in its 1988 proposal regarding banks'
securities activities, but rather, proposed retaining SEC as weIl as banking-
regulator authority over bank subsidiaries that would engage in securities
activities. 303 Thus, the amendment was perceived by its opponents as a
transparent ploy to broaden the SEC's jurisdiction.
Because the CFTC's supporters saw through the strategy, they did not
vote "sincerely" on the amendment with regard to their preferences for
deregulation. Instead, they voted strategically, against the amendment, in
order not to jeopardize their preferred outcome, the status quo in futures
market regulation. Accordingly, the amendment failed to split the winning
coalition and was defeated.
It can also be plausibly contended that the Bond-Wirth amendment failed
because it did not truly expand the issue-space of financial derivative
regulation, which was the only way to upset the status quo. In this
interpretation, the amendment essentiaIly involved the single outstanding
dimension in the historical disputes over futures regulation-the degree of
government intervention in the marketplace-because the impetus behind
effecting a transfer of jurisdiction to the SEC was to place at least some
financial derivatives under a regulator perceived to be more intrusive than the
CFTC. This is an alternative explanation for why senators typicaIly associated
with a market-oriented ideology (for example, Senator Phil Gramm) did not
support the amendment.304 By failing to introduce a new dimension into the
debate, the amendment predictably failed to marshaIl enough votes to aIter the
dispersed allocation of authority over financial markets.
The interpretation that the amendment failed because it did not expand
the dimensionality of the issue-space is less persuasive than the explanation
that strategic voting caused its defeat because the perception that the Bond-
Wirth amendment would increase government intervention in markets (as
opposed to enhance the SEC's position at the expense of the CFTC by
deregulating the market) seems unjustified. Although stock exchanges would
opt to register their derivative products with the SEC under the Bond-Wirth
302. See 137 CONGo REC. S4.609 (1991) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
303. See 137 CONGo REC. S4,43X (1991) (statement of Sen. Dixon).
304. It must also be noted that Senator Gramm might have had another concern, which Clluld
have affected his views regardless of the dimensionality of the issue: his wife was the Chairman of the
CFTC. A<; a prominent Republican, in charge of the party's Senate reelection campaign, Senator
Gramm's support for the CFTC's compromise with the Treasury Department (and perhaps the
knowledge that his wife was chairman of the agency) may have intluenced other senators' votes as well.
But Senator Gramm's effectiveness in supporting the CFTC's effort to fend off the SEC's encroachment
on it<; jurisdiction would probably not have been sufficient to counter Administration opposition. had the
CRC not reached an agreement with the Treasury Department on the matters most important to it: swap
market independence and government review of futures margins.
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regime given their position on IPs, if the SEC wa<; too zealous a regulator
compared to the CFTC, then most new products would still be registered with
the CFTC. By leaving the regulatory choice to the market participants, the
Bond-Wirth amendment could be predicted to have little impact on the scope
of financial market regulation.
It should be noted that a "pick your regulator" approach could very well
not promote product innovation from the perspective of regulators'
incentives. There is a pattern to the successful retention of regulatory
authority over specific product markets since the establishment of the CFTC
in 1974, a pattern that appears to be bound up in economic as well as political
explanations. The first movers in financial product innovations tend to retain
the largest market shares,305 and the first movers' regulators have maintained
jurisdiction over the product in question. CFTC-regulated exchanges created
equity index futures and these products were not transferred to the SEC
despite strenuous efforts to do so; an SEC-regulated exchange introduced
stock options, and they have remained in the SEC's jurisdiction
notwithstanding their greater resemblance to futures than securities; and
banks were the innovators in swap contracts, and the swap market has
remained unregulated by either the CFTC or the SEC.
This pattern of regulators' retention of jurisdiction over product
innovations suggests that regulators who facilitate product innovation are
rewarded: They retain jurisdiction over products created on their watch.
Hence, regulators operating in such a competitive regulatory environment will
encourage innovation (as illustrated by the SEC's shifting policy toward
product innovation from the 1970s to the 1980s), because doing so increases
the scope of the agency's operations, and hence maximizes its budget.306 As
Edward Kane has observed, agencies that establish more expensive regulatory
regimes will lose market share, as firms seek out less costly regimes for new
products that are substitutes for the products regulated by the high-cost
agencies.3°7 This pattern of regulatory competition that fostered financial
product innovation would not persist in the optional regulatory setting of the
Bond-Wirth amendment, however, because first-mover advantages would be
greatly reduced with the elimination of exclusive jurisdictional lines.
2. Analysis (~f the ~)te on the Amendment
An analysis of the vote on the Bond-Wirth amendment tracks the
narrative of events concerning the failed strategy of expansion of the
305. See Peter Tufano. FinlJncilJllnnovlJtion and First-Mover Advantages, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 213
(19X9).
306. See NISKANEN, SUpril note 266.
307. See Edward J. Kane, How Market Forces Influence the Structure of Financial Regulation,
in RESTRUcrURING BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES IN AMERICA 343 (William S. Haraf and Rose M.
Kushmeider eds., 19XX).
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dimensionality of the issue space. The cross-tabulations of the vote by party
and by region are not significant (although as in the 1936 vote, there are too
few cells with high enough expected frequencies for a valid statistical test of
the region and vote cross-tabulation), and such a table is therefore omitted for
this vote. Descriptive statistics for the regression variables are reported in
Table 19.
In contrast to the prior statistical analyses of congressional votes, an
important new constituent variable is now available to explain the 1991
Senate vote-campaign contributions from the political action committees
(PACs) of commodity exchanges and the securities industry (FutContrib and
SecContrib, respectively).30M Interest group campaign contributions are an
additional means of ferreting out a senator's reelection constituency from
more imprecise state-wide based constituent variables beyond the house d-
nominate score proxy but they are typically expended beyond the group's
geographical base and thus better viewed as an additional proxy beyond the
exchange and farm population variables for the influence of special interests
on voting. 309
Several models, whose results are reported in Table 20, were estimated
using the campaign contribution data. In Models I and 2, the PAC
contributions received in a senator's election campaign (1988 or 1990) are
entered directly into the vote regression. 3IO Models 3-6 take into account the
308. Another legacy of the Nixon era wa~ federal election and campaign financing refonn. which
created the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and eventually resulted in the emergence of political
action committees in the campaign contribution process due to restrictions on corporate and individual
giving. See SABATO, supra note 32. at 5-10. Campaign contributions must be reported to the FEe. and
these reports are available to the public. Contributions from the commodities and securities industries to
Senate campaigns were obtained from the reporL~ filed by the PACs of commodity exchanges, securities
finns, and stock exchanges, available on the Mead-Lexis network which included PACs of the CBOT,
Merc, New York Mercantile Exchange, NYSE, Pacitic Stock Exchange, Securities Industry Association,
and a number of securities brokers and investment banks.
309. As discussed in note 236 supra, the estimation procedure that Poole and Rosenthal usell fur
the 102d Congress is w-nominate, but because there is no significant interpretative difference between 1I-
nominate and w-nominate scores, I continue to refer to the 1991 scores as d-nominate scores for textual
consistency. As in the other vote regressions, the general electorate constituency variables are not
signiticant when entered directly into the vote regressions, but they 1I0 have significant explanatory power
for the d-nominate scores' decomposition regressions. The alljustell R2s for the first and seconll
dimension decompositions are, respectively, .X853 and .4820. For the tirst dimension, the signiticant
regressors are the house d-nominate score, party. South and 19X8 Democratic presidential vote; for the
second dimension they are party and 1988 Democratic presidential vote. The result~ of the tirst dimension
regression (the score associated with ideology) are especially encouraging, given the large proportion of
variance explained and the significance of the proxy for reelection constituent~ as well a~ some state-wille
constituent variables.
310. Because the CFTC reauthorization controversy hall not been on the agenlla lIuring the I<)X5-
86 federal election cycle. I do not use any campaign lIata for the thirll of the Senate electell in I<)XIi anll
who were, correspondingly, up for reelection in 1<)<)2. Some senators report no PAC contributions in
election cycles when they are not up for office while others report contributions in all cycles; in the latter
ca~s, the receipt~ tenll to be substantially larger in the cycles when the senators are up for reelection.
Given these discrepancies, restricting the contribution lIata to senators stanlling for election (which are
the senators elected in the 19X7-XX and I<)X9-<)0 election cycles) is the most appropriate approach, as
these are the most accurate for cross-sectional comparative purposes, even though this relluces the
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endogeneity of campaign contributions, through a two-stage estimation
process. 311 The first stage predicts contributions using a censored regression
model and the fitted values from this regression are then used as the
contribution regressors in the second stage regressions on the votes.312 Models
7 and 8, which omit the campaign contribution variables, are included solely
for comparative purposes with the earlier vote regressions when such data
were not available, and demonstrate the impact of the campaign contribution
variables upon model specification. These models will not be discussed in the
text.
The voting on the amendment is consistent with the interpretation of the
Bond-Wirth proposal as an unsuccessful effort at issue-dimensionality
expansion. As Table 20 indicates, the significant explanatory variables of
voting on the amendment are interest group variables and membership on the
banking committee, and not the ideology variables (although none of the
regressors are significant in every model).313 The insignificance of the
number of observations available for the regressions. Senators up in the 1987-88 cycle are included
because the jurisdictional issue was raised following the 1987 stock market crash in the Brady Report and
the CFTe's 1989 reauthorization date was known to all the participants. The ratio of yes to no votes in
the sample consisting of senators elected in 1988 and 1990 is about the same as in the population of
voting senators. 38 nays to 20 yeas in the election subset compared to 65 nays to 33 yeas in the
population. Hence, the election subset will provide an accurate sample for explaining the population vote.
311. A single equation estimation (models I and 2) is inadequate because groups may 'contribute
to senators based on how they voted in the past as well as to influence their vote in the future. There may
thus be unobserved correlations across the two variables that bias a single-equation estimator. The two-
stage tobit maximum likelihood estimation used here. which resolves the difficulty, is analogous to a
simultaneous equation two-stage conditional maximum likelihood estimation. See Lung-Fei Lee,
Simultaneous Equations Models with Discrete and Censored Dependent Variables. in STRUcruRAL
ANALYSIS OF DISCRETE DATA WITH ECONOMETRIC APPLICATIONS 346 (Charles F. Manski & Daniel
McFadden eds.. 1981). The tobit model of the first-stage is typically used to analyze censored regression
problems (the problem posed for estimation when there are observations about which we have no
information, that is, for some senators, no campaign contributions are observed). See G. S. MADDALA,
LIMITED-DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARtABLES IN ECONOMETRICS 3-6 ( 1983). Because the proofs of
the efficiency of this two-stage estimation technique use probit models, I use the probit model for all of
the 1991 vote regressions instead of the logit, which uses a cumulative normal, as opposed to logistic,
distribution function. td. at 22-23.
312. The explanatory variables in the regression of campaign contributions from commodity
exchanges are agriculture committee membership, commodity exchange in the state, the d-nominate
scores, party, and as the variables identifying the equation, incumbency status at the time of the election
(lncumb, 1 = incumbent, 0 = challenger or open seat) and total PAC contributions received in the election
cycle (TotPAC); those for the regression of campaign contributions from the securities industry are the
same except banking committee membership (BankCom) and stock exchange in the state (StockEx)
replace the agriculture committee and commodity exchange variables. The criterion for an identifying
variable is that it does not affect the vote on the Bond-Wirth amendment. Total PAC receipts for the
senatorial campaigns in 1987-88 and 1989-90 were obtained from the ALMANAC OF FEDERAL PACs 577-
649 (1992). The choices of identifying variables follow the approaches in Keith Krehbiel. Committee
Power, Leadership, and the Median Voter: Evidence from the Smoking Ban, 12 J.L., ECON., AND ORG.
234 (1996); Henry w. Chappell, Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous
Probit-Tobit Model, 64 REV. ECON. AND STAT. 77 (1982); and Thomas Stratmann, What Do Campaign
Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes, 57 So. ECllN. 1. 606 (1991). For a
further discussion of additional regressions using other identifying variables, see Romano, supra note 07.
313. One puzzling result is that the fitted component of the second dimension d-nominate score is
signiticantly positive in several of the models. This is unusual because Poole and Rosenthal find that the.
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ideology variables is important because it indicates that members were not
fooled by the introduction of additional dimensions in the debate concerning
deregulation and market competitiveness. Such dimensions would normally
have resulted in a significant ideological voting component (as wa'l true, for
instance, in the 1921 House vote).
Instead, the coalition supporting the status quo (farmers and futures
exchanges) was united: Senators whose states had a higher percentage of
farmers were more likely to vote against the amendment, as were members
who received contributions from commodity exchanges. Those voting for the
amendment represented a different set of constituents: Namely, senators
receiving contributions from securities exchanges, a variable correlated with
the presence of a stock exchange in the senator's state, were more likely to
vote for the amendment.
The contribution variables, significant when directly entered into the
regressions, are not significant in the tobit estimations (compare Models 1-4).
This is most likely due to multicollinearity, which is a common problem with
two-stage models. 314 For example, the correlation between the fitted
component of the securities contribution variable and the stock exchange
variable is .53, and it is .17 with the banking committee membership variable.
In contrast to the other variables, the coefficients on these variables decrea'le
substantially in the tobit formulations (compare Models I and 3).315 If the
model is run excluding the committee variables from the vote equation, then
the fitted contribution variables are both significant (Models 5 and 6). There
is no such effect if the model is run excluding the exchange variables instead
of the committee variables (not shown).
But there is an alternative interpretation of the insignificance of the
contribution variables in the tobit models, that campaign contributions do not
affect congressional voting. From this perspective, the difference between
Models 1 and 3 is substantive: Failure to model contributions' endogeneity in
a voting model will overstate the impact of contributions.
In contrast to the 1921, 1936 and 1974 votes, an institutional variable
second dimension d-nominate score. which is related to racial rather than rural issues in the post-World
War II period, ha~ become increasingly insigniticant since the late 1970s a~ race became fused with the
economic issue of redistribution a~sociated with the (ideological) first dimension score. POOLE &
ROSENTHAL, supra note 62, at 110-11. Given the concurrent signifIcance of the fann population variable
in the predicted (negative) direction, the second dimension is clearly parceling out some effect other than
a legislator's fann state connection. It is, perhaps. indicating the occurrence of a complicated logroll. But
I have no satisfactory explanation for this result.
314. See MA"nALA. supra note 31 I. at 252.
315. Although I include the committee membership variable.~ in both stages because the vote
directly implicated committee intluence, other analyses using the two-stage estimation techni4ue omit
committee membership variables from the probit vote regressions, using them solely a~ instrumenl~ in the
tobit contribution regressions. This is presumably done because committee membership is not expected to
explain tloor votes, due to either the reciprocity norm or committee representativeness. Both Chappell
and Stratmann. for instance, use committee membership only as a tobit instrument but neither discusses
why such a choice was made. See Chappell. .l'tIpra note 312; Stratmann, supra note 312.
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was significant in the 1991 Senate vote in the non-tobit models: Banking
committee members were more likely to vote for the amendment. (Its
insignificance in the tobit models, as already noted, is probably due to
multicollinearity.) This result lends credence to the model because the
amendment originated with the banking committee and would have expanded
its jurisdiction over financial products, benefiting its constituents (the SEC
and stock exchanges).
The constituent connection for the banking committee members is
apparent in the data: Securities industry contributions, presence of a stock
exchange, and membership on the banking committee are positively
correlated. Moreover, a test of the joint significance of these variables
(banking committee membership, stock exchange presence, and securities
industry contributions) indicates their importance as predictors of votes. A
likelihood ratio test comparing Model 3 and a model excluding those three
variables produces a chi-square of 8.15, which is significant at 5%. The result
is not a function of ideological differences across the banking and agriculture
committees because the committees' median d-nominate scores are not
significantly different from each other, nor from the chamber.316
Agriculture committee membership is not significant in any of the
regressions (nor is the likelihood ratio test excluding agriculture committee
membership, presence of a futures exchange and futures exchanges
contributions). This is also a predictable result, given the reciprocity norm,
which provides an institutional explanation for the amendment's defeat. The
reciprocity norm predicts that members who are on neither the banking nor
agriculture committee will share the agriculture committee members' interest
in not having well-established jurisdictional authority undermined in a power-
grab by another committee. The insignificance of the agriculture committee
variable is also consistent with the information-gathering, majority-control
view of committees, which maintains that committee preferences on
substantive policy will be representative of the chamber majority. But this
explanation does not mesh as well with the narrative of the expanded-
dimensionality strategy as does the reciprocity explanation.
The conclusion concerning the strength of the institutional component in
the vote on the Bond-Wirth amendment is reinforced by the insignificance of
the ideology variable (the first dimension d-nominate score, whether
decomposed or not) across all of the models. Senators voting on the
amendment were not concerned about the deregulatory issues raised by the
amendment's sponsors. An alternative explanation to the institutional
explanation for the insignificance of the personal ideology variables in the
316. The respective D-nominate( J) medians are -.4525 for the Banking Committee, ".186 for the
Agriculture Committee, and -.364 for members of neither committee; the chi-square statistics are,
respectively, across the committees. 0.02, across the Banking Committee and chamber, 0.004, and across
the Agriculture Committee and chamber; 0.3. The D-nominate( J) means are also not significantly
different.
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1991 regression in contrast to the other regressions is the presence of the
contribution variable. Given the absence of contribution data for the earlier
Congresses, it is possible that the significance of the residuals from the d-
nominate score decomposition is picking up the flow of campaign money (an
omitted constituent variable), rather than the effect of a legislator's personal
ideology on voting behavior.
Examination of same-state senators' match rates, as wa" undertaken for
the 1936 Senate vote on the CEA, sheds further light on the interpretation of
. the insignificance of the ideology variables. There were fourteen pairs of
disagreeing senators of the forty-eight pairs voting on the Bond-Wirth
amendment. As indicated in Table 21, the constituent model is a better
predictor of the vote pairs than the ideological model. This result is
compatible with the institutional explanation (that senators saw through the
amendment's coalition-splitting strategy and therefore did not vote their
preferences), for it strengthens the constituent-based interpretation of the vote
that underpins the institutional explanation. Namely, banking committee
members' jurisdictional interest meshed with that of their securities industry
constituents.
E. Aftermath of the Bond- Wirth Amendment
Following the defeat of the Bond-Wirth amendment, the two senators
made a final attempt to salvage the failed 1990 compromise by offering an
amendment on intermarket coordination between the CFTC and SEC. The
proposal required the agencies' adoption of numerous coordinating rules
within a fixed time period, including establishment of circuit breakers,
prohibition of front-running, and cross-margining of accounts (the subjects of
the intermarket provision contained in the original compromise proposal).
The debate on this amendment was more limited than the debate on the
market competition amendment. Agriculture committee members opposed the
intermarket coordination amendment, claiming it was just a continuation of
the 'turf war motivating the other amendment. On a motion of Senator Leahy,
the Agriculture Committee Chairman, the Senate voted 57 to 41 to table the
amendment. As was true of the other Bond-Wirth amendment vote, the vote
on the intermarket coordination amendment was not partisan, with a m~ority
of each party supporting the motion to table?l?
An analysis of the vote on the intermarket coordination amendment
indicates a somewhat different dynamic from the vote on the market
317. See 137 CONGo REC. 54.70K (1991). Of the senators voting on different sides of the two
amendment~, three supporters of the Bond-Wirth amendment (one of whom was a banking committee
member) shifted to vote to table the intermarket coordination amendment, while eleven opponent~ of the
Bond-Wirth amendment (one of whom was a banking committee member) voted against the motion to
table. In an effort to explain the change in vote. probit regressions on the choice of switching votes were
run duplicating Models 3 and 4 of Table 20: in both models. none of the regressors were signiticant and
the goodness offit was poor (.14 and .13, respectively).
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competition amendment. Constituent interests and ideology matter but
banking committee membership does not. Given the limited importance the
senators accorded this amendment, the regression result<; are not shown (the
models estimated were identical to those reported in Table 20 for the Bond-
Wirth amendment) and the analysis will be brief. The constituent ideology
variables (the fitted components of both d-nominate scores) are significant
(more liberal senators were more likely to vote against the motion to table, as
were senators from less urban states), as is the farm population variable
(farm-state senators were more likely to vote for the motion).318 The campaign
contribution variables are again significant when the committee variables are
omitted, or when they are entered directly as an exogenous variable. But the
banking committee membership variable is not significant, and neither is the
likelihood ratio test of the exclusion of the banking committee and securities-
related constituent variables from the Model 3 regression.
The difference in results between the two 1991 votes is a function of the
intermarket coordination amendment's more straightforward language, as
well as the fact that it did not contain any substantive change in the CFfC's
jurisdiction. The latter tactic made the amendment less threatening not only to
regulatory arrangement<;, but also to institutional prerogatives (the protection
of committee jurisdiction), considerations which trumped ideology in the first
Bond-Wirth amendment vote. The former tactic made votes consistent with a
senator's ideology: A vote for the intermarket amendment was a vote to
increase market regulation, while a vote for the market competition
amendment, even if it would arguably have. the same effect, was explicitly a
vote for deregulation. It would therefore not be necessary, as would have been
true of a vote for the first Bond-Wirth amendment, to explain to constituents
in an election campaign that a vote in favor of deregulation wa<; actually a
strategic device to increase regulation. It is also highly probable that with the
decisive victory on the first amendment, the floor manager knew he had
enough votes to defeat the second measure and did not seek to persuade
marginal senators to vote against the amendment.
Shortly after the defeat of the intermarket coordination amendment, with
the approval of some technical amendments, the bill wa<; adopted with the
Administration compromise intact by a vote of 90 to 8; three of the opponents
were banking committee members. The Senate thereafter sent its version of
. the CFfC reauthorization to the House with a request for a conference. In
October, the House agreed to the request. The conferees met the following
month and recessed. Almost one year later, in the summer of 1992, the
Conference Committee reconvened to negotiate the differences between the
3\ K. This is in keeping with the same-state senator match rate tests for this vote (not shown):
Paralleling the result~ for the other votes, the constituent model outperforms the' ideology model, with a
correct prediction rate of KK% (93% adjusting for· pairs consisting of senators from different parties)
compared to 73%.
376
HeinOnline -- 14 Yale J. on Reg. 377 1997
The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation
chambers, and in October 1992 it reported out a bill, which was approved by
both chambers. The margin provision was retained, but the specific swap and
IPs provisions were eliminated in favor of a provision providing the CFTC
with broad exemptive authority for products traded in institutional markets,
with an understanding, expressed in the legislative history, directing the
CFTC to "use its new exemptive powers" for swaps and hybrid
instruments.319
The revised exemptive authority provision further prohibited the use of
the exemptive authority for products covered by the Shad-Johnson accord,
and permitted boards of trade to apply for exemptions under the provision in
order to "promote fair competition." This latter clause wa<; a result of
lobbying by the futures exchanges, who feared that they would be at a
competitive disadvantage to off-exchange markets that received exemptions.
Their lobbying contributed to the delay of the reauthorization legislation in
the Conference Committee.
The CFTC promptly followed the Conference Committee's instructions
and exempted swaps.320 It acted equally promptly on hybrid instruments, but
in exempting these instruments, it resurrected the 50% test as the standard for
an exemption.321 The futures exchanges then petitioned for an exemption
from most of the requirements of the CEA for the trading of certain futures
and options contracts.322 In denying most of the exchanges' petition and
providing only a limited and temporary (three year) exemption, the CFTC
rejected the exchanges' claim that compliance with the CEA had rendered
them uncompetitive in global markets. 323 The CFTC further differentiated the
swap and hybrid exemptions from the exchanges' petition, in part, for arising
"out of a need specifically recognized by Congress to enhance the legal
certainty as to the regulatory status of those instruments.,,324 This response is
a fitting conclusion to the 1989 reauthorization process, for it demonstrates
the success of the 1974 Democratic strategy to create an agency responsive to
Congress' will. The CFTC did precisely what Congress told it to do: It
exempted no more and no less than the products Congress had specifically
mentioned. At the same time, the CFTC's response reveals the stability of a
regulatory status quo, by underscoring that one participant in a winning
coalition (the futures exchanges) cannot effect a change in the status quo.
319. Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, H. REP. No. 978. 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)
(Conference repon to accompany H.R.707). The exemptive authority is contained in § 502 of the Futures
Trading Practices Act of 1992, codified at 7 V.S.c. § o(c).
320. See CFTC, Exemption for Certain Swap Agreements. 58 Fed. Reg. 5,587 (1993) (17 CFR
PI. 35).
321. See CFTC, Regulation of Hybriu InstlUments, 58 Feu. Reg. 5,580 (1993) (17 CFR PI. 34).
322. See CFTC, Notices, Exemptions for Certain Exchange-Traueu Futures anu Options
Contracts, 58 Feu. Reg. 43,414 (1993) (notice of CBOT anu Merc petitions for exemption).
323. See CFTC. Section 4(ci Contract Market Transactions: Swap Agreements, 59 Feu. Reg.
54,139,54,142 (1994) (17 CFR Pts. 35 and 31l) (Proposeu Rule), tinalized in CFTC, Section 4(c)
Contract Market Transactions, IlO Feu. Reg. 51,323 (1995) (17 CFR PI. 31l) (Final Rule).
324. Id.
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F. Prognosis on the Winning Political Coalition:~ Stability
Whether the tripartite winning coalition of farmers, futures exchanges
and banks will continue to cohere in the future is somewhat more problematic
than its staying power from 1974 through 1992, for it is problematic whether
the exemptive authority granted the CFTC in the 1992 reauthorization will
serve as it wm; intended, to preserve the regulatory status quo. Although the
1992 legislation maintained the existing jurisdictional allocation across
agencies, the competitive position of the commodity exchanges has been
eroding with the globalization of derivatives markets and the expansion of the
unregulated over-the-counter derivative markets in which banks are major
players. For example, the U.S. share of global futures trading was 40% in
1995, compared to 78% in 1988,325 and the over-the-counter forward, swap
and options markets dominate in value the exchange-traded futures and
options markets.326 These developments have strained the coalition created by
the 1974 legislation, as the commodity exchanges jealously eye their
unregulated bank competitors, and have criticized the CFTC, with increasing
vigor, as an impediment to their domestic and international
competitiveness.327
The competitive disadvantage of the futures exchanges may well force a
reconsideration of the regulatory regime, by whichever forum whose attention
the exchanges succeed in attracting. In the current political climate, this is
more likely to be the Republican-controlled Congress than the CFTC, whose
chairperson, Brooksley Born, is not committed to market deregulation. To the
extent that the CFTC is not responsive to the exchanges' concerns over
regulatory burdens, the exchanges' support for the regime of multiple
regulators will evaporate. Jack Sandner, the chairman of the Merc, for
example, out of concern over unregulated competitors with lower costs, has
already gone so far as to propose revamping the regulatory apparatus. He has
recommended the creation of one cabinet department combining all financial
market regulators, which would be organized into regulatory subdivisions
along functional lines (separate divisions for investment securities markets
and risk-shifting markets) and would regulate all market participants
uniformly.328 In addition, the exchanges have been lobbying Congress to
overrule the CFTC's limited exemption for institutional markets by legislating
a broad professional markets exemption, with some initial success-the
325. See Fred Vogelstein, Futures Murts in the U.S. Run Scured, WALL ST. 1., June 10, 1996, at
Cl.
326. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supru note 279, at 36.
327. See, e.g., Testinwny of John F. Sundner, Chuirman of the Board of Directors. Chicago
Mercuntile Exchange, CFTC Reuuthorization Hearing and Markup, Bejilre the Subcomm. on Risk
Munugement and Specialty Crops, House Comm. on Agriculture, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 28,
1995), available in LEXIS, LEGIS library, Congressional Testimony file.
328. See CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, MODEL FOR FEDERAL FINANCIAL REGULATION
(undated report).
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introduction of bills, with bipartisan support, containing such a provision.329
The seriousness of the threat to the CFfC's existence which is contained
in Sandner's proposal is, however, more apparent than real. It would be costly
for the futures exchanges to abandon the CFfC, rather than intensify their
efforts at applying political pressure on the CFfC to adapt its policies to a
more deregulatory approach. This is because elimination of the agency would
sever the exchanges' connection to the agriculture committees at least with
respect to financial futures, requiring them to develop from scratch relations
with a new set of legislators. This is no doubt one explanation for the
exchanges' support of bills to create an exemption for professional markets
rather than a new regulatory entity along the lines envisioned by Sandner. The
more probable outcome of efforts at reorganizing futures regulation is an even
greater dispersion of financial market regulation, that shifts institutional
markets from the CFfC's aegis to a less-regulated status similar to the banks'
markets, rather than a shift to a unitary regulator.
There is another important factor that renders it extremely improbable
that institutional reform will entail greater market regulation, as has been the
goal of those who advocate expanding the SEC's jurisdiction over futures.
Competition from foreign markets is a powerful constraint on domestic
regulatory choices, as the CFfC itself found out to its dismay in its aborted
foray into commodity swap regulation and the Chase Manhattan Bank
investigation fiasco. Any attempt to impose a new and enhanced regulatory
regime would, therefore, have to be transnational in scope (a difficult and
problematic proposition) to be successful.
Besides the diminished competitiveness of the futures exchanges, there is
a second, albeit quite different, development in the environment that could
conceivably produce an alteration in the regulatory landscape, as it could
fundamentally affect the winning coalition without increasing issue salience
beyond Capitol Hill. Namely, the prospective termination of federal farm
subsidies may revive farmers' antagonism to futures markets should a severe
farm recession occur.
Farming has, however, changed dramatically since the 1920s and 1930s,
as derivative products are far more integrated into the producer side of the
agricultural business than before.33o Moreover, the sharp decline in
329. See S.257, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (sponsored by Sens. Lugar, Leahy and Hark.in);
H.R.467, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (sponsored by Rep. Ewing).
330. A recent example of derivatives usage by farmers are forward contracts k.nown as "hedge to
arrive" contract~, that provide farmers with guaranteed prices over multiple years, with values pegged to
comparable CBOT futures contract~. In the wake of a surge in wheat prices, wheat farmers and elevators
lost substantial sums on the contiact~, and the Senate Agriculture Committee held an oversight hearing to
review what the CFfC wa~ doing in response to the situation. See Ellyn Ferguson, Hedge-la-arrive
fUlures contraclS could ruin farmers. panel laid, GANNETT NEWS SERV.. May 15, 1996. available in
LEXIS, NEWS library. CURNWS tile. The day after the hearing, the CFfC issued guidelines for the
hedge-to-arrive contract~. without determining whether the contracts were futures contracts subject to
the agency's jurisdiction. or unregulated forward contract~. See CFfC Staff Issues Policy Statement;
Senate AG Considers Implications. 28 Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) 642 (May 17, 1996).
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agricultural compared to financial futures markets suggests that even
widespread distress in the agricultural sector would pose a potential issue of
only selective intervention on the agricultural side of the contract markets and
would not implicate the balance of authority across agencies. Thus, as with
the futures exchanges' changing environment of intense global and off-
exchange market competition, termination of the New Deal's farm income
maintenance programs also does not point toward a new regulatory
equilibrium that would establish the SEC, or any other entity, as a unitary
financial market regulator.
Although a break-up of the winning coalition of farmers, futures
exchanges and banks could open the way to a reconfiguration of the current
regulatory structure, it is a safe bet to conclude that, whatever regulatory
structure would be adopted if the exchanges ceased to support the CFTC,
banks' activities would not wind up under the jurisdiction of nonbank
regulators. The banks have three factors on their side, compared to the futures
exchanges: a different congressional connection (the banking committees),
which is unaffected by the status of the CFTC; a regulatory connection that
consists of far more powerful actors than either the CFTC or SEC-the
Federal Reserve Board and Treac;ury Department-given their role in the
regulation of monetary' policy; and a key taxpayer connection-the federal
deposit insurance fund-the protection of which has led bank regulators and
Congress to ensure that the banks' more profitable (albeit "nonbanking")
activities remain unburdened.
Conclusion
Federal regulation of futures markets was initiated in 1921 as a political
response to the most severe farm recession the United States had experienced
to that time. Farmers and their supporters in Congress attributed declining
farm prices to futures trading rather than post-World War I changes in supply
and demand for their products. They gained the support of non-farm state
legislators by packaging their economic interest in raising commodity prices
with moralistic rhetoric concerning the evils of gambling. The legislation's
opponents represented districts with futures exchanges or were Northeastern
legislators, who, mirroring the constituents they represented, were ideological
conservatives (proponents of free markets).
The concerns that motivated the legislation's supporters had little to do
with market perfection, as opposed to rent-seeking, the transfer of wealth
from the marketing middlemen who created the exchanges to farmers. The
economic premise of the farmers' proposal was wrong-restricting futures
trading would not raise' commodity prices. But the lobbying over the
regulation of futures exchanges wac; in actuality a second-best solution to the
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farm groups' favored policy for raising farm income without implementing a
price support system: The government's promotion of national farm
cooperatives as an alternative marketing and distribution system to the
existing network of which the futures markets were a part.
The 1921 futures legislation and other laws facilitating cooperatives'
organization did not dramatically shift the marketing system toward one
dominated by cooperatives and with the worsening depression of the 1930s,
the farmers' political agitation against futures exchanges continued. Farmers'
demands to prohibit futures trading ended only with the implementation of a
farm subsidy program in the second New Deal's Agricultural Adjustment Act,
which provided farmers with what they had always desired but were forced to
seek indirectly through futures regulation and the cooperative movement,
.guaranteed incomes.
Because the subsidy payments were paid to individual farmers, the New
Deal program was the death knell for the cooperative movement as a political
.. force, and the political actor most interested in closing down exchanges was
removed from the stage. As a consequence, there wa<; no significant federal
legislation involving futures markets from the 1930s until 1974, when
farmers' concerns were not the impetus for reform, but rather, inflation and
spiraling food prices, along with a scandal in unregulated precious metals
options, focused congressional attention on the futures markets.
The 1974 legislation created today's regulatory structure, an independent
agency with exclusive jurisdiction over futures contracts" the CFfC, whose
activities are overseen by the agriculture committees. Although futures
exchanges and many farm organizations advocated continuation of the futures
regulator within the Department of Agriculture (the organizational
arrangement introduced in 1921), their position did not carry the day because
of legislators' institutional concerns. An independent agency strengthened
congressional control over public policy, and in particular, that of the
Democratic majority, against the Republican Administration. In fact, the
politics of the 1974 vote on an independent agency structure differs from that
of all other votes on futures legislation: Not only wa<; it the only party-line
vote but also, legislators' economic (constituents') interests do not explain
their votes. The United States' distinctive regulatory regime, in short,
originated in an attempt to leverage congressional influence in an era of
divided government. The creation of an independent regulatory commission
overseeing futures trading wa<; only one of numerous such efforts during the
1970s.
Futures on fixed income securities were introduced soon after the
establishment of the CFTC. These instruments revolutionized financial
management, and set in motion a protracted jurisdictional struggle between
the SEC and the CFfC, as the SEC sought to prohibit the trading of financial
futures or to bring such products under its own regulatory ambit. Its lack of
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success is not surprising. Because the SEC and CFfC are overseen by
different congressional committees, shifting jurisdiction over product markets
from the CFfC to the SEC would remove those markets from the agriculture
committees' oversight authority, upsetting the established ties between
committee members and their consti tuents.
The agencies' jurisdictional controversy came to the top of the legislative
agenda during the CFfC's 1989 reauthorization, which commenced in the
aftermath of a series of industry scandals and the 1987 stock market crash,
and was not resolved until 1992. The delay wa'l caused by the effort of the
SEC and its political allies to transfer to it jurisdiction of equity-based
futures. In the late 1980s, the securities industry became an active lobbyist for
the jurisdictional transfer because the rapid growth of financial futures
markets impacted negatively on stock exchanges (institutional trading had
shifted to derivative markets).
Additional support for delaying the CFfC's reauthorization came from
the banking industry, which sought to ensure that its extensive over-the-
counter derivatives business would remain unregulated, as it was under the
terms of the 1974 legislation. When the reauthorization legislation was finally
enacted in 1992, the status quo established in 1974 was essentially
unaffected: All financial futures remained with the CFfC and the banks'
markets remained unregulated.
The key institutional arrangement of Congress, the committee system,
protected the regulatory status quo of multiple government regulators of
financial markets. It wa'l supported by the preferences for the maintenance of
the status quo of the coalition of constituents who were involved in the
initiation of federal regulation of futures markets in the 1920s, farmers and
futures exchanges, and those brought in by the regulatory pattern established
in the 1974 organizational reform, the banks. The committees preserving the
system are not, however, runaway committees. The ideological preferences of
the members of the committees with jurisdiction over the futures markets'
regulatory regime are representative of those of the chamber majorities.
The striking feature of the outcome of the battles in the political history
of the regulation of derivative securities is then, that, despite the massive
growth and change in futures markets (in instruments traded and market
participants) since 1974 and the considerable efforts after the 1987 stock
market crash by the SEC and its constituents to shift regulatory control, the
original regulatory structure has remained remarkably intact. The exemption
for the swap market, whose major players are banks, follows the original 1974
jurisdictional arrangement, in which banks' off-exchange forward contract
activities were excluded from the CFfC's jurisdiction. The SEC has retained
jurisdiction over stock options which it had obtained by historical accident:
Exchange-traded equity options were created prior to the establishment of the
CFfC, and thus the SEC wa'l the only conceivable regulator with which the
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option exchange could register. But the SEC's authority has not been
expanded to stock index futures. The CFTC has maintained exclusive
jurisdiction over futures contracts and obtained its preferred position on
hybrid securities, that it would cede to the SEC only those instruments whose
securities component comprised more than 50% of the instrument's value,
with the determination of the components' value made by the CFTC.
The allocation of jurisdictional authority has produced a form of
regulatory competition that has fostered financial product innovation, even
though that wa<; surely not an intended consequence of the legislation. The
process by which innovation has arisen occurs in two stages. First, market
participants create new products, often with an eye to lowering regulatory
costs by crafting them to avoid coming under the more expensive regulatory
regime; second, regulators concerned about the vibrancy of their regulated
firms, if only in order to increase their regulatory market share, seek to protect
their firms' product innovations from the challenges of other regulatory
agencies and firms.
Regulators whose firms have successfully innovated (as opposed to
simply imitated) have retained jurisdiction over the new products and thereby
expanded market share. By being rewarded with the jurisdiction over their
regulated firms' new products, regulators are provided with incentives to be
accommodating to their firms' efforts at innovation. Remarkably, the
industrial organization of Congress-the committee system, which is a
principal rea<;on for the maintenance of the multiple regulator regime-has
fortuitously facilitated financial product innovation.
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Table 1. 1921-22 Congressional Witnesses
(5 hearings before agriculture committees)
Witness type Number For Number Against
Farm organization 14 0
Individual farmer 3 2
Grain dealers 0 23
Grain elevator operators 1 16
Millers I 10
Boards of trade (exchanges) 0 31
Bankers 0 5
Members of Congress 10 I
Executive branch officials 12 0
State government offici a1s 3 0
Miscellaneous I 6
Total testifying 45 94
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Table 2. Periodical Coverage, 1900-94.
Readers' 1900-111 1919-24 1925-32 1933-37 1938-43 1944-53 1954-63
Guide (v.I-4) (v.s-6) (v.7-8) (v.9-1O) (v.II-13) (v.14-18) (v.19-23)
entry\vol
Conunod 3 (.2) 6 (I) 39 (5) 21 (4) 8 (I) 55 (6) 7 (.7)
Exch.
SlOck 277(15) 23 (4) 112 (14) 174 (35) 148 (25) 200 (22) 538 (54)
Exch.
Specu- 105 (6) 23 (4) 178 (22) 81 (16) 22 (4) 66 (7) 60 (6)
lation
Agri- 57 (3) 132 (22) 333 (42) 421 (84) 289 (48) 161 (18) 374 (37)
culture
Food 102 (5) 26 (4) 38 (5) 81 (16) 22 (4) 114(13) 56 (6)
Prices
Futures cross-ref cross-ref cross-ref cross-ref cross-ref
Products
CFTC 3 (.6) 2 (.3) I (.1) 0(0)
SEC 76 (15) 124(21) 40 (4) 99 (10)
Notes:
Commod Exch. = entries under Commodity Exchanges, Individual Commodity Exchange and futures-related entries
under Grain Trade;
Stock Exch. = entries under Stock Exchanges and Wall Street;
Agriculture = entries under AgriCulture-economic a~pect~, Agriculture-relief (through v.19 when entries under this
suhheading cea~e), Agriculture-laws & legislation (through v.40 when entries under this suhheading cease)
and Farmers-political acti vities;
Futures Products = entries under commodity futures, interest rate futures, stock index futures and swaps;
CFTC = entries under the federal agency regulating futures, with heading changing over time, from Grain Futures
Administration to Commodity Futures Trading Commission;
SEC =entries under Securities and Exchange Commission;
All foreign country or international subheading and individual foreign future exchanges entries under the topics are
excluded;
..... indicates no such entry heading in volume;
"cross-ref' indicates entry cross references other entries only, indexing no articles;
(entry counts on a per year hasis in parentheses).
Source: Readers' Guide 10 Periodical Literature (vols. J-54)
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Table 2. Periodical Coverage, 1900-94 (continued).
Readers' 1964·71 1972-73 1974-75 1976-83 1984-87 1988-92 1993·94
Guide (v.24-JO) (v.3I·32) (v.33-34) (v.35·42) (v.43.47) (v.48.52) (v.53-54)
entry\vol
Commod 32 (4) 22 (II) 40 (20) 146 (1M) 29 (6) 46 (9) M(4)
Exch.
Stock 412 (52) 101 (51) M2 (41) 201 (25) 119 (24) 133 (27) 39 (20)
Exch.
Specu- 43 (5) 2 (I) 3 (2) 24(3) 45 (9) 28 (6) 10 (5)
lation
Agri- 148 (19) 25 (13) 30 (15) 161 (20) 197 (39) 79 (16) 23 (12)
culture
Food 91 (II) 22 (11) 73 (37) M2 (10) 14 (3) 24 (5) 3 (2)
Prices
Futures cross-ref cross-ref cross-ref 69 (9) 152 (30) 95 (19) 44 (22)
Products
CFTC 0(0) 0(0) 5 (3) 30 (4) 5 (1) 10 (2) 3 (2)
SEC 168 (21) 66 (33) 45 (23) 227 (28) 147 (29) 112 (22) 27 (14)
Notes:
Commod Exch. = entries under Commodity Exchanges, Individual Commodity Exchange and futures-related entries
under Grain Trade;
Stock Exch. = entries under Stock Exchanges and Wall Street;
Agriculture = entries under Agriculture-econontic aspects, Agriculture-relief (through v.19 when entries under this
subheading cease), Agriculture-laws & legislation (through v.4O when entries under this subheading cease)
and Farmers-political activities;
Futures Products = entries under commodity futures, interest rate futures, stock index futures and swaps;
CFTC = entries under the federal agency regulating futures, with heading changing over time, from Grain Futures
Adntinistration to Commodity Futures Trading Comntission;
SEC = entries under Securities and Exchange Commission;
All foreign country or international subheading and individual foreign future exchanges entries under the topics are
excluded;
"." indicates no such entry heading in VOlume;
"cross-ref' indicates entry cross references other entries only, indexing no articles;
(entry counts on a per year basis in parentheses).
Source: Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature (vals. I-54)
386
HeinOnline -- 14 Yale J. on Reg. 387 1997
The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation
Table 3. Vote on Future Trading Act of 1921 by Party and Region.
Region Democrats Republicans Other Total
New England
Yes 1 II 0 12
No 0 9 0 9
Not voting I 9 0 10
Northeast
Yes 8 20 I 29
No 1 27 0 28
Non voting 3 31 0 34
East North Central
Yes 0 55 0 55
No 3 16 0 19
Non voting 0 II 0 II
West North Central
Yes I 43 0 44
No 0 5 0 5
Non voting I 7 0 8
South
Yes 75 6 0 81
No 6 0 0 6
Non voting 14 I 0 15
Border
Yes 10 13 0 23
No 0 I 0 I
Non voting 3 4 0 7
West
Yes 3 22 0 25
No 0 I 0 (
Non voting I 6 0 7
Note:
The region code is as follows:
New England = Conn., Me., Mass., N.H., R.I., VI.;
Northeast = Del., N.J., N.Y., Pa.;
East North Central = III., Ind., Mich., Oh., Wis.;
West North Central = la., Ks., Minn., Mo., Neb.. N.D., S.D.;
South = Ala., Ark., Fla.. Ga., La., Miss., N.C., S.c., Tenn.. Tex., Va.;
Border = Ky., Md., Okla., W.Va.;
West = Ariz., Cal .• Colo.. (d., Mont., Nev., N.M., Ore., VI., Wash., Wyo.
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for 1921 House Vote Regression Variables
(n=312).
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
Vote .8173 1.0 0.0 .3870
FarmPop .3761 .7268 0.0 .2070
Wheat .0921 .4698 0.0 .0925
Conon .0692 .6193 0.0 .1363
ComEx .0288 1.0 0.0 .1676
AgCom .0577 1.0 0.0 .2335
South .2789 1.0 0.0 .4492
Party .3237 1.0 0.0 .4687
D-nominate(l ) .1173 .6020 -.6240 .3429
D-nomina1e(2) .0757 .4070 -.3860 .\348
PctBlack .1112 .8071 .0002 .1679
PctnIit .0609 .4083 .0006 .0588
PctDemPres .4214 .9771 .1250 .2007
ElectPct .6802 1.0 .4244 .1578
Tenns 2.9978 \3.0 0.5 2.2592
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Table 5. Logit Regressions of 1921 House Vote on Future Trading Act
(n=312).
Variable Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 ModelS
Constant 2.9163' U449 1.964M' 2.2609' -0.163H
(1.2367) (1.1034) (0.H316) (1.1256) (0.44H5)
ComEx -2.3119· -1.6762 -2.6030' -2.5637' -2.5744'
(1.0360) (0.9732) (1.0533) (1.0992) (1.120)
FarmPop -2.9813 -1.3666 . 1.7574 1.9536 6.2018'
(3.7549) (3.4540) (1.4980) (1.5200) (1.1756)
Wheat -1.2185 1.5905 -0.5493 -1.1369 3.5517
(3.1298) (2.7221) (3.0630) (3.2514) (2.6657)
Cotton -1.2200 -0.3332 -0.6315 0.IM30 -1.7444
(2.3857) (2.5417) (2.4192) (2.7687) (2.4167)
AgCom 1.9812 0.9664 1.6619 1.5102 0.M694























% Correctly 90.705 H5.577 90.3H5 90.705 85.H97
Predicted
Log -84.651 -105.37 -H4.73 -83.937 -100.36
Likelihood (.4293) (.2897) (.4288) (.4342) (.3234)
Jic;;i'eSSiOfl model: Proh(vote; = I) = I/(J + e'P-'; ); standard errors in parentheses below coefficienL~: ' =t-statistic
significant at .05 or less; goodness-of-fit measured hy log likelihood ratio index in parentheses helow log likelihmd.
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Table 6. Bills Introduced to Regulate or Prohibit Futures Trading,
by Congress, 1901·96.
Congress No. Bills Congress No. Bills
57th 1 81st 3
58th 3 82nd 4
59th 8 83rd 7
.60th 22 84th 10
61st 20 85th II
62nd 44 86th 5
63rd 29 87th 4
64th 7 88th 13
65th 22 89th 7
66th 15 90th 7
a 67th 21 91st 2
68th 15 92nd 2
69th 12 c93rd 16
70th 18 94th 6
71st 22 95th II
72nd 13 96th 3
73rd 15 97th 9
b 74th 8· 98th 4
75th 3 99th 7
76th 4 looth 5
77th I IOlst 9
78th 0 d 102nd 5
79th I 103rd 6
80th 1 100th 5
Major Ellactmellls:
a Futures Trading Act of 1921;
b Commodity Exchange Act of 1936;
c Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974;
d Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992.
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Table 7. 1932-36 Congressional Witnesses
(4 hearings before agriculture committees).
Witness type Number For Number Against
farm organization or farmer 3H 6
Grain trade 0 21
Millers I 10
Boards of trade (exchanges) 0 32
Bankers 0 3
Members of Congress 4 0
Executive hranch officials 9 0
Miscellaneous 2 4
Total testifying 54 76
Note: In this tahle. grain trade includes conon trade and hrokerage firms.
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Table 8. Vote on Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 by Party and Region.
Region Democrats Repuhlicans Other Total
New England
Yes 2 I 0 3
No 4 5 0 9
NOl Voting 0 0 0 0
Northea..t
Yes 1 I 0 2
No 3 3 0 6
Not Voting 0 0 0 0
Ea..t North Central
Yes 5 2 1 8
No 1 0 0 1
Not Voting 1 0 0 1
West North Central
Yes 6 4 2 12
No 0 0 0 0
Not Voting 0 2 0 2
South
Yes 17 0 0 17
No 0 0 0 0
Not Voting 6 0 0 6
Border
Yes 5 0 0 5
No 2 0 0 2
Not Voting 2 0 0 2
West
Yes 14 5 1 19
No 0 0 0 0
Not Voting 3 0 0 3
Note:
The region code is as follows:
New England = Conn., Me., Ma.'5., N.H., R.I., Vt.;
Northea..t = Del., N.J., N.Y., Pa.;
East North Central = 01., Ind., Mich., Oh., Wis.;
West North Central = la., Ks., Minn., Mo., Neh., N.D., S.D.;
South = Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., La., Miss., N.C., S.C., Tenn., Tex., Va.;
Border = Ky., Md., Okla., W.Va.;
West = Ariz., Cal., Colo., Id., Mont., Nev., N.M., are., Ut., Wa..h., Wyo.
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for 1936 Senate Vote Regression Variables
(n=78).
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
Vote .7692 I 0 .4241
Farmpop .2734 .6781 .024 .1654
Wheat .1293 .5319 0 .1392
Conon .0678 .3939 0 .1205
Comex .0513 1 0 .2220
Unregex .0513 I 0 .2220
AIlex .1026 1 0 .3054
Agcom .1795 1 0 .3862
South .2051 I 0 .4064
Party .7564 1 0 .4320
D-nominate(I ) -.1720 .763 -.653 .3511
D-nominate(2) .0566 .912 -.608 .2395
PctBlack .0875 .5024 .0006 .1247
Pctlllit .000005 .00005 .0000003 .000008
PctDemPres .6171 .9803 .4108 .1396
HouseD(I) -.1055 .4895 -.383 .2510
HouseD(2) -.0089 .299 -.363 .1478
ElectPct .6330 I .434 .1556
Tenns 1.0620 4.33 0 1.1362
Upin36 .2564 1 0 .4395
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Table 10, Logit Regressions of 1936 Senate Vote on Commodity
Exchange Act (n=78),
Variable Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 ModelS
Constant 5.6509 2.62g0 -2.3630 4.1429 2.1193
(4.9749) (2.2336) (1.1417) (4.1320) (l9.2X3)
AlIEx -g.5220 -X.0567 -9.4929 -9.6369 -3.4257
(44.563) (52.219) (105.52) (72.409) (3.7855)
FannPop -.5g34 -1.2171 14.52X' 14.018 6.2678
(15.165) (7.4g26) (5.7707) (8.3624) (18.424)
WheatAcr 9.109 10.550 5.3451 7.3840
(11.516) (7.0114) (5.1442) (7.9691)
CononAcr 11889 18333.7 21410.6 19529.9
(128519) (150551) (304108) (208672)
AgCom -3.3225 -1.6263 -.3603 -2.3686 -1.0267






























% Correctly 96.154 91.026 91.026 96.154 94.872
Predicted
Log Likelihood -6.2136 -14.199 -14.437 -7.6621 -6.4451
(.8525) (.6630) (.6574) (.8182) (.8470)
Reliressioll model: Proh(vote; =I) =1/(1 + e'W'; ); std. errors in parentheses; , =t-statistic significant at ,05 or less;
goodness-of-fit measured hy log likelihood ratio index in parentheses below log likelihood.
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(4 disagreeing pairs of 37 voting pairs)
Notes:
The expected match rate is p2 + (I_p)2, where p is the observed probability of a yes vote
on the roll-call; the observed match rate is the ratio of matched pairs to total pairs; the
constituent model is the proportion of classification successes where matched pairs count
as 2 successes and disagreeing pairs as 1 success and 1 error; the political party model
adjusts the constituent model's number of successes by counting disagreeing pairs where
the senators are from different political parties as 2 successes; the ideology model is the
proportion of classification successes when senators are ordered .by the frrst dimension of
the d-nominate score and the cutoff is chosen that minimizes classification error.
References: Keith Krehbiel, Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences, 76
PUBLIC CHOICE 21 (1993); Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Are Legislators
Ideologues or the Agents of Constituents?, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 707 (1996).
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Table 12. 1973-74 Congressional Witnesses
(3 hearings before agriculture committees).
House House House Senate Senate Senate No
Witness type For Against NoOp. For Against Op.
Farm organization 2 3 I 2 5 I
Grain organization 2 2 4 2 3 I
Board~ of Trade 0 12 3 I 3 2
Futures industry 2 2 6 4 I 0
Members of 5 0 0 5 0 0
Congress
Executive branch 0 I I 0 I I
officials
State government I 0 0 0 0 1
officials
Metals industry 0 0 4 3 0 2
Consumer groups 2 0 0 2 0 0
Miscellaneous 2 I 2 7 0 4
Total testifyi ng 16 21 21 26 13 IS
Testimony "for" indicates support for independent agency outside of Agricultural Department, "against" indicates
opposition to independent agency (those testifying for independent agency inside Department are classified as
"against," as are Senate witnesses supporting enacted House bill that established new agency in Department) and
"no op," indicates no position expressed on the independent agency issue, whether or not the witness was a~ked
about it; three Senate witnesses (one farm and two grain organizations) with conflicting testimony on the issue
excluded; includes 12 House and IS Senate letter-writers,
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Table 13. Vote on Sisk Amendment by Party and Region.
Region Democrats Republicans Total
New England
Yes 9 5 14
No 0 3 3
Not voting 6 2 X
Northeast
Yes 23 6 29
No 5 24 29
Non voting 16 6 22
East North Central
Yes 25 4 29
No 4 35 39
Non voting X 10 IX
West North Central
Yes 15 3 IX
No 0 12 12
Non voting 3 2 5
Soulb
Yes 25 0 25
No 23 29 52
Non voting 26 5 31
Border
Yes X I 9
No 9 4 13
Non voting 0 2 2
West
Yes 32 2 34
No 3 28 31
Non voting 7 5 12
Note:
The region code is as follows:
New England = Conn., Me., Mass., N.H., R.I., Vt.;
Northea~t = Del., N.J., N.Y., Pa.;
Ea~t North Central = Ill., Ind., Mich., Oh., Wis.;
West North Central = la., Ks., Minn., Mo., Neh., N.D., S.D.;
Soulb = Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga.. La., Miss., N.C., S.C., Tenn.. Tex.. Va.:
Border = Ky., Md., Okla., W.Va.;
West = Alask., Ariz., Cal., Colo., Ha., Id., Mont., Nev., N.M., Ore., Ut., Wa~h .. Wyo.
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Table 14. Descriptive Statistics for 1974 House Vote Regression Variables
(n=337).
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
Vote .46XX \.0 0.0 .499X
FarmPop .043\ .2X75 0.0 .0579
Comex .03X6 \.0 0.0 .\929
AgCom .0920 \.0 0.0 .2X94
Party .537\ \.0 0.0 .4994
South .2285 \.0 0.0 .4205
D-nominate(l ) -.0\53 .7490 -.65\0 .2957
D-nominate(2) -.0219 .4280 -.4080 .1724
PctBlack .1067 .X900 .0000 .\459
P~1College .1073 .3407 .031\ .0465
PctDemPres .3X05 .9000 .1300 .11 XO
MedAge 42.9 58.6 34.0 2.941
Medlncome 9649.2 17102 5320 2015
E1ectPct .6728 \.0 .4300 .136X
Tenns 4.9 20.0 0.0 3.8X7
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Table 15. Logit Regressions of 1974 House Vote on Sisk Amendment
(n=337).
Variable Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant -0.2633 -0.2326 -1.3294' 0.4596
(0.2153) (0.1979) (0.5579) (3.4557)
ComEx 1.2765 0.7946 1.0908 1.2599
(1.2520) (1.2677) (1.2171) (1.1607)
FarmPop -0.5548 0.3646 0.9245 5.6703
(3.2895) (2.9070) (3.2991) (4.1162)
AgCom 0.0054 -0.0161 0.0190 0.1551



























%Correct 84.57 80.119 83.68 84.57
Log Likelihood -123.89 -142.12 -122.55 -116.12
(.4682) (.3899) (.4739) (.5015)
Regressioll model: Prob(vote; = I) = 1/(1 + e-W';); std. errors in parentheses; '= t-statistic
significant at .05 or less; goodness-of-fit measured by log likelihood ratio index in parentheses
below log likelihood.
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Table 16. 93d Congress Ideology Comparisons across Chambers.
Senate House Between chamber test-
(n=100) (n=434) statistic·
Chamber Median -0.126 -0.01 •4.44
Agr. Comm. Median 0.169 0,02 1.69
Non-Comm. Median -0.156 -0.014 •6.79
Chamber Mean -0.093 -0.045 1.33
Agr. Comm. Mean 0.044 0.03 -0.13






n = number of observations; Agr. Comm. = members of chamber's Agriculture Committee, the committee with
jurisdiction over commodity futures regulation (n= 13 for Senate, 35 for House); Non-Comm. = chamber members
not on Agriculture Committee
a Chi-square test for difference in median~ across chambers; t-test for difference in means across chambers
h Chi-square test for difference in median~ between committee and non-committee members within chamber; t-test
for difference in means between committee and non-committee members within chamber
• Significant at .05.
Ideology scores are first-dimension of Poole and Rosenthal common space w-nominate score estimated for the 93rd
Congress
Reference: K.EITIi T. POOLE, RECOVERING A BAStC SPACE FROM A SET OF ISSUE SCALES, (Carnegie-Mellon
University, Graduate School of Industrial Adntinistration Working Paper #44-H2-H3, 1996).
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Table 17. 1990-91 Congressional Witnesses
(5 hearings on jurisdictional issues).
Witness type Banking Banking Agric. Agric. Comm.,
Comm.,# Comm.,# Comm.,#For # Against
For Against
Farm/grain organization 0 3 0 4
Investment managers 4 I 0 ()
Securities industry 4 0 I 0
Stock exchanges 7 0 3 0
Boards of trade (exchanges) 0 2 0 6
Members of Congress I 0 3 (J
Executive branch officials 11 5 7 3
Futures industry 0 3 0 3
Miscellaneous 7 0 2 0
Total testifying 34 14 16 16
• Testimony for indicates support for shifting jurisdiction away from the CFTC to the SEC, testimony against,
opposition to the shift of jurisdiction; three witnesses, of which two took no position on the issue and one lOok a
mixed position. are not included in the tally.
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Table 18. 1989·91 Congressional Witnesses
(3 hearings before agriculture committees).
Witness type• Number For Number Against
Farm organization 5 0
Grain organization 0 12
Boards of trade (exchanges) 0 22
Futures industry 4 10
Members of Congress I 2
Executive branch officials 1 0
Miscellaneous 2 1
Total testifying: 13 47
• Testimony for indicates support for increased regulation by the CFTC over futures markets or for shifting
jurisdiction away from the CFfC to the SEC; testimony against indicates opposition 10 increased regulation or shift
of jurisdiction; eight witnesses who took mixed positions excluded from tally.
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Table 19. Descriptive Statistics for 1991 Senate Vote Regression
Variables (n=58).
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
Vote .3448 1 0 .4795
FarmPop .4386 .961 .003 .2596
ComEx .0862 I 0 .2831
StockEx .0172 1 0 .1313
AgCom .1379 1 0 .3478
BankCom .1552 I 0 .3652
FutContrib $2,348 $11.000 0 $3.239
SecContrib $6,313 $37.400 0 $8,284
Party .6035 1 0 .4935
South .2069 I 0 .4086
D-nominate(l ) -.2577 .933 -.998 .5709
D-nominate(2) .0692 .996 -.834 .4007
PctBlack .0935 .344 0 .0968
PctCollege .1997 .272 .123 .0368
PcDemPres .4466 .56 .32 .0578
Medlncome $29.927 $40.805 $22,137 $4.861
Over65 .1245 .183 .041 .0203
HouseD(I) -.0634 .657 -.7325 .4432
HouseD(2) -.0326 .599 -.6598 .2662
Incumbent .7931 1 0 .4086
TotPAC $932.465 $2,438.040 0 $453.063
Election Margin· .2234 .598 -.019 .1709
• This variable ha< only 45 observations.
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Table 20. Probit Regressions of 1991 Senate Vote
on Bond-Wirth Amendment.
Variable Modell Model 2 Model 3 (Tobit) Model 4 (Tobit)
Constant -.6752 .0451 -.9541 -.3054
(.5621) (1.1245) (.7046) (1.1106)
ComEx -.7332 -.5074 .0428 .2252
(1.0817) ( 1.0396) (1.0793) (.9722)
FarmPop -1.7079 -2.1484" -1.4817 -1.8472"
(1.2505) (1.1924) (1.1643) (1.0851)
StockEx 1.4517 1.3097 .0509 -.1268
(52.78) (57.60) (44.60) (48.52)
AgCom -2.4581 -2.5491 -2.4782 -2.4712
(15.90) (15.00) (14.78) (13.76)
BankCom 1.4698" 1.4724" .9945 .8925
(.7161) (.6952) (.6838) (.6710)
FutContrih -.00014 -.00018" -.0001 -.00017
(.0001) (.00009) (.0001) (.00012)
SecContrih .0001" .00012" .0001 .00014"















Numherof 58 64 58 64
Ohservations
% Correctly 87.931 84.375 79.31 82.813
Predicted
Log Likelihood -19.151 -19.562 -21.514 -22.366
(.4874) (.5170) (.4242) (.4478)
Regression model: Proh(votei = I) = F(Wx;) = Ill, tlle normal distrihution; log likelihood is given hy: logL=
ry;log<IJ(Wx;) + r(1 - y;)log(1 - IIl(Wx;»; std. errors in parentheses; " = I-statistic significant at .05 or less;
goodness-of-fit measured hy log likelihood ratio index in parentheses below log likelihood; IOhit models estimate
wntrihutions in a first-stage tohit (censored) regression and use the fined values in a second-stage prohit regression
of votes.
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Table 20. Probit Regressions of 1991 Senate Vote on
Bond-Wirth Amendment (continued).
Variable Model 5 (Tobit) Model 6 (Tobit) Model 7 Model II
Constant -1.2820' -.0278 -.0167 .4324
(.6917) (1.0644) (.4150) (.6178)
ComEx .0327 .2559 -.0148 .0200
(1.0104) (.9511) (.6026) (.5794)
FarmPop -1.3891 -1.9464' -1.9069' -1.9897'
(1.0512) (.9834) (.97X6) (.9166)
StockEx -2.9562 -2.1412 -.8080 -.8062











D-nominate( 1) -2.6803 -1.4596











No. Observations 58 64 90 98
% Correctly 79.31 87.5 78.889 78.751
Predicted
Log Likelihood -23.039 -23.924 -34.625 -37.413
(.3834) (.4093) (.4089) (.4024)
Regression model: Prob(vote, = I) = F(jrx,) = <1>, tlle nonnal distribution; log likelihood is given hy: logL=
1:y,Jog<1>(I3'x,) + 1:(1 - y,)log(l - <1>(I3'x,»; std. errors in parentheses; , = t-statistic significant at .05 or less;
goodness-of·fit measured by log likelihood ratio index in parentheses below log likelihood; tobit models estimate
contributions in a first-stage tobit (censored) regression and use the fined values in a second-stage prohit regression
of votes.
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Table 21. Match Rates for Voting Senators, Paired by State




















(14 disagreeing pairs of 48 voting pairs)
Notes:
The expected match rate is p2 + (1-pf, where p is the observed probability of·a yes vote
on the roll-call; the observed match rate is the ratio of matched pairs to total pairs; the
constituent model is the proportion of classification successes where matched pairs count
as 2 successes and disagreeing pairs as 1 success and I error; the political party model
adjusts the constituent model's number of successes by counting disagreeing pairs where
the senators are from the different political parties as 2 successes; the ideology model is
the proportion of classification successes when senators are ordered by the first dimension
of the d-nominate score and the cutoff is chosen that minimizes classification error.
References: Keith Krehbiel, Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences, 76
PUB CHOICE 21 (1993); Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Are Legislators Ideologues
or the Agents ofConstituents?, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 707 (1996).
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